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ABSTRACT 
In 2009, the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps started merging its two SOF units 
into one: The Netherlands Maritime Special Operation Forces (NL MARSOF). 
This newly formed unit is envisioned as a unique mixture of “traditional” maritime 
special operations and national counter-terrorism capabilities. Even though the 
creation of NL MARSOF marks significant progress in the professionalization of 
Dutch maritime SOF, new challenges in determining its strategic utility and 
cultural differences between NL MARSOF’s sub-units hamper its optimal 
development and effectiveness. 
Based on an organizational model of unit culture and a theoretical 
framework based on SOF’s strategic utility, this research explored how NL 
MARSOF can better unify its culture and clarify its strategic utility. Governing 
document analysis, survey research, and interviews with key members of NL 
MARSOF revealed several shortcomings that should be addressed in order to 
improve NL MARSOF’s effectiveness and ensure its survival during times in 
which the Dutch Ministry of Defense faces the largest budget cutbacks in its 
history.  
The survey results and interviews indicate that NL MARSOF is 
experiencing a sort of “identity crisis.” Even though NL MARSOF leadership has 
focused on (infra-)structural elements of the reorganization, it failed to define and 
communicate a clear mission supported by the majority of the community, and 
thus offered neither a sense of purpose nor sufficient guidance. This lack of a 
long-term vision set out in strategic direction now negatively affects the overall 
performance of NL MARSOF. The way forward is to get NL MARSOF members 
involved in the process of defining the unit’s “way ahead.”  
Strategic management sessions will define the way ahead for NL 
MARSOF, thereby clarifying its strategic utility. These sessions are the vital first 
step in improving operational effectiveness. A working group on symbols & 
 vi 
traditions will give NL MARSOF its much-needed professional “face” and provide 
the symbols (logos, insignias, traditions, and customs) to strengthen the shared 
system of beliefs and values and thus create a stronger unit culture. Finally, 
training courses in change management and team-building sessions will help 
smooth the transition to one NL MARSOF. 
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I. TRANSFORMATION TO NL MARITIME SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES (NL MARSOF)  
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DUTCH MARITIME SOF 
Dutch maritime Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability resides within 
the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. Until 2008, this maritime SOF capability 
consisted of three distinct units: the Dutch Frogmen Platoon, the Mountain 
Leader Reconnaissance Troop, and the Unit Intervention Marines.  
The oldest of these units is the Dutch Frogmen Platoon, a specialized 
diving unit created in 1959.1  Its original task was to conduct demolition and 
sabotage missions on ships, as done numerous times by British and Italian 
frogmen during World War II.2 Over the last fifty years, the Dutch Frogmen 
Platoon developed into a small maritime special operations unit able to conduct 
the full spectrum of special operations,3 although it naturally specialized in diving 
operations. The Dutch Frogmen historically have had a strong connection with 
the UK Special Boat Service (UK SBS).4  
The second unit, the Mountain Leader Reconnaissance Troop (ML Recce 
Troop), was formed in 1990 and modeled after the UK Brigade Patrol Troop 
                                            
1 Fifty years of Frogmen in the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps [50 Jaar Kikvorsmannen bij 
het Korps Mariniers] (Den Helder: Royal Netherlands Navy, 2010). 
2 John Parker, SBS: the inside Story of the Special Boat Service (London: Headline, 2004). 
3 The NATO SOF HQ identifies four principle special operation tasks:  (1) Special 
Reconnaissance and Surveillance, (2) Direct Action, (3) Military Assistance, and (4) additional 
activities of Allied Joint Special Operations Forces. Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
[NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special 
Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, January 2009) 
4 The UK SBS is a Special Forces unit that specializes in special operations at sea, along 
coastlines and on river networks. The SBS also has a team on standby for maritime counter-
terrorism (MCT) operations. Source: “Special Boat Service,” http://www.specialboatservice.co.uk/ 
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(UKBPT) of the UK Royal Marines.5 The ML Recce Troop’s primary mission was 
to serve as a long-range special reconnaissance unit for all the operational 
battalions of the Dutch Marines. Most of its members get their initial training from 
the Mountain Leader Cadre of the UK Royal Marines and, therefore, have a 
strong connection with the members of the UK BPT. The ML Recce Troop 
quickly evolved into a small troop able to conduct full-spectrum special 
operations in mountainous and arctic environments.6  
The Dutch government formed the third unit, the Unit Intervention Marines 
(UIM), on 22 February 1973, in response to a rising threat of terrorist attacks in 
Europe.7 The most infamous of these terrorist assaults was perpetrated during 
the Olympic Games in Munich, when Palestine militants of the Black September 
terrorist organization murdered 11 Israeli athletes. The German police were 
improperly equipped and unprepared to deal with such assaults. Their rescue 
attempt failed.8 The Dutch government realized the need to protect the nation 
against such incidents.  
The UIM focuses solely on countering national terrorist threats. The Royal 
Netherlands Marine Corps was assigned to form this special counterterrorism 
unit from a selection of its members. At its inception, the unit was named 
Bijzondere Bijstandseenheid (trans. Special Assistance Unit). In 2006, as a result 
of a classified government efficiency report, the Dienst Speciale Interventies 
                                            
5 UK BPT is a special reconnaissance unit within 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines. 
Brigade Patrol Troop (BPT) will insert ahead of an amphibious landing or other RM operation to 
gather intelligence on the surrounding area. The Marines of the Brigade Patrol Troop are 
comparable in role and proficiency to the Para’s Pathfinder Platoon. While not technically special 
forces, they are certainly an elite within an elite. Source: “Elite UK Forces, Brigade Patrol Troop,” 
http://www.eliteukforces.info/royal-marines/brigade-reconnaissance-force/ 
6 Head of the Netherlands Center of Expertise in Military Operations Under Extreme 
Environmental Circumstances (KCMox), conversation with author, Doorn, the Netherlands, 
December, 2010.  
7 Royal Netherland Navy Staff, Unit Intervention Marines manual [Handboek Unit Interventie 
Mariniers] (Den Helder, the Netherlands: 2011). 
8 In reaction to the failed rescue attempt, the German government created the GSG-9 
(Grenzschutzgruppe 9) in 1972 as a special counter-terrorism unit within the German national 




(DSI) was created as a special national police service responsible for all 
domestic counterterrorism activities. The DSI formed its own Intervention Unit 
and Support Unit to counter small-scale terrorism. The Bijzondere 
Bijstandseenheid changed its name to Unit Intervention Marines; it acts as a 
counterterrorist force in the event of large-scale or specific terrorist threats. 
During operations, the UIM resides under the operational command of the DSI. 
Figure 1 depicts a simplified (unclassified) version of the organizational structure 
for the UIM. 
 
Figure 1.   Organization of Unit Intervention Marines 
In March 2008, the Dutch Frogmen Platoon and the ML Recce Troop 
merged into the Maritime Special Operations Company (MSO-Coy) and were 
tasked with all amphibious shaping operations for the Royal Netherlands Navy, 
including cliff assaults and maritime special operations.9 The organizational chart 
below shows a simplified (unclassified) version of the organizational structure for 
the MSO-Coy. 
                                            
9 Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Reorganization plan: integration Amphibious Support 
Battalion & Fighting Support Battalion [Reorganisatieplan Integreren AMFOSTBAT & 
GEVSTBAT] (Den Helder, the Netherlands: 2007). 
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Figure 2.   Organization of Maritime Special Operations Company 
In retrospect, the creation of the MSO-Coy in 2008 can be seen as the first 
step in forming a new and better-organized maritime SOF unit.10 Finally, in 2009 
the senior members of the MSO-Coy and the UIM took the initiative to merge 
their units into one, The Netherlands Maritime Special Operation Forces (NL 
MARSOF). This merger is still informal, but the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps 
(RNLMC) staff is developing the necessary reorganization plans to approve the 
formal creation of NL MARSOF.11  Within these plans, NL MARSOF will still be 
one of the subunits of the RNLMC, under direct command of the Commandant of 
the RNLMC. NL MARSOF will consist of three squadron-size units. 
Conventional-Squadron (C-Squadron) is tasked with full spectrum special 
operations outside the Netherlands, and Maritime-Squadron (M-Squadron) is 
dedicated to national counterterrorism missions under operational command of 
the DSI. Training-Squadron (T-Squadron) will support both M-Squadron and C-
                                            
10 Based on author’s own experience with the MSO-Coy, in addition to views expressed 
through conversations with NL MARSOF personnel.  
11 Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Policy proposal: restructuring Netherlands Maritime Special 
Operations Forces (NL MARSOF) core capacity [Beleidsvoornemen: herschikken kerncapaciteit 
Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces (NL MARSOF)] (Den Helder, the Netherlands: 
Royal Netherlands Navy, 2011). 
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Squadron in their training and is responsible for the selection of new members of 
NL MARSOF.12 The organizational chart below illustrates the desired 
organizational structure and position of NL MARSOF. On an informal basis, the 
units are already partly working within this structure. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Organization and Position of NL MARSOF 
The initiative to create NL MARSOF had two main justifications. Firstly, 
the separation of the relatively small SOF units within the Dutch Royal Navy 
                                            
12 Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Policy proposal: restructuring Netherlands Maritime Special 
Operations Forces (NL MARSOF) core capacity [Beleidsvoornemen: herschikken kerncapaciteit 
Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces (NL MARSOF)] (Den Helder, the Netherlands: 
Royal Netherlands Navy, 2011). 
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made SOF management inefficient and SOF operational capability unbalanced. 
The imbalance arose from the difference in operational demand between 
maritime SOF and domestic CT forces. Over the last decade, the demand for 
SOF has grown exponentially, but demand for domestic CT forces remained 
relatively stable. Constant SOF deployments abroad overstretched the teams of 
MSO-Coy, while the teams of the UIM were tied to stand-by missions in the 
Netherlands. The dislocation between the MSO-Coy and the UIM and the 
difference in hierarchal position within the RNLMC organizational structure 
contributed to the lack of efficiency in allocation management of Navy SOF 
operations.13 The merger of MSO-Coy and the UIM will enable a more efficient 
management of scarce SOF. The creation of NL MARSOF resolves the issue of 
organizational position, which will improve the allocation management.  
Secondly, other Dutch units tasked with special operations and national 
counterterrorism responsibilities have emerged over recent years. All “bid for” 
different SOF tasks and missions, increasing the competition to the MSO-Coy 
and UIM at the national level. The larger Dutch ARMY SOF unit (The Dutch 
Commandos) has professionalized immensely, becoming a well-respected force 
within the Netherlands Defense Forces. It thus has an increasingly strong 
position over the MSO-Coy in national-level prioritization of different SOF tasks 
and missions. The creation of the national special police service DSI, with its own 
Intervention Unit, has also increased the “competition” with the UIM in the 
national allocation of the already limited CT tasks.14 The merger of MSO-Coy and 
UIM into one larger and better-organized NL MARSOF having unified 
management and greater operational endurance will give the maritime SOF units 
a better position towards the “competition.” 
                                            
13 The UIM and MSO are located on different bases. In addition, the commander of the UIM 
is placed higher in the RNLMC chain of command than the commander of the MSO-Coy. 
14 Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Short study on enhancing SOF capabilities of the Royal 
Netherlands Navy [Korte Studie naar versterking van de SOF capaciteit van CZSK] (Den Helder, 
the Netherlands: 18 November 2009).  
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Figure 4 shows the evolution of NL MARSOF up to mid-2011, which is the 
planned date to formalize the creation of NL MARSOF.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Timeline: Evolution of NL MARSOF 
In a 1989 Marine Corps Gazette article, William Lind, Keith Nightengale, 
and John Schmitt described and predicted the changing nature of warfare. They 
divided the history of warfare into three generations and argued that we were 
entering the fourth generation of warfare, in which weaker forces are increasingly 
adopting unconventional methods (such as terrorism) to defeat stronger foes.15 
In 2007, John Robb described this Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) as the 
“death of conventional warfare and the rise of unconventional warfare,” in which 
the use of insurgent and terrorist proxies serve as the primary means of warfare 
between state and non-state actors.16 As a result of these particularly new 
security challenges of 4GW, the international community, as well as the National 
Dutch decision making branch, recognize the increasing generic need for SOF 
                                            
15 William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton, and Gary I. 
Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Marine Corps Gazette 85, no. 
11 (Nov, 2001): 65–68. 
16John Robb, Brave New War – The next stage of terrorism and the end of globalization 
(Wiley, New Jersey: 2007), 24. 
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capability and maritime SOF capability in particular.17 The recent increase in 
actual SOF missions and overall demand for Dutch SOF capability gives ample 
evidence for this increased need.18 These changes in the operating environment 
only further strengthen the initial reasons to professionalize maritime SOF units 
and form NL MARSOF. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
A practical purpose of this thesis is to help improve the operational 
effectiveness of the newly formed Maritime Special Operations Forces 
(NL MARSOF). By investigating its strategic utility and organizational culture, the 
thesis makes recommendations to unify NL MARSOF’s members in culture and 
clarify strategic utility, in order to ultimately improve the operational effectiveness 
of NL MARSOF.  
Because NL MARSOF is still an informal organization, procedures and 
organizational design are fluid and amenable to reasonable change In addition, 
the recent growth of and organizational changes within the Joint Special 
                                            
17 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC), The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Special Operations Forces Study (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, December 2008.); North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special 
Operations Coordination Center (NSCC), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) 
(Mons: Belgium: NSCC, January 2009); North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], Military 
Committee Decision 437/1, Special Operations Policy (June 11 2006). Minister of Defense (NL), 
The Netherlands Defense Forces, to serve worldwide [Defensie, Wereldwijd Dienstbaar] (Den 
Haag, the Netherlands, 18 September 2007),14; Ministry of Defense (NL), Study: Special 
Operations Forces moving to 2020 (Den Haag, the Netherlands: MoD, 2010); Royal Netherlands 
Navy Staff, Maritime strategy. The Royal Netherlands Navy in 2030, for security on and from the 
sea [Maritieme Visie, De Koninklijke marine in 2030, Voor veiligheid op en vanuit zee] (Den 
Helder, the Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Navy, March, 2009); Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, 
The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps Commandant vision 2015 [De Visie van de Commandant 
van het Korps Mariniers op de Ontwikkeling van het Korps tot 2015] (Den Helder, the 
Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Navy, 2008). 
18 Post 9/11, the Dutch SOF troops have been constantly deployed in various missions in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavian countries, and the Horn of Africa. In the former 
Yugoslavian countries, Dutch SOF has conducted detention operations to bring PIFWC’s 
(Persons Indicted for War Crimes) to trial in the International War Tribunal in Scheveningen, the 
Netherlands. In southern Iraq, Dutch SOF has conducted various HUMINT and offensive 
operations by deploying Field HUMINT Teams (and other special mission units). In Afghanistan 
they have been part of OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom). As Task Force Orange, they were 
embedded in Task Force Uruzgan in the South of Afghanistan as Special Task Unit Viper, and 
they were part of ISAF SOF as Task Force 55. For the last few years Dutch SOF have embarked 
on Dutch Naval vessels to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa.  
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Operations Branch of the Operations Staff of The Netherlands Defense Forces 
makes a holistic analysis of Dutch maritime special operations forces prudent.19  
C. TARGET AUDIENCE 
The findings of this thesis are for the use of the NL MARSOF community. 
In the proper spirit of SOF, the early initiative by senior members of NL MARSOF 
to form this new organization showed dedication, innovation, and boldness. The 
previously mentioned internal and external pressures induced the strong urge to 
change and improve Dutch maritime SOF units. However, the rapidity of this 
organizational change for the MSO-Coy and UIM has resulted in new challenges 
for NL MARSOF that must be addressed.  
The thesis addresses a research problem recognized by NL MARSOF and 
the RNLMC. The problem requires a holistic analysis to determine and optimize 
operational effectiveness in order for the NL MARSOF to survive as a new 
organization and meet the challenges of the 21st century. The research findings 
will be outlined in a formal report to the Commanding General of the Royal 
Netherlands Marine Corps, the Commander of all the fighting units of the 
RNLMC, the Commander of The Netherlands Maritime Special Operations 
Forces (NL MARSOF), and the head of the Joint Special Operations Branch of 
the Operational Staff of The Netherlands Defense Forces.  
D. THE PROBLEM 
1. History Explored 
In Commandos and Politicians, Eliot Cohen examines the birth and 
evolution of elite units. He studied U.S., British, French, and Israeli elite military 
units to describe the developmental stages of elite units.20 Cohen was primarily 
interested in the interplay of civil-military affairs related to elite units, and he 
                                            
19 Head of Joint Special Operations Branch Netherlands MoD, conversation with author, Den 
Haag, the Netherlands, 13 December, 2010 
20 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians – Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978). 
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emphasized the political aspects that appear at the birth of elite units and the 
difficulties these new elite units face in their struggle with bureaucratic 
predators.21 The survival of new elite units depends on: (1) their ability to quickly 
show their military utility to military leaders; (2) their natural appeal to influential 
sponsors in their “romantic image of war”; and (3) the political benefits SOF 
offers to politicians.22  As Cohen writes:  
An elite unit must be justifiable to a degree if it is to exist at all. In 
order to grow, however, it must either attract a high-level patron of 
the romantic type or offer political benefits to less heroically-minded 
politicians.23  
Elite units, therefore, sometimes undertake missions to prove their worth to 
regular army and political skeptics. For example, the British SAS took on tasks 
during WWII for which they were neither suited nor equipped, for no other reason 
than to prove their adaptability to circumstances and insure their organizational 
survivability after the war.24 In her book Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. 
Special Operations Forces,25 Susan Marquis stresses the necessity for 
“bureaucratic guerillas” during this initial phase of SOF units’ existence. This 
coalition of passionate, capable, and experienced SOF supporters, which 
                                            
21 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians – Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 27. 
22 The military utility of SOF can be describes as the unit’s ability to conduct full spectrum 
special operations. Source: Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians – Elite Military Units in 
Modern Democracies (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978). 
“Special Operations are military activities conducted by specially designed, organized, trained 
and equipped forces using operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to 
conventional forces. These activities are conducted across the full range of military operations 
independently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve political, 
military, psychological and economic objectives. Politico-military considerations may require 
clandestine, covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a degree of physical and 
political risk not associated with conventional operations.” Source: North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO], Military Committee Decision 437/1, Special Operations Policy (June 11 
2006). This distinctiveness in missions for SOF defines the “organizational essence” of elite units, 
i.e. SOF.    
23 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians – Elite Military Units in Modern Democracies 
(Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 56. 
24 Ibid., 59. 
25 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare – Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 266. 
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promotes and protects the interests of SOF, is vital to the survival of the 
organization. Like Cohen, she also points out the predicament in which new SOF 
units find themselves.  
In his book U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action,26 Thomas Adams 
also underscores the hard struggle new SOF units face in “the bureaucratic 
jungle.” He describes the tough bureaucratic environment of internal rivalry, the 
vital importance of competent sponsors to protect SOF interests, and the 
adaptations SOF had to make towards conventional units to be accepted. Even 
though Adams predominantly focuses on Army SOF, the parallels with Cohen’s 
and Marquis’ findings are remarkable. David Tucker and Christopher Lamb also 
describe the particular struggle of several U.S. SOF units during their birth and 
evolution in their book United States Special Operations Forces,27 and they 
describe the recurring tensions between conventional and unconventional, i.e., 
special forces. Therefore, Tucker and Lamb highlighted the vital importance of 
good performance during the first operations in which SOF units from U.S. 
SOCOM were showcased almost directly after its activation.28 The detailed 
description of the problems the new U.S. SOF units faced, as described by 
Tucker, Lamb, Marquis, and Adams, serve as lessons learned to prepare other 
new SOF units in their own struggle.  
NL MARSOF appears to face the same political and organizational 
pressure that Cohen identified almost 35 years ago, and that Tucker and Lamb, 
Adams, and Marquis described in the case of U.S. SOF. Even though the original 
units that form NL MARSOF have a solid “elite reputation of bravura and 
success,” NL MARSOF is the new kid on the military block and needs to build on 
creating a new, unique, elite reputation based on success. Recent Dutch SOF 
deployments (after the attacks on the World Trade Center on 11 September 
                                            
26 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action – The challenge of 
Unconventional Warfare (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). 
27 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 
28 Ibid., 99. 
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2001) have demonstrated the political benefits of SOF to Dutch politicians.29 
Nevertheless, as history has demonstrated for most new SOF units, NL 
MARSOF is likely to struggle with its modern-day bureaucratic predators, and it 
needs to demonstrate its specific military utility to the political and military 
leadership. If the initiative of NL MARSOF is to succeed, it has to perform at its 
best to overcome the bureaucratic resistance of those conventional or SOF units, 
which might feel their interests and authority threatened by this new unit.30 
Ineffectiveness and inefficiency in NL MARSOF arising from cultural difference, 
or misunderstanding about goals and purpose, will weaken NL MARSOF’s 
external position in this struggle for survival at birth.  
In 1982, two management consultants, Thomas Peters and Robert 
Waterman, argued that organizations with a strong culture and clear objectives or 
aims performed best.31 They argued that a coherent culture and clear, consistent 
objectives positively affect the performance of organizations. This positive 
influence of cultural coherence and clear, consistent objectives to organizational 
performance corresponds directly with the first ground truth of SOF, namely, the 
recognition that “humans are more important than hardware in special 
operations.”32 The importance of the human factor in performance outcome is 
caustically illustrated in the saying “All the gear, but no idea,” to criticize high-tech 
military units without superior military personnel. This simple phrase captures the 
importance of human quality over technological quality in SOF operations.  
The previous USSOCOM commander, Admiral Eric T. Olson, also points 
to the human factor in successful SOF: “Investments in weapons platforms and 
                                            
29 Head of Joint Special Operations Branch Netherlands MoD, conversation with author, Den 
Haag, the Netherlands, 13 December, 2010.  
30 Norbert Tajti, Enhancing Hungarian Special Forces Through Transformation–the Shift to 
Special Operations Forces (master’s thesis, Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School, 
2010), 26. 
31 Thomas J. Peters & Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from 
America’s Best-run Companies (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).  
32 “The Five SOF Truths,” Soldiers 64, no. 11 (Nov, 2009): 6.  
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technologies are incomplete without the right people to employ those systems.”33 
The USSOCOM Posture Statement 2006 again gives another example to 
emphasize the importance of the human factor in SOF: “SOF’s core philosophy 
centers on the human as the most critical capability in special operations and as 
foundation of USSOCOM’s success in meeting the daunting challenges of 
defeating global terrorist networks.”34  Therefore, despite resources like high-tech 
equipment and large training facilities, the overall organizational performance of 
SOF cannot be optimal unless the human factor is optimized.  
Dr. Robert Spulak describes the importance of humans in SOF operations 
in several publications for the Strategic Studies Department of the Joint Special 
Operations University (JSOU) in Florida.35 He argues that it is not the specific 
missions that are assigned to SOF that define special operations. The missions 
can change, but the ability to overcome the limitations of conventional forces is 
embodied in the SOF personnel itself. Their qualities and attributes are critical in 
successful conduct of SOF operations. 
Within the Netherlands Ministry of Defense, NL MARSOF is envisioned as 
a unique mixture of “traditional” maritime SOF units and a national 
counterterrorism unit. Even though the first step in the creation of NL MARSOF 
has marked a significant progress in the professionalization of maritime SOF 
capability in the Netherlands, new challenges in unit culture and purpose 
determination can hamper the optimal development and utilization of NL 
MARSOF. 
                                            
33 Eric T. Olson, “U.S. Special Operations: Context and Capabilities in Irregular Warfare.” 
Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ) n58, no. 1st quarter 2010 (January, 2010): 64–70. 
34 United States Special Operations Command, Posture Statement 2006 United States 
Special Operations Command, 2006.  
35 Robert G. Spulak, Jr., “A Theory of Special Operations: The Origin, Qualities and Use of 
SOF,” JSOU Report 07–07, Joint Special Operations University (2007): 23–28. 
 14 
2. Identified Friction Points 
The first year after the initiative to form NL MARSOF from the UIM and the 
MSO-Coy, key members observed some internal and external misunder-
standings in unit culture and unit purpose.36 These misunderstandings have 
resulted in several friction points. Internal friction points surfaced when members 
of NL MARSOF, who originated from the two separate SOF units, failed to agree 
on common practices, behavior, and goals. External friction points emerged 
when other organizations (conventional forces, other Dutch SOF, and police 
forces) misinterpreted or misperceived, or even worse, second-guessed the 
general purpose for NL MARSOF.  
 These friction points can be divided into four different categories: (1) the 
selection process for organization members; (2) the way the organization trains 
and prepares for its missions; (3) the generally accepted customs and traditions 
of the organization members; and (4) the specific kind of operations that have 
been conducted.37 The remainder of this section summarizes some of the most 
apparent friction points within these four categories: selection, training, customs 
and traditions, and missions.  
a. Selection Process 
The selection processes for the three separate SOF units were 
originally very different. The Frogmen do a physically intense eight-month course 
in which they learn all the crafts of maritime special operations and combat diving 
in particular.38 The whole course focuses on aptitude testing of the individuals, 
and, for that purpose, they undergo arduous physical and mental training. Sleep 
deprivation, hazing rituals, and constant physical and mental pressure are 
                                            
36 Key NCO’s and Officers of NL MARSOF, conversations with author, Doorn, the 
Netherlands, 2010. 
37 Author’s own synthesis from friction points expressed through conversations with key 
NCO’s and officers of NL MARSOF. 
38 Fifty years of Frogmen in the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps [50 Jaar Kikvorsmannen bij 
het Korps Mariniers] (Den Helder: Royal Netherlands Navy, 2010). 
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considered a vital part of the selection to assess whether candidates are suitable 
for the unit and fit in the distinct unit culture.39  
Most of the members of the ML Recce Troop undergo the UK Royal 
Marine Mountain Leader course. This eight-month course takes place in 
Southern coastal parts of England, the highlands of Scotland, and the arctic 
climate of Norway. It is considered one of the most arduous and physically 
demanding courses the UK has to offer, and it emphasizes long-range 
reconnaissance in mountainous and arctic environments. Again, common factors 
like sleep deprivation, initiation rituals, and constant physical and mental 
pressure are part of the aptitude testing in this course.40  
To become a member of the Unit Intervention Marines requires a 
five-month training period. The training starts with a one-week test phase, in 
which the aptitude and trainability of the candidates is tested through a high 
number of intense physical and mental exercises. Afterwards, the candidates 
undergo training that emphasizes acquiring excellent shooting skills and close 
quarter battle (CQB)41 skills needed in counter terrorist operations.42 Aptitude 
testing, such as sleep deprivation, mental pressure through hazing, and arduous 
physical training are not part of the training. Instead, the members and training 
cadre of the UIM deliberately treat candidates more or less as equals to create a 
better learning environment.  
                                            
39 Head of the Frogmen Selection Course at the Royal Navy Dive School (H-KVM, DDS), 
conversation with author, Den Helder, the Netherlands, December, 2010. 
40 The Mountain Leaders course is one of the hardest in the British military, as indicated by 
its 20% pass rate. To gain the Mountain Leaders (ML2) specialty, a Royal Marine must go 
through an eight-month training course, which features: climbing cliffs, free climbing (without 
ropes), mountaineering, survival, resistance to interrogation (RTI) training, ice climbing, arctic 
survival, arctic navigation, and long distance skiing. Once qualified, a Mountain Leader (ML2) will 
usually be integrated into the Commandos, often into the Brigade Patrol Troop. Source: “Elite UK 
Forces, Brigade Patrol Troop,” http://www.eliteukforces.info/royal-marines/mountain-leaders/ 
41 Close Quarter Battle (CQB) is a type of fighting in which small units engage the enemy 
with personal weapons at very short range, in which specific methods of room entry and room 
clearance are used, needed to either obtain a suspect or rescue a hostage.  
42 The selection course for the Unit Intervention Marines (UIM) focuses on shooting skills, 
close quarter battle, and hand-to-hand fighting. This enables an UIM operator to conduct high-risk 
arrest operations and hostage rescue missions under the most rigorous circumstances and 
demanding environments, like the sea.   
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These differences in selection process have historically resulted in 
different beliefs about the emphasis on physical toughness and the necessity for 
aptitude testing between the two separate units. These deeply held beliefs about 
selection processes within the current members of NL MARSOF will not change 
overnight with the merger of MSO-Coy and the UIM. NL MARSOF already 
identified and implemented the long-term solution. All new members of NL 
MARSOF have to go through a newly developed joint selection, so that over the 
long run all members of NL MARSOF will share the same selection 
background.43 However, at this time the majority of NL MARSOF personnel still 
does not. 
b. Training 
The training philosophy, the type of training, the training locations, 
and the duration of the main exercises of the MSO-Coy and UIM have historically 
been quite different. These differences in training are not surprising given the 
different tasks originally assigned to the units. The Dutch frogmen and the ML 
Recce Troop, now merged into the MSO-Coy, generally conduct long and 
physically demanding exercises in which they train in all aspects of special 
operations. The MSO-Coy training philosophy emphasizes physical and mental 
fitness. Arctic warfare training of two to three months, mountain warfare training 
of approximately two months, specific dive or rock-climb exercises of multiple 
weeks, desert training and jungle training of up to three months are common 
recurring exercises in their yearly training cycle.44 Adding the duration of these 
exercises up shows that, excluding real-time deployments, the members are 
conducting long exercises up to nine months of each year.  
                                            
43 Head of the Frogmen Selection Course at the Royal Navy Dive School (H-KVM, DDS), 
conversation with author, Den Helder, the Netherlands, December, 2010. 
44 Maritime Special Operations Company Staff, Operational year plans Maritime Special 
Operations Company [Operationele Jaarplannen MSO-Coy (OJP)] (Den Helder, the 
Netherlands). 
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The Unit Intervention Marines predominantly focus on domestic 
counterterrorism. For this main task, the UIM members are on constant 
readiness alert in the Netherlands. This precludes the members from engaging in 
long exercises abroad. The yearly training cycle of the Unit Intervention Marines 
consists of short (up to a week) exercises in or near the Netherlands.45 Except for 
multiple weeklong exercises each year, the members are predominantly doing 
daily training activities. During these short evolutions, the training philosophy 
emphasizes shooting skills and tactical procedures. These differences in the 
yearly training cycle of the MSO-Coy and the Unit Intervention Marines have 
historically resulted in distinct customs and views in training philosophy and 
methods.   
c. Customs and Traditions 
The UIM and MSO-Coy have developed different customs and 
traditions. The frogmen and the ML Recce Troop historically have had a strong 
connection with their British counterparts. Since 1969, the Dutch Frogmen Troop 
has trained extensively with the UK Special Boat Service (SBS), which has also 
given them the name of the 7th Troop SBS.46 Adding to that strong connection, 
the Dutch frogmen also modeled their selection course closer to the UK SBS 
selection.47 Because of their common selection course and similar mission set, 
the ML Recce Troop has trained extensively with the UK Brigade Patrol Troop 
(BPT). Even after the merger to MSO-Coy the historical ties to either UK SBS or 
 
                                            
45 Unit Intervention Marines Staff, Operational year plans Unit Intervention Marines 
[Operationele Jaarplannen UIM (OJP)] (Doorn, the Netherlands). 
46 Before 1987, when the UK SBS was still part of the UK Royal Marines and not taken 
under control of Directorate of Special Forces (DSF), their C-Squadron consisted of 6 Troops. 
Because of the intense cooperation of C-Squadron with the Dutch Frogmen Platoon, the UK SBS 
called the Dutch Frogmen 7th Troop SBS. The Dutch Frogmen also used this name when 
presenting itself internationally. Source: Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, NL guidelines for 
amphibious operations [Leidraad Amfibisch Optreden] (Den Helder, the Netherlands: Royal 
Netherlands Navy, 2010). 
47 Head of the Frogmen Selection Course at the Royal Navy Dive School (H-KVM, DDS), 
conversation with author, Den Helder, the Netherlands, December, 2010. 
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UK BPT have remained. The Frogmen and ML Troops of MSO-Coy are currently 
conducting annual exercises and cross-training with the UK SBS and the UK 
BPT.48   
The Unit Intervention Marines, on the other hand, historically have 
had strong connections with Dutch police units and other European counterparts, 
such as the GSG-9 in Germany, the AKS in Denmark, and GIGN in France.49 
The UIM trained extensively with these highly specialized CT units, who 
predominantly originated from their respective country’s police forces. The 
establishment of the National Police Service DSI in 2006, which has operational 
control of the UIM in domestic CT operations, has only further emphasized the 
close connection with the police forces. Due to this historical difference in 
partnership and training, the developed customs and habits within the MSO-Coy 
and UIM also display differences.  
One difference between the UIM and the Dutch frogmen is the 
importance its members place on unit traditions. For instance, the Dutch frogmen 
platoon has specific hazing traditions for new members that serve to imbue the 
new members with the norms, authority relations, and codes of conduct within 
the unit. Most of these customs are similar to their UK SBS counterpart. Although 
considered somewhat old-fashioned to most outside observers, this practice is 
still highly valued in most military organizations, because it implies a reward 
                                            
48 Maritime Special Operations Company Staff, Operational year plans Maritime Special 
Operations Company [Operationele Jaarplannen MSO-Coy (OJP)] (Den Helder, the 
Netherlands). 
49 Unit Intervention Marines Staff, Operational year plans Unit Intervention Marines 
[Operationele Jaarplannen UIM (OJP)] (Doorn, the Netherlands).  
Aktionsstyrken of Action Force (AKS) is a SWAT unit of the National Danish Police, trained in 
hostage rescue techniques. They are approximately 70 strong, broken down into 8 man assault 
units. Source: “Aktionsstyrken (AKS),” http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/Denmark/  
The National Gendarmes Intervention Group, or Groupement d’Intervention de la 
Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), is France’s counterterrorist Force. It was created in 1974 
following not only the Munich Olympic incident, but more directly because of the Saudi Arabian 
embassy incident in Paris in 1973. They are approximately 90 strong, broken down into four 
assault groups and a support group. Source: “Groupe de Sécurité et d’Intervention de la 
Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN),” 
http://www.specialoperations.com/Foreign/France/GIGN/default.htm 
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system in which ultimately becoming a member is the reward.50 The UIM does 
not have this long tradition of “degreening.”51 Instead, the new members of the 
UIM deliberately do not undergo any type of hazing. Hazing is actually 
considered inappropriate within the UIM. Instead, the members create an 
environment more open to critique from new, fresh members.  
Another example is the difference in social interaction between 
members of the units. Because the members of the MSO-Coy practically live 
together for almost nine months of the year, they have more opportunities to 
bond and form friendships than the members of the UIM. The separate 
geographic location of the two home bases of the MSO-Coy and the UIM 
reinforces this difference in social interaction. The MSO-Coy is remotely located 
at the coast in the city of Den Helder, so the majority of its members are forced to 
live with each other on base during the weeks they are not on exercise. The UIM 
is located in the city of Doorn in the centre in the Netherlands, which gives its 
members the opportunity to live off base during the week.  
One last example is the difference in hierarchy between members 
of the units. The leadership of the UIM tends to be more hierarchic than the 
leadership of the MSO-Coy. The distance between officers, NCOs and enlisted 
men within the UIM tends to be greater than within the MSO-Coy. Within the 
MSO-Coy it is generally considered normal to be on a first-name basis with every 
member. Within the UIM more traditional hierarchy interaction, in which members 
address each other with ranks, is considered more appropriate. This simple 
custom reveals an important, subtle difference in social distance between the 
members of the units. During previous combined exercises and missions, the 
                                            
50 A new member’s transition into a new social role and status within a specific organization 
is a process that at the United States Military Academy at West Point is called the “plebe system.” 
It is known as the “degreening” program in European military academies. Source: Joseph L. 
Soeters, “Culture in Uniformed Organizations,” in Handbook of Organizational Culture & Climate, 
edited by Neal M. Ashkanasy, Celeste Wilderom and Mark F. Peterson (Thousand Oaks, Calif: 
Sage Publications, 2000), 465–481. 
51 Joseph L. Soeters, “Culture in Uniformed Organizations,” in Handbook of Organizational 
Culture & Climate, edited by Neal M. Ashkanasy, Celeste Wilderom and Mark F. Peterson 
(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2000), 465–481. 
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difference in social interaction and distance has resulted in internal friction. The 
most recent example is the pre-deployment build-up phase for the latest mission 
in Afghanistan.52  
d. Missions 
These three different units—The Dutch Frogmen Platoon, The ML 
Recce Troop, and the UIM—have in the past conducted numerous SOF 
operations domestically and abroad in regions such as Afghanistan, Iraq, the 
former Yugoslavia, and the Horn of Africa. However, the types of operations 
differed significantly among the three units. The Dutch Frogmen and the ML 
Recce Troop predominantly focused on special operations abroad with an 
emphasis on the two NATO SOF principle tasks of Special Reconnaissance and 
Military Assistance.53 Within these tasks, they primarily conducted environmental 
reconnaissance, target assessment, and training missions.54 The UIM have 
predominantly focused on the two principle NATO SOF tasks of Direct Action and 
Additional Activities, primarily hostage release operations, direct assaults, and 
opposed boarding operations.55  
                                            
52 In 2009, teams and staff members form the UIM and the MSO-Coy formed a Task Force 
55 SOTG as part of ISAF SOF. The six-month pre-deployment build-up phase marked several 
incidents between members of the MSO-Coy and the UIM related to social interaction and 
distance. 
53 Special reconnaissance and surveillance complements national and Allied theatre 
intelligence collection assets and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and possibly time-
sensitive information of strategic or operational significance. It is a pre-dominantly HUMINT 
function that places eyes-on-target. Military Assistance is a broad spectrum of measures in 
support of friendly forces throughout the spectrum of conflict. Source: North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC), Allied Joint Doctrine for 
Special Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons: Belgium: NSCC, January 2009), 2–1. 
54 Environmental reconnaissance is conducted to collect and report critical geospatial 
information. Target assessment is conducted to detect, identify, locate, and assess a target to 
determine the most effective employment of weapons. Training missions are conducted to 
militarily train host nation forces to protect from threats, and to develop individual, leader, and 
organizational skills. Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations 
Coordination Center (NSCC), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons: 
Belgium: NSCC, January 2009), 2–1. 
55 Direct Actions are precise (usually offensive) operations on specific well-defined strategic 
or operational targets. Additional Activities is an overarching umbrella of specific missions 
dedicated to NATO SOF, like CT operations and hostage release operations.  
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Until the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, this 
rough division of labor in SOF tasks remained intact. However, after the global 
war on terror started, the increasing demand for SOF units caused some 
capacity issues for the maritime SOF units. The demand for SOF units abroad 
outpaced the capacity of the MSO-Coy. Therefore, on occasion teams from the 
UIM have been used for these special operations abroad and teams from the 
MSO-Coy have been used for national stand-by mission to fulfill domestic 
counterterrorism responsibilities.56 While this mixed employment of UIM and 
MSO-Coy teams resolved some of the capacity problems, the mixing of teams for 
different missions abroad and domestically has revealed the aforementioned 
internal friction points even more. Differences in operational experience, 
selection background, training level, and traditional customs have resulted in 
initial reluctance between the MSO-Coy and the UIM to work together and 
necessitated the need for longer pre-deployment preparation.  
The mixed employment of UIM abroad and MSO-Coy teams also 
domestically created misunderstandings at other Dutch SOF and police forces 
about the exact purpose and missions for NL MARSOF. As a result, the Dutch 
Army SOF—the Dutch Commandos—have formally expressed doubts in the 
SOF capabilities of NL MARSOF.57 The National Police Service DSI has also 
 
                                            
Hostage release operations are offensive operations conducted to secure the safe release of 
hostages. Direct assaults typically involve attacking critical military targets of significance, 
capturing designated personnel or material, or neutralizing adversary’s capabilities. Opposed 
boarding operations are the forced entering of uncooperative maritime vessels or platforms. 
Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons: Belgium: NSCC, January 
2009), 2–1. 
56 The deployment of maritime SOF units as part of Task Force Orange, Special Operations 
Task Unit Viper, and Task Force 55 in Afghanistan has consisted of teams both of the MSO-Coy 
and the Unit Intervention Marines. The MSO-Coy teams that returned from deployments were put 
on stand-by for the domestic counterterrorism tasks. That way the members of MSO-teams were 
operating in the Netherlands close to their respective families, and the UIM teams were able to go 
abroad for missions.   
57 During post-deployment evaluations of SOTU Viper in Afghanistan, the Dutch Army SOF 
had critical comments on the capabilities of NL MARSOF units. These comments varied from lack 
of specific skill sets and training, lack of experience, and difference in SOF mindset. Source: 
classified Army post-deployment report to the Joint Special Operations Branch MoD.  
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expressed concerns about the recent mixed deployments. The DSI fears a 
change of priorities in preparing and training the UIM-teams for its primary 
domestic counterterrorism tasks.58    
e. Friction Points Related to Strategic Utility and Unit 
Culture 
The identified friction points in the four categories of selection, 
training, customs and traditions, and missions are related to either the absence 
of one strong cohesive unit culture or the lack of clarity in strategic utility for NL 
MARSOF. The schematic overview below summarizes the main identified friction 
points and shows the relationship to unit culture and strategic utility. This 
categorization in mission, selection, training, and customs and traditions as well 
as the connection to unit culture and strategic utility is imperfect. Categories 
overlap. For instance, the training philosophy is connected to strategic utility as 
well as unit culture. Nevertheless, the categorization and connection is useful 
since it illustrates the broad range of friction points in relation to unit culture and 
strategic utility. 
                                            
58 Views expressed through conversations with members of the management team of the 
Special Intervention Service (DSI) in March 2009.  
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Figure 5.   Schematic Overview of Identified Friction Points Connected to 
Strategic Utility and Unit Culture 
The fact that NL MARSOF still is an initiative and currently in the 
process of being formalized within the RNLMC organization arguably contributes 
to the observed internal friction points in selection, training, and organizational 
customs. 
E. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This research intends to find remedies to the observed internal and 
external friction points in this precarious phase of existence. As mentioned in 
previous sections, the specific circumstance is the NL MARSOF’s organizational 
developmental phase as a new organization. As history has shown, new SOF 
units at birth are vulnerable to external bureaucratic forces and therefore have to 
be quite strong or enjoy the protection of a powerful guardian to survive this 
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crucial phase. The observed friction points resulted from quickly bringing two 
distinct units with different tasks and history together and asking its members to 
form a new unit. The identified friction points can result from a lack of clarity in 
strategic utility and disparate unit cultures. By answering the following research 
question, these probable deficiencies are addressed and investigated, ultimately 
aiming to make NL MARSOF strong enough to stand up to the challenges it 
faces in its early days: 
How can NL MARSOF better unify its culture and clarify its strategic 
utility in order to improve its organizational effectiveness? 
In this main research question, “clarifying strategic utility” means 
developing the process to define the strategic utility for NL MARSOF’s members. 
The definition of unify is “to join (one or more) to or with another, so as to form 
one whole or unit.”59 Unifying NL MARSOF culture, therefore, means reconciling 
the cognitive processes of the members of the previous different SOF units to 
form one effective whole.  
Two professors in organizational behavior, Joseph Soeters and Tibor 
Tresh, have used a framework (developed by the cross-cultural psychologist 
John Berry60) to distinguish different levels of unifying military organizations.61 
Based on this framework three strategies of organizational unification achieve an 
acceptable level of effectiveness. The first strategy, assimilation, is when one 
organization becomes more similar to the other(s), either because the latter 
appears to be “better” or has the power to force adaptation. The second strategy, 
separation, is when two or more organizations cooperate, but keep their own 
cultural characteristics, because they perceive their own organization as being 
                                            
59 Oxford English Dictionary Online, s.v. “unify,” accessed December, 2010, 
http://www.oed.com 
60 John Berry, “Fundamental Psychological Processes in Intercultural Relations,” in 
Handbook of Intercultural Training, edited by D. Landis, J.M. Bennett and M.J. Bennett (eds.) 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004), 166–184. As cited in Joseph Soeters and Tibor Tresch, 
“Towards Cultural Integration in Multinational Peace Operations,” Defence Studies 10, no. 1/2 
(Mar-Jun, 2010): 272–287. 
61 Joseph Soeters and Tibor Tresch, “Towards Cultural Integration in Multinational Peace 
Operations,” Defence Studies 10, no. 1/2 (Mar–Jun, 2010): 272–287. 
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equal or better than the other ones. The third strategy, integration, is when two or 
more organizations cooperate, and try to adapt to the best cultural characteristics 
and qualities of one another. In other words, integration identifies and combines 
the strengths of each organization into one better overarching organization. The 
best strategy to unify NL MARSOF—assimilation, separation, or integration—will 
depend on the research findings. 
Two hypotheses will help answer the above-stated main research 
question. The hypotheses capture the effect of strategic utility and unit culture on 
operational effectiveness. They incorporate the following three key terms: 
operational effectiveness, strategic utility, and unit culture. The following chapters 
will explain these key terms more in detail. 
Hypothesis 1: Clearing up misunderstanding and misperception in 
strategic utility leads to purpose and direction, which positively affects NL 
MARSOF’s organizational effectiveness. 
This hypothesis entails the clarity in strategic utility and addresses internal 
and external misunderstandings about the general mission and purpose of NL 
MARSOF. Strategic utility is the strategic value of SOF, by which it contributes to 
national goals and policy. The hypothesis describes the difference between what 
the strategic utility of NL MARSOF should be (required-situation), as stated by 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and how members actually interpret and 
perceive the strategic utility of NL MARSOF (current-situation).  
The hypothesis builds on the causal assumption that the more consistent 
the perceived strategic utility is with required strategic utility for NL MARSOF on 
the national and military service level, the more focused the unit is in 
organizational purpose and direction; hence, the more effective NL MARSOF can 
achieve its objectives and aims. Several researchers in organizational culture 
and effectiveness emphasize the importance of a clear mission to an 
organization. The following quote clearly describes the current situation of NL 
MARSOF and captures its difficulties: 
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The importance of mission to culture and effectiveness was […] 
supported by the observation that the most critical crises in each 
organization came when the basic mission was questioned or 
altered. Each of the organizations provided a compelling example 
of the close relationship between the overall purpose and direction 
of the firm, and the meaning held by each of the organizational 
members. This loss of meaning and direction seemed to coincide 
with significant losses of momentum and effectiveness.62 
Hypothesis 2: One strong and cohesive culture for NL MARSOF creates 
more organizational commitment that positively affects organizational 
effectiveness.  
The second hypothesis focuses on the cultural differences between NL 
MARSOF sub-units in order to examine internal friction points in selection, 
training, and customs and tradition. It captures the degree of cultural strength 
and coherence within NL MARSOF and assumes that cultural strength positively 
effects operational effectiveness. The hypothesis builds on the assumption that 
dominance of a strong and coherent culture is an essential quality for excellent 
organizations, and strong organizational culture permeates the most successful 
groups.63 
F. CAUSAL FRAMEWORK OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Each developed hypothesis covers one independent variable against the 
dependent variable. Hypothesis 1 covers strategic utility; Hypothesis 2 covers 
unit culture. Figure 6 gives a schematic overview of the causal relation between 
these independent variables, unit culture and strategic utility; and the dependent 
variable, organizational effectiveness.  
                                            
62 Daniel R. Denison and Aneil K. Mishra, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Culture and 
Effectiveness,” Organization Science 6, no. 2 (Mar–Apr, 1995): 216.  
63 Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from 
America’s Best-Run Companies (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 75. This assertion is also 
made by other renowned organizational culture researchers such as Daniel Denison, John P. 
Kotter, and James L. Heskett. 
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Figure 6.   Model of Variables and Causal Mechanism 
The first independent variable, strategic utility, is broken down into three 
dimensions: special operations spectrum, operating environment, and political 
domain. Chapter III explains these dimensions in detail. The second dependent 
variable, unit culture, is broken down in four cultural traits: mission, adaptability, 
involvement, and consistency, all derived from Denison’s model of organizational 
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culture.64 Chapter IV explains these cultural traits in detail. The causal 
mechanisms for both independent variables related positive to operational 
effectiveness for NL MARSOF. Operational effectiveness can affect the hot and 
cold side of organization. Chapter II explains this delineation in detail.  
The hardware factor consists of all factors (other than the two human 
factors) that can positively influence organizational effectiveness. Resources and 
structural design are the most obvious examples of these hardware factors. The 
hardware factor is presumed to complement the human factor in operational 
effectiveness. In other words, the human factor is necessary in achieving 
operational effectiveness in SOF, which the hardware factor complements. This 
research examines only the two human factors—unit culture and strategic 
utility—in relation to organizational effectiveness.  
G. RESEARCH DESIGN 
To answer both hypotheses, a specific research strategy is developed to 
investigate both and ultimately answer the research question. Figure 7 gives a 
schematic overview of the complete research strategy, containing the use of 
surveys, governing document analysis, and potential follow up interviews. The 
remainder of this chapter describes all research methods in detail and explains 
the connection to the main research question and both hypotheses. 
                                            
64 Daniel R. Denison, “Bringing Corporate Culture to the Bottom Line,” Organizational 
Dynamics (1984): 5–22; Daniel R. Denison, Corporate Culture and Organizational Effectiveness 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990); Daniel R. Denison and Aneil K. Mishra, “Toward a Theory 
of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness,” Organization Science 6, no. 2 (Mar–Apr, 1995): 
204–223; Daniel R. Denison, S. Haaland, and P. Goelzer, “Corporate Culture and Organizational 
Effectiveness: Is there a Similar Pattern Around the World,” Advances in Global Leadership 3 
(2003): 205–227.  
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Figure 7.   Research Strategy 
Hypothesis 1: Clearing up misunderstanding and misperception in 
strategic utility leads to clear purpose and direction, which positively affects 
NL MARSOF’s operational effectiveness. 
Survey research determines the current perceptions of strategic utility for 
NL MARSOF. Concurrently, unit history, relevant SOF theory, and governing 
documents are analyzed on three levels (international, national, and unit) to 
determine the required strategic utility for NL MARSOF. Observed differences 
between the current and the required strategic utility are discussed in follow-up 
interviews that lead to practical recommendations for creating clear purpose and 
direction. Figure 8 illustrates the connection of the chosen methods in the 
research strategy to Hypothesis 1.  
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Figure 8.   Research Strategy in Relation to Hypothesis 1: Strategic Utility 
Hypothesis 2: One strong and cohesive culture for NL MARSOF creates 
more organizational commitment that positively affects operational effectiveness.  
Survey research is used to determine the current and desired unit culture 
within NL MARSOF. Observed differences between the current and the desired 
unit culture are discussed in follow-on interviews that lead to practical 
recommendations. These recommendations are intended to set the path to the 
desired unit culture and ultimately improve cultural coherence and strength. 
Figure 9 illustrates the connection of the chosen research methods to 
Hypothesis 2.  
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Figure 9.   Research Strategy in Relation to Hypothesis 2: Unit Culture 
1. Methods 
Three data-gathering methods are used to collect the necessary data for 
the research. These methods provide quantitative as well as qualitative 
information. The primary collection method is survey research, augmented by 
document analysis and follow-up interviews. The use of these three methods to 
provide quantitative and qualitative information allows for statistical analysis as 
well as in-depth analysis. This provides richer research data than when using 
either quantitative or qualitative data separately and, therefore, enhances better 
understanding of NL MARSOF’s unique cultural characteristics. 
a. Surveys 
This method employs a survey questionnaire designed to test the 
independent variables (strategic utility and unit culture) in relation to the 
dependant variable (organizational effectiveness). Figure 10 illustrates the 
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quantitative and qualitative part of the survey in relation to the main research 
question and the two hypotheses. Chapter V explains the survey design, parts, 
and connections in detail. 
 
 
Figure 10.   NL MARSOF Survey in Relation to Both Hypotheses. 
b. Governing Document Analysis 
Current policy documents, various studies, and doctrine are 
analyzed to investigate the required strategic utility for NL MARSOF. Figure 11 
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illustrates the governing document analysis in relation to the main research 
question and Hypothesis 1. The next section explains this relationship in detail. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Governing Document Analysis in Relation to Hypothesis 1: Strategic 
Utility 
The governing documents can be divided into three levels of analysis: 
international level, national level, and unit level.   
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Figure 12.   Governing Document Analysis 
At the international level, the documents produced and published 
by NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) lead in determining strategic utility. Of 
these documents, the NATO SOF Study (2008) sought input from NATO SOF 
personnel to examine broad trends in SOF structure, organization, capabilities, 
interoperability, and resourcing. Other documents produced by the NSHQ include 
MC-437/1—Military Committee Special Operations Forces and AJP 3–5—Allied 
Joint Doctrine for Special Operations Forces.  
At the national level, the governing documents produced and 
published by the Ministry of Defense are examined. Though most of the NL MoD 
documents concerning SOF are classified, sanitized parts were used for this 
thesis. The NL Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has also produced several (classified) 
documents concerning the domestic employment of Special Forces in a counter 
terrorist role.  
 At the military service level, the Royal Netherlands Navy has 
traditionally been weak in producing doctrine and policy documents, compared to 
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the Royal Dutch Army. Nevertheless, several documents have been recently 
published in which policy concerning the employment of maritime special 
operations forces is described.  
c. Interviews 
Upon completion and analysis of the survey, interviews were held 
with key members of NL MARSOF in order to gather qualitative information 
pertaining to the survey results. Figure 7 illustrated the follow-up interviews with 
key members of NL MARSOF in relation to the main research question and both 
hypotheses.  
The purpose of conducting these interviews is twofold. Firstly, 
interviews conducted after the survey allow in-depth questions to address any 
anomalies in the collected data or to expand any area needing further scrutiny. 
This qualitative information is compared to the survey results in an effort to 
validate the overall survey results.  
Secondly, depending on the survey results, viable possibilities for 
improvement are discussed with key members to formulate recommendations. 
The target sample for these interviews was a random selection of officers and 
senior enlisted members, because they can provide the most comprehensive 
view on the NL MARSOF organization and have the authority and influence to 
either support or reject recommendations.  
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
A. ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS REVIEWED 
Organizational effectiveness is the degree to which the organization 
reaches its goal or mission. This overall goal, or mission, is the organization’s 
reason for existence. The organization’s leadership usually writes this overall 
mission down in a formal mission statement, which describes the organization’s 
purpose, vision, and shared values and beliefs.65 This overall purpose is broken 
down into several operating goals that describe specific, measurable outcomes. 
For not-for-profit organizations such as the military, these outcomes specify the 
degree to which the organization provides specific utility.   
Pierre Richard, Timothy Devinney, George Yip, and Gerry Johnson (from 
the business universities in Sydney, Rotterdam, and Lancaster) study 
organizational performance and distinguish between organizational performance 
and effectiveness. “Organizational performance encompasses three specific 
areas of firm outcomes: (a) financial performance; (b) product market 
performance; and (c) shareholder return. Organizational effectiveness is broader 
and captures organizational performance plus the plethora of internal 
performance outcomes normally associated with more efficient or effective 
operations and other external measures that relate to considerations that are 
broader than those simply associated with economic valuation.”66 The latter 
definition of organizational effectiveness fits the military better, because it entails 
more than just economic output. Therefore, this thesis uses the term 
effectiveness instead of performance.  
                                            
65 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 8th ed. (Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-
Western, 2004), 18. 
66 Pierre J. Richard, Timothy Devinney, George Yip, and Gerry Johnson. “Measuring 
Organizational Performance: Towards Methodological Best Practice,” Journal of Management 35, 
no. 3 (Jun, 2009): 722. 
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Richard Daft, a noted expert in organizational behavior and organizational 
design, provides a simple definition of organizational effectiveness that captures 
the same meaning. “Organizational effectiveness is the degree to which an 
organization realizes its goals. Effectiveness evaluates the extent to which 
multiple goals are attained.”67   
Three experts in military organization and effectiveness, Allan Millett, 
Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, define military effectiveness as “the 
process by which armed forces convert resources into intended fighting power.”68 
In their definition, a fully effective military unit derives maximum intended combat 
power from the resources physically and politically available.  
In 2000, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
conducted an extensive survey within the U.S. military on a variety of matters 
concerning military culture in relation to military effectiveness.69 CSIS simply 
defined military effectiveness as “the ability to accommodate assigned missions 
within an appropriate amount of time with minimal casualties and an appropriate 
expenditure of resources.”   
B. MEASURING ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 
Daft et al. discuss the difficulty of measuring organizational effectiveness 
because of its multidimensional conceptualization related to stakeholders, 
heterogeneity in resources, environment, strategic choice, and timeframe.70 To 
address this difficulty of multidimensional conceptualization, Daft identified 
                                            
67 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 8th ed. (Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-
Western, 2004), 24. 
68 Allen R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of 
Military Organizations,” International Security 11, no. 1 (Summer, 1986): 37. 
69 Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, T. O. Jacobs, and Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Report of the CSIS 
International Security Program, CSIS Report (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, 2000). 
70 Pierre J. Richard, Timothy Devinney, George Yip, and Gerry Johnson, “Measuring 
Organizational Performance: Towards Methodological Best Practice,” Journal of Management  
35, no. 3 (Jun, 2009): 718–804. 
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several approaches to measuring organizational effectiveness.71 These 
approaches measure effectiveness by focusing on different parts of the 
organizational process of input, transformation, and output. The following 
explains the three approaches:  
The goal approach to organizational effectiveness is concerned 
with the output side, and whether the organization achieves its 
goals in terms of desired levels of output. The resource-based 
approach assesses effectiveness by observing the beginning of the 
process and evaluating whether the organization effectively obtains 
resources necessary for high performance. The internal process 
approach looks at internal activities and assesses effectiveness by 
indicators of internal health and efficiency.72 
Millett et al. argue that military effectiveness is not measured just in terms 
of victory. Instead, one can measure military effectiveness at four different levels: 
political, strategic, operational, and tactical.73 Political effectiveness is the 
proficiency achieved in acquiring resources for military activity. The resources 
allocated depend on the degree to which politicians regard the military unit as 
valuable. Strategic effectiveness is the degree to which armed forces obtain 
national goals as stated by political leadership. Operational effectiveness is the 
degree to which the military develops successful concepts and doctrine for 
effective employment of forces. Finally, tactical effectiveness is the way the 
organization successfully uses specific military techniques to win engagements. 
In comparing his categorization of military effectiveness in four levels to Daft’s 
three approaches, one can observe a similarity. Political effectiveness focuses on 
the input side of the organization, operational and tactical effectiveness focus on 
the transformation side, and strategic effectiveness focuses on the output side.  
Joseph Soeters, a Dutch military organizational behavior professor, 
distinguishes between two subcultures of the uniformed organization. One 
                                            
71 Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 8th ed. (Mason, Ohio: Thomson/South-
Western, 2004), 24. 
72 Ibid., 24. 
73 Allen R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of 
Military Organizations,” International Security 11, no. 1 (Summer, 1986): 37–71. 
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subculture focuses on prevention, facilitation, and preparation, and one 
subculture focuses on the real action. The former, which refers to headquarters 
and garrison life, is called the “cold” side, and the latter, which refers to the real-
time military operations, is called the “hot” side of the uniformed organization. 
The cold subculture is highly bureaucratic and process-oriented, while the hot 
subculture tends to be more flexible and goal-oriented because the latter occurs 
in critical, dangerous, and ambiguous circumstances.74 Measuring military 
effectiveness on the cold side focuses on the input (resource-based approach) 
and transformation (internal process approach) part of organizations. Measuring 
military effectiveness on the hot side focuses on the output (goal approach) and 
transformation part (internal process approach) of organizations.  
The bulk of the substantial modern research on military culture in relation 
to organizational performance focuses on this hot subculture and the importance 
of military cohesion in this particular subculture. Within that narrow focus of 
military culture, the literature is heavily weighted toward studies on cohesion in 
the U.S. Armed Forces. 75 The published scholarly literature on cohesion relating 
to performance in the Dutch Armed Forces is, by comparison, limited. Some 
exceptions might be Peter Boer’s early research on a wartime squadron of the 
Netherlands East India Air Force and the research of Joseph Soeters in Dutch 
military culture.76 Therefore, the majority of literature used in this thesis is 
necessarily not Dutch, which raises a question as to whether this literature is 
applicable to Dutch Forces in general and Dutch SOF in particular.  
The forces in the Netherlands are organizationally and culturally distinct, 
having different histories and traditions arising out of different national cultures. 
This thesis, however, assumes that general research findings about military 
                                            
74 Joseph L. Soeters, “Culture in Uniformed Organizations,” in Handbook of Organizational 
Culture & Climate, edited by Neal M. Ashkanasy, Celeste Wilderom and Mark F. Peterson 
(Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2000), 465–481. 
75 Charles Kirke, “Group Cohesion, Culture, and Practice,” Armed Forces and Society 35, 
no. 4 (Jul, 2009): 143–159. 
76 Peter C. Boer, “Small Unit Cohesion: The Case of Fighter Squadron 3-VI.GIV,” Armed 
Forces and Society, vol. 28. (2001),  2–15. 
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cohesion in relation to effectiveness are relevant to the present case of the Dutch 
Forces, except where there are visible, scientifically supported contra-indications. 
This is a realistic measure, reflecting both the quality and the quantity of the 
international scholarship, and the relative scarcity of published work directly 
applied to the Dutch Armed Forces. 
Examining military cohesion in relation to military effectiveness only during 
real-time missions (i.e., the hot side of the organization) is too narrow a view of 
military effectiveness. To survive at birth, NL MARSOF needs to be effective on 
the cold side as well.  
This thesis does not take one singular approach to effectiveness, because 
they all are too narrow to encompass the military effectiveness needed at this 
stage of NL MARSOF’s development. Therefore, this thesis synthesizes Daft’s 
definition of organizational effectiveness with the above-mentioned military 
scholarly literature on effectiveness. To wit: 
Organizational effectiveness is the degree to which an organization 
achieves its goals on the hot and cold side of the organization. 
Effectiveness evaluates the extent to which multiple goals at the 
cold side, as well as the hot side, are attained.  
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Figure 13 synthesizes the views on military effectiveness to Daft’s 
approaches in measuring effectiveness. 
 
 
Figure 13.   Focus in Measurement of Military Effectiveness 
To answer the main research question, this thesis investigates NL 
MARSOF’s strategic utility and unit culture, under the assumption that clear 
strategic utility and strong and cohesive culture improve the degree to which an 
organization achieves its goals on its hot and cold side (i.e., improves 
organizational effectiveness).  
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III. STRATEGIC UTILITY EXPLORED 
A. STRATEGIC UTILITY DEFINED 
Before clearly stating the strategic utility of NL MARSOF, a short historical 
review of the discussion on SOF strategic utility is needed. This section reviews 
the historical works of Eliot Cohen, Edward Luttwak, Colin Gray, Thomas Adams, 
and Susan Marquis, as well as the recent works of David Tucker and Christopher 
Lamb, Hy Rothstein, James Kiras, Robert Spulak, and Joseph Celeski. This 
review presents and analyzes different approaches and definitions of strategic 
utility, and develops a conceptual framework to define the strategic utility of NL 
MARSOF. This framework separates the more theoretical approaches in defining 
SOF strategic utility from the more pragmatic approaches.  
1. Review Strategic Utility SOF 
In 1983, security analyst Edward Luttwak gave his theoretical perspective 
on the strategic utility of SOF and proposed that SOF are best suited for 
relational-maneuver warfare. He countered the armed forces’ assumption that 
low-intensity conflicts77 can be placed in a one-dimensional scale from low- to 
high-intensity conflicts, where low is just “lesser” form of the high-intensity 
conflicts such as full-scale conventional war.78  
He argued that the assumption implied by this one-dimensional scale—
that forces that perform well in high-intensity conflicts will automatically perform 
                                            
77 According to the U.S. Army’s 1990 doctrinal manual, low-intensity conflict is a political-
military confrontation between contending states or groups below the level of conventional war 
and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. Low-intensity conflict frequently 
involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. It ranges from subversion to 
the use of armed force. It is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, 
informational, and military instruments. Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, generally in the 
Third World, but contain regional and global security implications. Source: United States 
Department of the Army, Field Manual 100–20 Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflicts 
(1990). 
78 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters [U.S. Army War 
College] XX, no. 4 (December 1983). 
 44 
well in low intensity conflicts—is false. Instead, he proposed a scale from 
attrition-based warfare to relational-maneuver-based warfare.  
In attrition warfare, victory is obtained by superior material resources (i.e., 
firepower and number of forces). In relational-maneuver warfare, victory is 
obtained by identifying specific weaknesses of the enemy and reconfiguring 
one’s own capabilities to exploit those weaknesses. “The closer [armed forces] 
are to the theoretical extreme of pure attrition, the more armed forces tend to be 
focused on their own internal administration and operations, being 
correspondingly less responsive to the external environment comprising the 
enemy, the terrain, and the specific phenomena of any particular conflict.”79 For 
these types of forces, optimization of standard operating procedures for general 
application, easily interchangeable personnel, and an emphasis on strong 
logistics are important. “By contrast, the closer [armed forces] are to the 
relational-maneuver end of the spectrum, the more armed forces will tend to be 
outer-regarding.”80 Flexible adaptation to each operating environment, highly 
specialized personnel, and low demand for logistic support are important to these 
forces. 
To the degree that the intensity of a conflict declines because the targets 
are less visible, less defined and more dispersed—as is the case in, for instance, 
counterinsurgencies—the usefulness of attrition also declines. Therefore, trying 
to fight a low-intensity conflict with forces focused on attrition is ineffective. 
Instead, forces with an outward-regarding focus are needed to distinguish 
between the enemy and the population and identify the enemy’s weakness. 
Special operations forces naturally fall into that relational-maneuver category. 
“SOF use human judgment and persistent surveillance at the scene to discover 
 
 
                                            
79 Edward N. Luttwak, “Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare,” Parameters [U.S. Army War 
College] XIII, no. 4 (December 1983), 336. 
80 Ibid., 337. 
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what is hidden in plain sight; that is to discriminate between real targets and fake 
ones that deceive nonhuman sensors.”81 Conventional forces naturally fall into 
the attrition category. 
In 1993, Lucien Vandenbroucke, a Foreign Service Officer in the U.S. 
Department of State, distinguished strategic special operations from regular 
special operations as having a larger impact on U.S. foreign policy and, 
therefore, requiring approval at the highest level of the U.S. government.82 These 
missions are also high-risk because of the difficulty of the objective and the 
limited means. The strategic utility of these strategic special operations, 
therefore, lies in the degree to which they affect foreign policy. In his book 
Perilous Options, Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy, 
Vandenbroucke describes several recurring problems that have hindered the 
success of strategic special operations: faulty intelligence, poor joint and 
interagency cooperation and coordination, inadequate information provided to 
decision makers, wishful thinking on the part of decision makers, and 
micromanagement of mission execution from afar. 
In 1998, security consultant Thomas Adams argued that one must 
conceptually separate the tasks and missions more suited to conventional forces 
from the tasks and missions more suited to unconventional forces such as SOF. 
Specific SOF strategic utility lies in the latter set of tasks and missions because 
conventional forces do not have the skill set for these missions, but SOF does.83 
                                            
81 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 51.  
82 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S. 
Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
83 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action—The Challenge of 
Unconventional Warfare (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001). 
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The core activities assigned to SOCOM84 can be divided into two types of 
missions. The first are missions that include truly special activities that are not 
part of conventional war fighting. The second are missions that are essentially 
conventional warfare activities, but are special because they have to be done 
with a high level of proficiency and special equipment under difficult 
circumstances.  
In the first type, the mission itself is special, such as Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA). In the second type, the unit 
conducting the mission is special, like Direct Action (DA) and Special 
Reconnaissance (SR).85 Adams calls the former missions unconventional 
warfare missions and proposes to re-order and assign these missions to an 
Unconventional Operations Force (UOF).86 In his opinion, Army SOF—
specifically Army SF, PsyOps, and Civil Affairs units—are best suited to form this 
UOF. By differentiating tasks, SOF can even better prepare and train in these 
difficult special tasks and missions. According to Adams, SOF are not just better 
at doing the same things as conventional forces, but have capabilities distinct 
from conventional forces and need to exploit these capabilities to generate the 
best strategic value.   
In 2006, Hy Rothstein, a retired Army Special Forces colonel and lecturer 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, also stressed the importance of a force—
                                            
84 The nine SOF core activities for USSOCOM are: (1) Direct Action, (2) Special 
Reconnaissance, (3) Foreign Internal Defense, (4) Unconventional Warfare, (5) Counterterrorism, 
(6) Counter-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (7) Civil Affairs Operations, (8) 
Psychological Operations/Military Information–support Operations, and (9) Information 
Operations. Source: Department of Defense, JP 3–05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations 
(2003). The current USSOCOM commander recently added two more activities to these core 
tasks: (10) security-force assistance by sustaining and assisting host-nation or regional security 
forces in support of a legitimate authority through the unified action of the joint, interagency, 
intergovernmental and multinational communities, and (11) other activities specified by the 
president or secretary of defense. Source: Olson, E. T. “U.S. Special Operations: Context and 
Capabilities in Irregular Warfare.” Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ) n58, no. 1st quarter 2010 
(January, 2010): 64–70. 
85 FID, SA, DA, and SR are defined in U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3–05 Doctrine for 
Joint Special Operations (2003). See Appendix F: U.S. SOF Doctrine. 
86 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action—The Challenge of 
Unconventional Warfare (New York: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 305. 
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USSOF—capable of conducting unconventional warfare to meet current and 
future threats. The progress of the war in Afghanistan showed a U.S. Army that 
struggled with accepting and conducting unconventional warfare. The initial 
unconventional warfare proposal to confront the Taliban in Afghanistan was 
developed by the CIA, not the Army. According to President Bush, the Army put 
forth “unimaginative plans.” Furthermore, when the big Army took over from the 
USSF teams in Afghanistan: “[the Army] snatched defeat from the jaws of victory. 
As the war became increasingly unconventional, the command & control 
arrangements became more conventional. The command arrangement evolved 
into a large and complex structure that could not adequately respond to the new 
unconventional setting. The bureaucratized military reproduced their own 
image.”87 
In 2006, Professor James Kiras of the U.S. School of Advanced Air and 
Space Studies examined the connection between special operations and 
strategy by, on the one hand, countering grossly exaggerated claims of special 
operations strategic effects in war and conflict and, on the other hand, countering 
reductionists who were critical of any claim of strategic utility of special 
operations. Kiras made the counterintuitive argument that SOF strategic utility 
lays in its ability to inflict strategic attrition.88 This strategic attrition not only 
contains the more widely known material dimension of combat power destruction, 
but specifically the moral dimension. “The cumulative effect of a number of 
special operations focused against an enemy’s moral and material vulnerabilities, 
in conjunction with conventional operations, is a more rapid and less costly 
dissolution of an enemy’s will to fight than by conventional means alone.”89 
Special operations are defined throughout his work as: “Unconventional actions 
against enemy vulnerabilities in a sustained campaign, undertaken by specially 
                                            
87 Hy S. Rothstein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare 
(Annapolis, Md: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 14. 
88 James Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on 
Terrorism (Cass Series–Strategy and History, 17. London; New York: Routledge, 2006). 
89 Ibid., 3. 
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designated units, to enable conventional operations and/or resolve economically 
politico-military problems at the operational or strategic level that are difficult or 
impossible to accomplish with conventional forces alone.”90 Kiras’ theory of SOF 
strategic utility draws from the classic work of Clausewitz. Kiras methodologically 
supports his argument of strategic attrition with a less known historical SOF case 
study of the British SAS campaign of attrition in Normandy, 1944. In this case 
study, he identifies the difficulty for special operations in conducting a sustained 
campaign, in conjunction with conventional forces, to extend and expand upon 
the moral and material effects they both generate cumulatively at the strategic 
level. In the modern fight against terrorism, special operations get their strategic 
utility not only from depriving these terrorists of their leaders and logistical 
support, but specifically from neutralizing the ideology that fuels recruitment and 
sustains their will to fight.    
In their 2007 book United States Special Operations Forces, Professor 
David Tucker of the Naval Postgraduate School) and Christopher Lamb, director 
of the Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies of the 
National Defense University, described strategic utility in “roles and missions.” 
SOF’s military roles are defined by the broad and enduring purposes 
(implementing national policy) for which Congress established SOCOM; the 
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Terrorism (Cass Series–Strategy and History, 17. London; New York: Routledge, 2006), 5. 
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York: Columbia University Press, 2007).  
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“SOF have the strategic role to attack adversaries and targets not vulnerable to 
conventional forces, and that unconventional warfare[92] is a mission that 
supports role.”93  
The strategic value of SOF is measured by the way it can best support 
national strategy for dealing with current and future security challenges. Without 
a clearly defined strategic utility, SOF is more likely to be ill-prepared and used 
ineffectively. SOF will also have more problems getting needed political support 
and material resources to conduct missions effectively. A well-defined strategic 
utility thus keeps the organization focused on what is most important. This 
strategic utility depends on three factors: (1) the unique force capabilities, (2) the 
national security challenges, and (3) the military requirements derived from 
national strategy. These three factors show much overlap with Eliot Cohen’s 
reasons for creating elite units—military utility and political usefulness—and Colin 
Gray’s main areas of SOF strategic utility—economy of force and expansion of 
choice. Both Cohen and Gray are discussed in following sections.   
However, contrary to Eliot Cohen, Tucker and Lamb say the most 
distinguishing characteristic of SOF is that they are not just elite, but also special. 
SOF do not just perform military tasks with greater proficiency; instead, they 
conduct missions that conventional forces cannot perform at acceptable levels of 
risk and costs. SOF are, therefore, distinguished, not by their proficiency, but by 
their operating environment’s unique characteristics and the specific capabilities 
required for successful operations.  
                                            
92 Unconventional warfare is described as operations that involve a broad spectrum of 
military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, 
with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and 
directed in varying degrees by an external source. UW is unique in that it is a SO that can either 
be conducted as part of a geographic combatant commander’s overall theater campaign, or as an 
independent, subordinate campaign. When conducted independently, the primary focus of UW is 
on political-military objectives and psychological objectives. UW includes military and paramilitary 
aspects of resistance movements. Source: U.S. Department of Defense, JP 3–05 Doctrine for 
Joint Special Operations (2003), II-7.  
93 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 143. 
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Five requirements distinguish SOF: (1) SOF must possess political 
sophistication; (2) SOF must have an uncommon will to succeed; (3) SOF must 
use unorthodox approaches; (4) SOF require unconventional equipment and 
training; and (5) SOF have special intelligence requirements.94 To be able to 
conduct the whole spectrum of special operations,95 SOF have two unique sets 
of characteristics. Commando skills refers to their superior small unit penetration 
and precision strike skills, and warrior-diplomat skills refers to their political, 
cultural, and linguistic skills.  
Tucker and Lamb split SOF missions into direct and indirect approaches 
to underscore the difference between commando and warrior-diplomat skills. The 
direct approach in special operations puts SOF against the enemy and, 
therefore, provides more control over outcomes. In his book, Spec Ops: Case 
Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory & Practice Admiral William 
McRaven has elaborated principles for successful conduct of these direct 
missions.96 The indirect approach in special operations enables indigenous 
forces and populations to target the enemy and, therefore, reduces resource and 
political commitment. In his work, Thomas Adams called these indirect missions 
unconventional warfare missions.   
                                            
94 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 148. 
95 Special operations are operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing 
military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These operations 
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Department of Defense, JP 3–05 Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (2003), I-1. 
96 The six principles of direct special operations (simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, 
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phases of operations, will allow SOF to achieve relative superiority, necessary for successful 
completion of a special operations mission. William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in 
Special Operations Warfare: Theory & Practice (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995).  
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Tucker and Lamb make the argument that the primary strategic value of 
the commando and warrior-diplomat skills of SOF is in their ability to  counter 
unconventional threats. Given that SOF’s unique warrior-diplomat skills differ 
most from conventional force skills, SOF indirect missions can make a 
comparatively larger strategic contribution than SOF direct missions. “Direct 
action missions in support of larger conventional force operations only hasten 
victory or retard defeat, which is pretty much the historical norm in the modern 
era for special operations.”97 Therefore, in these times of combating modern 
terrorism and counterinsurgency warfare, SOF should make better use of its 
strategic value as warrior-diplomats. In comparison to Edward Luttwak’s 
theoretical spectrum of warfare, Tucker and Lamb argue that SOF naturally have 
the most strategic value at the relational-maneuver based end, because  their 
commando skills and warrior-diplomat skills are particularly  well suited to 
distinguish between the enemy and the population and identify the enemy’s 
weakness. 
In a 2008 article in the journal Special Warfare, Joseph Celeski, a retired 
Special Forces colonel and senior SOF Fellow with the Joint Special Operations 
University, makes a similar distinction between the direct and indirect approach. 
Celeski, however, argues that SOF demonstrate strategic utility primarily as a 
countervailing force that directly counteracts or neutralizes security threats and 
secondarily as an instrument of foreign policy that enables others to indirectly 
neutralize threats.98 Contrary to Tucker and Lamb, Celeski thus emphasizes the 
SOF strategic utility of the direct approach mission over the indirect approach 
mission. Within this realm of direct and indirect missions, SOF strategic utility is 
then accomplished by: (1) improving the performance of conventional forces, (2) 
leading covert and clandestine operations (i.e., unconventional warfare), or (3) 
preventing war or conflict. This distinction between supporting missions (in which 
                                            
97 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special Operations Forces (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 159. 
98 Joseph D. Celeski, “Strategic Employment of SOF in a UW Environment,” Special Warfare 
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SOF facilitate the achievement of conventional-force objectives) and independent 
missions (in which SOF take the lead as the primary force) has previously been 
made by Tucker and Lamb. The lack of a clear, unified and sound understanding 
of SOF strategic utility can hamper its correct employment.99 
As early as 1978, future counselor to the Secretary of State Eliot Cohen 
studied the strategic utility of SOF and identified three reasons to create and 
maintain elite light infantry units (i.e., SOF).100  
The first reason is military utility, in which the usefulness of elite units is 
considered from a military rational perspective. The military needs elite units, 
because their specialized skill set allows operations to be conducted in 
hazardous situations. The distinctiveness of these specialized hazardous 
missions defines the “organizational essence” of elite units. Elite units also inject 
fresh thinking into the mainstream of military thought by their “out of the box” 
nature and can develop leaders with special skills for the rest of the army. From 
the military utility perspective, the specialist function seems the most compelling 
military reason for elite units.  
The second reason is what Cohen called the “romantic” image that elite 
units bring to the conduct of war. Their reputation as highly trained, professional, 
and fearless forces has appealed to certain highly ranked political leaders, like 
Churchill and Kennedy.  
The third reason, Cohen argued, is the increased political usefulness of 
military actions other than war. This last argument for the usefulness of SOF has 
especially grown during the last decades. The fading distinction between war and 
peace, of which the Global War on Terrorism is the latest example, necessitates 
the particular skills of low visibility elite forces. Effective politico-military signaling 
can be better done by elite units than by regular forces, because of their 
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reputation and their better chances of success in performing sensitive signaling 
operations. For political purposes, elite units can also raise public morale with 
their reputation of heroism and bravery.  
In his 1996 book Explorations in Strategy, the strategist Colin Gray 
describes the strategic utility of special operations forces in wars and conflicts.101 
To demonstrate the strategic use of SOF, its assigned mission and purpose must 
have strategic utility and clarity in assessing how SOF directly contributes to the 
outcome of a wars and conflicts. Gray categorized the general strategic utility of 
SOF in nine areas of military and/or political benefit: (1) economy of force, (2) 
expansion of choice, (3) Innovation, (4) morale, (5) showcasing of competence, 
(6) reassurance, (7) humiliation of the enemy, (8) control of escalation, and (9) 
shaping of the future.102 Of those categories, economy of force (i.e., the 
achievement of significant results with limited forces) and expansion of choice 
(i.e., expanding the choices available for political and military leaders) are 
considered the most important areas of SOF strategic utility.103 Even though 
some of these categories seem somewhat nebulous, the gist—that SOF creates 
the ability to facilitate others to military success or is an effective deterrent 
against hostilities—is valid.104 Based on historical factors, Gray later also defines 
eleven independent conditions for success that can increase the prospect for 
achieving strategic affect. These conditions for success can be stated as 
recommendations for policy.105 
In several studies published in 2007 by the Strategic Studies Department 
of the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), Robert Spulak also 
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categorizes the strategic utility of SOF into nine areas: (1) SOF provide unique 
capabilities to address strategic objectives; (2) SOF can create initiative by their 
offensive posture; (3) SOF can provide somebody else’s mass by enabling 
partner nations’ forces; (4) SOF can prevent the commitment of large numbers of 
conventional forces in conflicts; (5) SOF can create the right conditions for the 
maneuver of conventional forces; (6)  SOF can perform liaison functions because 
of their cultural and language skills; (7) SOF can provide strategic security for the 
overall force; (8) SOF can create deception in military campaigns; and (9) SOF 
can sometimes just be the simplest way to achieve the strategic goal.106 The 
utility categorization of Spulak shows much overlap with the two most important 
categories identified by Gray, namely, that SOF provide economy of force to the 
military and expansion of choice to politicians.  
2. Framework for Strategic Utility 
SOF strategic utility can be illustrated in a theoretical framework that 
separates the more conceptual approaches in defining strategic utility from the 
more pragmatic approaches. This framework is not perfect, as several overlaps 
exist between the conceptual and more pragmatic approaches. However, this 
simple framework serves as a theoretical foundation from which three 
dimensions are formulated that capture Dutch SOF strategic utility. These 
dimensions can be used to distinguish NL MARSOF unique strategic utility from 
other Dutch SOF. 
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Figure 14.   Theoretical Framework for Strategic Utility 
The first dimension of the special operations geographic environment is 
derived from the more traditional approach to division of labor between land and 
maritime units. General SOF operating environment differs from conventional 
forces by their “conceptual and sometimes physical distance from [them] and/or 
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their closer proximity to indigenous forces and populations.”107 Within this 
operating environment, SOF can distinguish themselves by the nature of their 
physical environment. This pragmatic approach categorizes SOF on the specific 
skill sets needed to operate in particular physical environments. The Netherlands 
does not have an SOF Air component. Dutch Army and Naval SOF forces use 
the air to insert, but will operate at sea, on land, or somewhere in between. 
Therefore, the second dimension will cover SOF missions from sea to land. 
Figure 15 illustrates the special operations geographic environment. 
 
Figure 15.   Dimension I. Special Operations Geographic Environment 
The second dimension, special operations in the political domain, is 
derived from the pragmatic approaches to strategic utility, separated in political 
and military utility. This domain can be divided into domestic counterterrorism 
missions and full-spectrum SOF activities abroad. Within the U.S., this division in 
political domain is represented by the organizational separation of the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense. In the former, 
the SOF focus is predominantly domestic with the emphasis on counterterrorism 
to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks.108 For the latter, the SOF focus is 
predominantly on protection of the nation-state in accordance with the national 
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military strategy with the emphasis on special operations abroad.109 In the 
Netherlands, the employment of SOF abroad lies within the political domain of 
the Ministry of Defense. The employment of SOF for policing tasks such as 
domestic counterterrorism is grounded in the legislation Dutch Police Law articles 
59 and 60. Figure 16 illustrates the political domain of special operations. The 
Dutch Special Intervention Service (DSI) of the national police has command 
authority in domestic counterterrorism missions and can employ Dutch SOF for 
these missions. This difference in political domain is also referred to as the 
difference in military and policing missions. In missions abroad, strategic 
utilization is found in the direct contribution to the outcome of a conflict. In 
domestic missions, strategic utilization is the degree to which the country is 
protected against terrorist threats.  
 
Figure 16.   Dimension II. Special Operations Political Domain 
The final dimension of the special operations spectrum is derived from the 
more conceptual approaches to strategic utility. Almost three decades ago, 
Edward Luttwak defined the particular type of warfare in which SOF could 
operate best. However, Luttwak did not distinguish between different types of 
missions within this relation-based warfare, in which identifying and exploiting the 
specific weaknesses of the enemy is crucial, but extremely difficult. Within this 
difficult operating environment, Thomas Adams divided SOF missions into 
unconventional warfare missions and more conventional warfare missions; 
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Tucker and Lamb subsequently placed these special operations in a spectrum 
from direct missions to indirect missions. SOF core missions according to U.S. 
doctrine (JP 3–05 Doctrine Joint Special Operations) and NATO doctrine (AJP-
3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations) are positioned along this 
spectrum.110 Figure 17 illustrates this spectrum of special operations. 
 
Figure 17.   Dimension III. Special Operations Spectrum 
The 3-D Cube 
The three dimensions (geographic, political and spectrum) described 
above can be placed on the three axes of a cube. This cube than represents the 
whole range in strategic utility of SOF. All possible identified SOF missions can 
be placed within the 3-dimensional context of the cube. Each of these SOF 
missions has specific strategic utility from a pragmatic or conceptual perspective 
described in the previous paragraphs.  
It is possible to position every single SOF unit within this 3-D cube. By 
identifying the SOF unit’s focus on each axis, their specific strategic range can be 
visualized. The visualization of strategic utility in these three dimensions is not 
                                            
110 See Appendix F for the definitions of the SOF core missions according to U.S. doctrine 
and see Appendix E for the definitions of the SOF core missions according to NATO doctrine. 
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perfect. When, for instance, looking at the historical employment of some SOF 
units, you can see that they have performed missions along the whole of all three 
dimensions. Nevertheless, one can always identify a particular focus in specific 
missions every SOF unit has conducted. Therefore, as a visual tool the 3-D cube 
is useful for comparison and contrast analysis.  
 
 
Figure 18.   Strategic Utility SOF 
In the following sections, this thesis uses the 3-D cube for a comparison-
contrast analysis by looking at desired/required strategic range versus actual 
strategic range. The required strategic utility can be derived from the analysis of 
governing documents and from a survey. The governing document analysis 
reveals the (inter)national demand in NL SOF, and the survey research exposes 
what the unit actually thinks its strategic value and utility should be. This strategic 
requirement in NL SOF is discussed in chapter III B. NL MARSOF and Governing 
Documents, Doctrine, and Policy and the desired strategic utility of NL MARSOF 
is analyzed in chapter V. Empirical Research.   The actual strategic range can be 
derived from the historic employment of NL SOF and is discussed in Chapter III 
C. Historical Employment of NL SOF. 
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B. NL MARSOF AND GOVERNING DOCUMENTS, DOCTRINE, AND 
POLICY 
The purpose of a governing document analysis is to identify the required 
strategic utility of NL MARSOF. The analysis uses the 3-D cube as a framework 
to look at how each document describes SOF strategic utility. The dimensions of 
the 3-D cube identify each document’s priorities and focus within the whole range 
of SOF strategic utility.  
As mentioned, the governing documents have three levels of analysis: 
from international level, to national level, and finally to Royal Netherlands Navy 
level. The analysis uses the 3-D cube framework to investigate documents, 
doctrine and policy in detail on each level and provides answers to the following 
questions in order to determine the required strategic utility of NL MARSOF:  
 Is there a connection between the theoretical analysis of strategic 
utility (3-D cube) and NL MARSOF’s required strategic utility? 
 Is there a connection in NL MARSOF’s required strategic utility among 
the different levels of governing document analysis?  
 Is there a connection between future scenarios in political stability and 
NL MARSOF’s required strategic utility? 
 Does the required strategic utility for NL MARSOF give priorities in 
missions and allow for division of labor? 
Positive answers to these questions would reveal a high degree of 
coherence in international, national, and unit policy concerning SOF utilization. 
The answers will also identify strategic utility by illustrating whether roles and 
missions are grounded in formal policy or not. Finally, the answers will help 
determine options for potential division of labor between Dutch SOF units. Figure 
19 depicts the levels of analysis of the governing documents, in which the 3-D 
cube is used as a framework on each level.  
 61 
 
Figure 19.   Governing Document Analysis, Using the 3-D Cube as a Framework 
1. International Governing Documents, Doctrine, and Policy. 
At the international level, the documents produced and published by 
NATO SOF Headquarters (NSHQ) lead in determining strategic utility. NATO 
SOF doctrine and policy are described in AJP 3–5—Allied Joint Doctrine for 
Special Operations Forces and MC-437/1 en 2—Military Committee Special 
Operations Policy. In addition, the NATO SOF Study from 2008 offers the most 
current NATO perspectives on SOF strategic utility. All three documents use the 
same cornerstone definition to characterize special operations for NATO 
members, including the Netherlands:  
Special Operations are military activities conducted by specially 
designated, organized, selected, trained, and equipped forces 
using unconventional techniques and modes of employment. These 
activities may be conducted across the full range of military 
operations independently or in conjunction with other joint forces to 
help achieve NATO’s objectives.  
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Politico-military considerations may require discreet or covert 
techniques and the acceptance of a degree of political, military, or 
physical risk not associated with conventional operations.111 
The NATO definition highlights the strategic nature of special operations 
by emphasizing that such operations are undertaken to achieve military, 
psychological, and informational objectives that represent the foundational 
instruments of national power.112 
NATO AJP 3–5—Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations Forces 
The 2009 NATO AJP 3–5 refers to SOF’s strategic utility in terms of high-
value objectives. “Special operations should be directed at the accomplishment 
of high value, critical objectives that may entail high risk but also high pay-off 
value.”113 The high risk of these operations is justified by the potential high pay-
off.  
AJP 3–5 also gives specific special operations mission criteria for 
evaluating SOF employment. A special mission has to be appropriate, feasible, 
sustainable, and justifiable.114 These criteria, however, are generic and do not 
give specific direction for SOF in gaining strategic utility.  
Of further help in determining strategic utility of NATO SOF are the three 
defined principal tasks (Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Direct Action, 
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113 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC) Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons: Belgium: NSCC, January 
2009), section 1–4. 
114 Ibid., section 1–5. 
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and Military Assistance) and additional activities.115 These principal tasks can all 
be placed in the 3-D cube along Dimension III. Special Operations Spectrum.  
Within the principal tasks, AJP 3–5 briefly discusses the distinction in 
special land operations, special air operations, and special maritime operation.116 
This traditional distinction is in accordance with Dimension I. Special Operations 
Geographic Environment.  
Finally, AJP 3–5 mentions Hostage Release Operations (HRO) of one’s 
own nationals as a “predominantly national responsibility.” It is unlikely that 
nations would give operational control of such operations to NATO.117 Here, it 
must be emphasized that this NATO policy in HRO does not fit Dimension II. 
Special Operations Political Domain. Even though NATO sees HRO as a national 
responsibility, the AJP 3–5 was intended for special operations abroad, which still 
falls within the political domain of the Ministry of Defense. Domestic (policing) 
operations by definition are not part of NATO operations. 
NATO MC-437/1 and 2—Military Committee Special Operations Forces 
Policy 
MC-437 defines SOF as a “strategic asset to be employed by a 
commander to help achieve specified operational-level objectives.” Therefore, 
special operations can, but do not need to, have specific strategic goals. This 
also fits James Kiras’ interpretation of strategic utility as the “cumulative effect of 
numerous special operations that have strategic attrition.”  
According to MC437/1 “SOF differ from other Joint forces principally 
through their unique capabilities, agility, and flexibility and are not a substitute for 
                                            
115 Appendix E gives a detailed explanation of these tasks and activities. Source: North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC) Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons: Belgium: NSCC, January 2009), section 2–1 – 
2–5.  
116 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC) Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons: Belgium: NSCC, January 
2009), section 2–6 – 2–8. 
117 Ibid., section 2–4. 
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conventional forces.”118 Their strategic utility thus lay in the fact that they are 
different from conventional forces in capabilities: they can react and move 
quickly, and they can continuously adapt to developing situations. The point that 
SOF has to be different (not just better) than conventional forces is also 
emphasized in the work of, for instance, Thomas Adams. 
The latest versions of MC-437/1 and MC-437/2 also add several notes to 
the definitions of the three principle SOF tasks: special reconnaissance (SR), 
direct action (DA), and military assistance (MA). These additions address some 
of the recent discussion in tasking and strategic utility of NATO SOF. For 
instance, MC-437/1 and MC-437/2 state, “SOF conduct MA within their field of 
expertise and therefore MA is not exclusively a SOF task.”119  So, the domain of 
training, advising, and mentoring indigenous friendly assets is not exclusive to 
SOF anymore.120 NATO concluded this after the recent experiences of 
conventional forces conducting similar tasks in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Finally, MC-437 states that “Direct Action (DA) differs from conventional 
offensive actions in the level of risk, techniques employed and the degree of 
precision utilized to achieve a specific effect” and “SOF employ unique 
capabilities for Special Reconnaissance (SR), like HUMINT activities, or the 
employment of ISR assets.”121 DA and SR missions, therefore, are not exclusive 
to SOF, and SOF’s strategic utility lies in its unique abilities to mitigate the level 
of risk involved, to employ the special techniques and skills required, and the 
ability to discriminate in target acquisition. 
                                            
118 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military Committee Decision 437/1, Special 
Operations Policy (Belgium: NATO, 2006), 1. 
119 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military Committee Decision 437/2, Special 
Operations Policy (Belgium: NATO, 2006), 3. 
120 This non-exclusiveness in tasks is also stated in a broader sense in the NATO SOF 
Study. “CT and COIN are not the exclusive domain of NATO SOF, but SOF can effectively 
complement the overarching application of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military 
operations applied in a COIN role.” Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special 
Operations Coordination Center (NSCC). NATO Special Operations Forces Study (Mons, 
Belgium: NSCC, December 2008), 13. 
121 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Military Committee Decision 437/1, Special 
Operations Policy (Belgium: NATO, 2006), 4. 
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Within the 3-D cube, MC-437/1 and MC-437/2 predominantly focus on 
describing the different kinds of special operations within the Special Operations 
Spectrum (Dimension III). The NATO document, for obvious reasons, does not 
address the realm of domestic counterterrorism (Dimension II) nor does it make 
distinctions in geographic environment (Dimension I) as does the Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5).  
NATO Special Operations Forces Study (2008) 
The 2008 NATO SOF Study’s purpose was to examine broad trends in 
SOF structure, organization, capabilities, interoperability, and resourcing. The 
study specifically analyzed the roles and tasks of national SOF organizations. To 
that end, NATO SOF HQ interviewed personnel from twelve different NATO 
nations, including the Netherlands, to see which of three different types of 
national SOF organizational models would determine the optimal special 
operations organization.122   
As strategic assets, SOF are understandably viewed primarily through the 
lens of national interest. However, the increasingly prevalent security perspective 
indicates that multinational collective security arrangements are a prerequisite for 
confronting the disparate and complex security challenges of the 21st century. 
NATO SOF derives its strategic utility from this anticipated security environment, 
abstracted from NATO’s Comprehensive Political Guidance. This environment is 
characterized as “increasingly complex and unpredictable where more diverse, 
less visible and less predictable irregular threats create a state of low level 
                                            
122 The three models from which NATO members can choose depending upon their national 
requirements and their stage of SOF development are: a National Military Staff Element; a 
Component Command; or a Military Service. The study concluded that the “critical ingredient to 
optimize SOF is a dedicated national special operations organization to provide coherent, long 
term stewardship, authority, and direction over all aspects of special operations.” Source: North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC). NATO 
Special Operations Forces Study (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, December 2008), 22.  
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persistent conflict for the foreseeable future.”123 Specific capabilities required to 
operate in this security environment are:124 
 Strategic Anticipation: The capability for rapid and effective response 
to unforeseen circumstances. This requires high-readiness forces with 
the capability to analyze the environment and task-organize 
accordingly in order to deploy rapidly to provide tailored responses to 
many different situations.  
 Deter, disrupt, defend and protect against terrorism: This capability is 
needed to protect the Alliance’s populations, territory, critical 
infrastructure and forces, and to support consequence management. 
 Support to Counter-Irregular threat activities: These activities are 
predominately related to CT and COIN operations.125 
 Secure, interdict, destroy, or assist with rendering safe weapons of 
mass destruction: The additional pressing concern for NATO regarding 
future enemy capabilities in WMD has elevated the importance of this 
capability. 
 Conduct operations in demanding geographical and climatic environ-
ments. 
 Identify hostile elements, including in urban areas, in order to conduct 
operations in a way that minimizes unintended damage. 
 The ability and flexibility to conduct operations in circumstances where 
the various efforts of several authorities, institutions and nations need 
to be coordinated in a comprehensive manner to achieve the desired 
results. 
From this analysis of the security environment in which SOF should be 
able to operate, the study does not explicitly define NATO SOF strategic utility. 
The Study merely gives a series of statements that complement NATO’s formal 
definition of special operations: 
                                            
123 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC). NATO Special Operations Forces Study (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, December 2008), 11. 
124 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] “NATO Comprehensive Political Guidance.” 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO].   
125 Counter-insurgency operations are those military, paramilitary, political, economic, 
psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. Counter-terrorism encompasses 
all offensive measures taken to neutralize terrorism before and after hostile acts are carried out. 
Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC) Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations (AJP-3.5) (Mons: Belgium: NSCC, January 
2009), LEX-3.   
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 “SOF in essence provide a strategic offensive and defensive 
asymmetric capability.”126 SOF provides an alternative to 
overwhelming military force in the form of precision attacks against the 
enemy’s critical vulnerabilities. Therefore, SOF gives political and 
military leaders “expansion of choice” and “economy of force.”127 
  “Military activities deemed special are outside the realm of 
conventional operations or beyond the standard capabilities of 
conventional forces.”128 
  “The full employment of SOF is brought to bear through the comple-
mentary employment of direct and indirect approaches across the full 
range of potential military operations.”129  
 “The current and anticipated future security environments plagued with 
uncertainty and ambiguity are precisely those for which SOF are 
ideally suited.” 130 
 Finally, “SOF can also maintain formal and informal relationships to 
domestic counter-terrorism organizations and can provide varying 
degrees of support when circumstances require additional capabilities 
and assistance is required.”131 This point emphasizes the homeland 
security utility of SOF.  
Fitting NATO SOF Headquarters’ perspective on SOF strategic utility to 
the 3-D cube framework of three dimensions reveals a substantial resemblance. 
The NATO SOF Study supports the applicability and relevance of all three 
dimensions. The relevance of “Dimension I: Special Operations Geographic 
Environment” is demonstrated, because SOF must be able to “conduct 
operations in demanding geographical and climatic environments.” The NATO 
SOF Study supports the applicability and relevance of “Dimension II: Special 
Operations Political Domain,” because it recognizes SOF’s utility in the support of 
domestic counter-terrorism organizations for homeland security. Finally, the SOF 
                                            
126 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC). NATO Special Operations Forces Study (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, December 2008), 10. 
127 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy. Contributions in Military Studies, no. 164. 
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996). 
128 North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] Special Operations Coordination Center 
(NSCC). NATO Special Operations Forces Study (Mons, Belgium: NSCC, December 2008), 5. 
129 Ibid., 7. 
130 Ibid., 10. 
131 Ibid., 13. 
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study demonstrates the relevance of “Dimension III: Special Operations 
Spectrum,” because NATO SOF has to be able to function “through the 
complementary employment of direct and indirect approaches across the full 
range of potential military operations.”  
In summary, the various relevant NATO studies and doctrine all support 
the applicability and relevance of the 3-D cube as a visual tool for showing the 
whole range of SOF strategic utility. However, as expected, the NATO guidelines 
are generic and all encompassing. They do not give strategic focus to specific 
NATO countries or specific NATO SOF units. This task is left to the discretion of 
the different NATO country members. Therefore, to discover further guidance on 
strategic utility for the two SOF elements in the Netherlands, this thesis must 
undertake the second level of analysis: the national governing documents, 
doctrine, and policy.  
2. National Governing Documents, Doctrine, and Policy 
At the national level, the documents addressing SOF strategic utility are 
predominately produced by the Netherlands Ministry of Defense. However, the 
rules and regulations concerning the domestic counterterrorism task of MARSOF 
are described in legislation and documents from the Department of Justice.  
 National Defense policy and cooperation is laid out in the Minister of 
Defense’s written policy in Netherlands Defense Forces, to Serve Worldwide 
from 2007, and this policy is in turn based on the publication Netherlands 
National Security Strategy 2007. The Final Report on Explorations, Guidance for 
the Defense Forces of the Future from 2010 describes future scenarios in global 
stability and the several policy options to address these scenarios. The Dutch 
Chief of Defense has formulated his military strategy accordingly in the Dutch 
National Military Strategy 2010.  
As a final important point, the Dutch government recently decided to 
implement the most severe budget cutbacks in the history of the Dutch Military 
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Forces. This decision also has implications in national policy choices for the 
Dutch armed forces that this analysis will address.  
 
Dutch National Security Strategy (2007) and Netherlands Defense Forces, 
to Serve Worldwide (2007) 
 
The Dutch National Security Strategy states five vital interests for the 
Netherlands.132 These interests are interconnected, as a breach in one interest 
can affect other interests as well. 
1. Territorial Security: territorial integrity and independence of the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands 
2. Economic Security: an undisturbed, effective and efficient economy 
3. Ecologic Security: the capability to recover completely after environmental 
disasters 
4. Physical Security: undisturbed living conditions for all citizens in the 
Netherlands by preventing and protecting against threats to national 
health, terrorism, and other, human inflicted disasters 
5. Social and Political Stability: an undisturbed social climate where values 
such as tolerance, collaboration, and democracy prevail  
Nine threats are identified that can disturb these vital national interests 
and cause social disruption in Dutch society. They are divided (and subdivided 
below) into: classic threats, socio-economic threats, and natural threats. Classic 
threats are CBRN attacks, terrorism, the degradation of international law and 
order, and international organized crime. Socio-economic threats are cyber 
attacks, resource attacks, and radicalization. Natural threats are climate change 
and natural disasters, and pandemic outbreaks.133  
                                            
132 Department of State (NL), Dutch national security strategy [Strategie Nationale 
Veiligheid] (Den Haag, the Netherlands: DoS, 2007), 10. 
133 Ibid., 12. 
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The Dutch military forces’ contribution in protecting the five vital interests 
from the aforementioned nine threats is grounded in the Dutch Constitution and 
legislation. The Constitution states that “the Dutch military forces are to protect 
the territory and interests of the Kingdom of The Netherlands and help maintain 
and promote international law and order.”134 To uphold this constitutional 
obligation, Dutch forces have three core tasks, recorded in various legislative 
acts: 
1. The protection of national and allied territory, including the Dutch 
Antilles and Aruba; 
2. Maintaining and promoting international law and order; 
3. Supporting civil authorities, national as well as international, in law 
enforcement, disaster prevention, and humanitarian aid. 
The 2007 policy statement from the Dutch Minister of Defense highlights 
the shift in Defense strategic focus to counter-insurgency capability. Besides the 
protection of territorial integrity and national interests, Dutch MoD is to remain an 
active and constructive partner within the international community (NATO, UN, 
and EU) in order to promote international law and order.135 
The minister’s policy statement addresses the change in the security 
environment to a more global nature with inherent growing threats, such as weak 
states, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Furthermore, the rise of 
powerful states like China as a world power is perceived as a potential threat.  
To prepare for these threats the Dutch military forces need to be prepared 
to conduct effective security sector reform (SSR), operate in complex (human) 
environments, work amongst the local population, and integrate the military force 
                                            
134 The protection of territorial integrity and national interests, and the promotion of 
international law and order is stated in the Dutch Constitution: “Een krijgsmacht is ten behoeve 
van de verdediging en ter bescherming van de belangen van het Koninkrijk, alsmede ten 
behoeve van de handhaving en bevordering van de internationle rechtsorde.” Source: Dutch 
Const. art. 97.  
135 Minister of Defense (NL), The Netherlands Defense Forces, to serve worldwide. 
[Defensie, Wereldwijd Dienstbaar.] (Den Haag, The Netherlands, 18 September 2007). 
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with the other instruments of power in a multinational operational environment. 
To that end, the Netherlands adopted the 3-D approach of Diplomacy, Defense, 
and Development as the way forward for Dutch foreign policy and defense 
capability.136  
From a national security perspective, military disaster support capability 
and counterterrorism forces are required. This use of military force for domestic 
counterterrorism is grounded in legislation. Articles 59 and 60 of Dutch Police 
Law states that units that national counterterrorism capability (bijstands-
eenheden) will be provided by special police forces as well as special defense 
forces.  
 
Final Report on Strategic Explorations, Guidance for the Defense Forces 
of the Future (2010) 
 
This study was the most extensive strategic exploration ever for the 
Netherlands defense forces. The Minister of Defense’s policy statement 
Netherlands Defense Forces, to Serve Worldwide from 2007 led directly to this 
study. The study’s purpose was to explore long-term global developments and 
construct policy options to best accommodate different future scenarios in 
political stability towards 2030. Depending on the likelihood of each scenario, 
policy makers can objectively assess choices in the future roles and missions of 
the Netherlands defense forces. Thorough analysis of the findings in this final 
report, therefore, is most relevant in determining the required Dutch (maritime) 
SOF strategic utility. 
The study presents a quadrant of four different strategic scenarios that 




                                            
136 Interestingly, U.S. SOCOM also emphasizes the development of “3-D operators” to 
counter current and future threats.  
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world. These four scenarios give detailed insight in how—and with what 
consequences—the world could develop in the next two decennia. The scenarios 
are based on two core uncertainties:137 
1. Is there a tendency toward global cooperation and integration, or self-
reliance and fragmentation? 
2. Is our security predominantly determined by state or non-state actors? 
 
 
Figure 20.   Four Hypothetical Scenarios in Future Political Stability around the 
World. (After138)  
 
In the multi-polar scenario, state actors determine security and the states 
have formed multiple power blocks. In the multilateral scenario, state actors also 
                                            
137 Ministry of Defense (NL), Final report: explorations, guidance for the Defense Forces of 
the future [Eindrapport: Verkenningen. Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst] (Den Haag, 
The Netherlands: MoD, 2010). 
138 Ministry of Defense (NL), Final report: explorations, guidance for the Defense Forces of 
the future [Eindrapport: Verkenningen. Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst] (Den Haag, 
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determine security, but states have formed well-functioning systems of 
international cooperation. In the fragmentation scenario, non-state actors 
determine security and the states have formed multiple power blocks. Finally, in 
the network scenario, non-state actors determine security, but states have 
formed well-functioning systems of international cooperation. 
These scenarios all offer different implications for the “best fit” strategic 
focus of the Dutch defense forces. The study proposes different configurations in 
conventional forces for each scenario, but it emphasizes a growing need for 
special operations capability within all four future scenarios.139 Having said that, 
the four scenarios do not explicitly mention a specific need and/or priority in one 
particular SOF principal tasks (e.g., Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, 
Military Assistance, or Counter Terrorism).140  
The study also divides the role of the Dutch military forces into seven 
strategic functions. These functions provide a coherent approach to looking at 
national security issues and help determine the role of Dutch military in each 
function.141 
1. Anticipation: prepare for foreseen and unforeseen developments that 
affect the Netherlands’ national interests and international law and order.  
2. Prevention: conduct operations in and outside country borders to prevent 
threats to the Netherlands’ national interests and international law and 
order from rising. 
3. Deterrence: credibly discourage all activities taken against the 
Netherlands’ national interests and international law and order. 
                                            
139 Ministry of Defense (NL). Final report: explorations, guidance for the Defense Forces of 
the future [Eindrapport: Verkenningen. Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst] (Den Haag, 
The Netherlands: MoD, 2010), Part III. 128–194. 
140For a detailed description of SOF principle tasks, see Appendix E: SOF core missions 
(NATO doctrine).  
141 Ministry of Defense (NL). Final report: explorations, guidance for the Defense Forces of 
the future [Eindrapport: Verkenningen. Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst] (Den Haag, 
The Netherlands: MoD, 2010), Part IV. 194–297. 
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4. Protection: protect and defend the national kingdom as well as allied 
territory and civilian safety.   
5. Intervention: actively change threatening courses of action of actors 
against Netherlands’ national interests and international law and order. 
6. Stabilization: assist in termination of conflicts and promote political, 
economical and social stability according to the Netherlands’ Kingdom’s 
national interests and international law and order. 
7. Normalization: restore acceptable living conditions after (military) conflict 
or catastrophic disaster.  
 
Figure 21.   Seven Strategic Functions of the Dutch Defense Forces. (After142)  
These seven strategic roles are similar to the NATO terminology of conflict 
development over time and NATO’s Crisis Management System. Dutch military 
forces play a role in each of these strategic functions, which are embedded in the 
three core tasks of the military. However, based on all the presented future 
                                            
142 Ministry of Defense (NL), Final report: explorations, guidance for the Defense Forces of 
the future [Eindrapport: Verkenningen. Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst] (Den Haag, 
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scenarios, the Dutch military will have to focus more on nontraditional military 
strategic functions such as deterrence, protection and intervention.  
First, the future Dutch military needs to be able to carry out the strategic 
functions of anticipation and prevention. Practically, that means having a 
sufficient strategic intelligence position, having enough flexibility and adaptability 
structurally embedded in the organization, intensifying international military 
cooperation, and being able to conduct training and operate with other 
(indigenous) forces.  
Secondly, the future Dutch military needs to be better able to carry out the 
strategic functions of stabilization and normalization. Practically, that means 
being able to conduct security and stability operations as part of international 
coalitions in which Security Sector Reform (SSR) has priority. Reconstruction, 
humanitarian aid, and advising, training, and conducting operations with 
indigenous security forces are essential capabilities for the military.   
Finally, all four future scenarios highlight the continuing threat of terrorist 
attacks. Therefore, the Dutch military must have counterterrorism capability to 
employ domestically and abroad in each of the seven strategic functions.  
When comparing the NATO SOF principal tasks to the focus of the future 
strategic functions of Dutch military forces, they project growing importance in 
Military Assistance and Special Reconnaissance. The military capacities needed 
for anticipation, prevention and stabilization (i.e. strategic intelligence, flexibility, 
and advising/training of indigenous forces) can be provided by SOF with special 
reconnaissance and military assistance. Furthermore, the need for counter 
terrorist capability will remain important for the general protection of national 
interests and especially throughout the phases of conflict development: 
prevention, deterrence, protection, and intervention. The figure below illustrates 




Figure 22.   SOF Principal Tasks in Relation to Dutch Military Strategic 
Functions (After143) 
In summary, two main conclusions can be drawn from this extensive 
report on future guidance for the Dutch Defense Forces. First, the study 
specifically addresses a growing need for special operations capability within all 
four future security scenarios. There will be a continuous need for all three 
principal SOF tasks, including domestic counterterrorism. This conclusion 
justifies the general and growing need for SOF within Dutch forces. Secondly, the 
analysis of the future Dutch forces’ focus in strategic functions indicates a 
growing importance of military assistance and special reconnaissance. 
Dutch National Military Strategy (2010). 
The Dutch National Military Strategy 2010 (DNMS) builds on the findings 
in the Report on Strategic Explorations, Guidance for the Defense Forces of the 
                                            
143 Ministry of Defense (NL), Study: Special Operations Forces moving towards 2020 [Studie 
“Special Operations Forces op weg naar 2020”] (Den Haag, The Netherlands: Ministry of 
Defense, 11 October 2010). 
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Future. The Strategy uses the Report’s analysis of the future operating 
environment (security scenarios and strategic functions) to assemble a coherent 
guidance for the capability development of Dutch military forces. 
The DNMS takes into consideration two main military implications of the 
environment analysis for its strategy development.144 The first finding is the 
growing connection of internal and external security. For instance, the growing 
instability in other countries can induce international terrorism that threatens 
national security. This implies the necessity for military capability to address 
causes and effects of security threats globally that affect the Netherlands 
nationally. The second finding is the more unpredictable, complex character of 
military operations with different levels of violence, different actors, and irregular 
or asymmetric methods.  
To execute the three constitutionally-mandated tasks in this future 
operating environment, the Dutch military needs to be flexible, expeditionary in 
nature, and capable of protracted operations. Judging from the scenario analysis, 
the military embraces the growing importance of the strategic functions of 
prevention and stabilization. This, however, does not mean the abandonment of 
capabilities for deterrence, protection, and intervention. The direct implication for 
Dutch SOF, as mentioned in the analysis of the previous report, is the growing 
importance of military assistance and special reconnaissance. 
The DNMS specifically highlights the ability to operate effectively in 
complex military operations such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism. 
Along this line of intent, DNMS indicates a continuous need for distinct forces 
that can operate in this environment. Furthermore, the DNMS mentions specific 
capabilities needed for effective military operations like strategic intelligence 
gathering, advising and training of (indigenous) forces, reconstruction, and joint, 
 
 
                                            
144 Ministry of Defense (NL), Dutch national military strategy 2010 [Militaire Strategische 
Visie 2010] (Den Haag, The Netherlands: MoD, 2010), Ch. 2, 9–22. 
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combined and interagency cooperation. Of these capabilities, strategic 
intelligence gathering and advising/training of (indigenous) forces are principal 
tasks of SOF. 
In summary, the analysis of the DNMS does not show any disconnect with 
the findings in the Report on Strategic Explorations, Guidance for the Defense 
Forces of the Future. On the contrary, the DNMS fully supports the report’s 
findings and consequently describes the military implications and operational 
priorities.  
Dutch Defense Forces after the Economic Crisis: A Smaller Force in an 
Unstable World (2011) 
Because of the economic crisis beginning in 2008, Dutch defense forces 
face the largest budget cutbacks in their history. The military has to structurally 
reduce approximately 15 percent of all its costs. That means a drastic reduction 
in forces and capabilities. Indicative is the 18 percent cutback in military 
personnel.145 Furthermore, several heavy reductions in land, air, and maritime 
force capability will be implemented immediately. As a result, the Dutch 
government realizes that Dutch forces cannot fully achieve the strategic goals set 
out previously in the Report on Strategic Explorations and the DNMS.  
However, budget cutbacks will be implemented under the condition that 
SOF capability remains unaffected. In practice, this means that the cutbacks do 
not have a big impact on Dutch SOF because of the identified continuous need 
for all three principal SOF tasks, including domestic counterterrorism. In addition, 
the growing importance of military assistance and special reconnaissance 
remains unchanged by the budget cuts.  
One implicit minor effect of the budget cuts for Dutch SOF is in intensifying 
the need for maritime SOF and land SOF units to divide SOF tasks more 
                                            
145 Minister of Defense (NL), Dutch Defense Forces after the economic crisis: a smaller 
force in an unstable world [Defensie na de kredietcrisis: een kleinere krijgsmacht in een onrustige 
wereld] (Den Haag, The Netherlands, 08 April, 2011), 12. 
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efficiently between them and conduct missions more effectively.146 Furthermore, 
intensified cooperation between police and defense units (UIM) in domestic 
counterterrorism activities is necessary to promote effectiveness and efficiency. 
One possible result can be co-location of all national counterterrorist units 
(including the UIM), which will affect the organizational structure of MARSOF. 
However, these intensified cooperation initiatives are still in an early exploratory 
phase. 
 
Special Operations Forces Moving Towards 2020 (2010) and Guidance 
Service Special Interventions (2008) 
 
The classified Ministry of Defense study Special Forces 2004 was the first 
Dutch document to describe joint national SOF policy. The follow-up study 
Special Operations Forces Moving towards 2020 sought to implement lessons 
learned from recent SOF missions and adjust the national SOF policy of 2004 
accordingly.147 Even though both these NL MoD documents concerning SOF are 
classified, sanitized parts can be used.  
The study builds on the other governing documents analyzed in this 
thesis, especially the Report on Strategic Explorations, and concurs with these 
findings. Even in these times of budget cuts, the growing need for special 
operations capability validates Dutch SOF. Previous missions emphasize a need 
to intensify the cooperation between the maritime SOF unit (MARSOF) and the 
army SOF unit (Dutch Commandos). This enhanced cooperation must focus on 
effective joint operations as well as effective division of labor between both units. 
Furthermore, domestic counterterrorism capability remains a core task for Dutch 
SOF. 
                                            
146 Minister of Defense (NL), Dutch Defense Forces after the economic crisis: a smaller 
force in an unstable world [Defensie na de kredietcrisis: een kleinere krijgsmacht in een onrustige 
wereld] (Den Haag, The Netherlands, 08 April, 2011), 24. 
147 Ministry of Defense (NL), Study: Special Operations Forces moving towards 2020 [Studie 
“Special Operations Forces op weg naar 2020”] (Den Haag, The Netherlands: Ministry of 
Defense, 11 October 2010). 
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The study does not give specific guidance on which SOF tasks belong to 
which SOF unit. Unfortunately, the sensitivity involved with these choices 
prevented clear written guidance. Historic unit rivalry between maritime and land 
units has somewhat blurred the process of making an objective choice.  
The study does give guidance on two points of division of labor. First, 
maritime SOF predominantly must focus on operating in a maritime environment 
and land SOF predominately must operate in a land-based environment. This 
obvious guidance can be placed in Dimension I: Special Operations Geographic 
Environment. Secondly, MARSOF is the Dutch SOF unit specifically tasked with 
domestic counterterrorist operations. The classified policy document of the NL 
Department of Justice (DoJ) Service Special Interventions supports this SOF 
tasking concerning domestic counterterrorism.148 
Finally, in accordance with other national studies and policy, Dutch SOF 
must anticipate that special reconnaissance and military assistance will grow in 
importance over the next years. These, as well as other non-kinetic skills such as 
non-combatant evacuation, must be present in Dutch SOF. However, the study 
does not give guidance on potential division of labor in these particular tasks for 
the two Dutch SOF units.  
In summary, the various relevant national policy documents and studies all 
support the usefulness of the 3-D cube as a visual tool for showing the strategic 
utility of an SOF unit. Dutch SOF will have to be able to operate along the whole 
spectrum of special operations, with the note that special reconnaissance and 
military assistance will grow in importance. As for the political domain of special 
operations, the continuing threat of terrorism necessitates a domestic 
counterterrorism capability. Finally, the documents do not emphasize a growing 
or declining focus in a particular geographic operating environment. They only 
offer the cautionary note that current operations in Afghanistan are not to be 
taken as the sole reference for future operating environments. Dutch SOF need 
                                            
148 Department of Justice (NL), Guidance Service Special Interventions [Richtlijnen Dienst 
Speciale interventies (DSI)] (Den Haag, The Netherlands: DoJ, 2008). 
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to be able to conduct operations on land as well as in maritime operating 
environments. The SOF documents give some suggestions on task 
differentiation, but do not mandate a division of labor between the Dutch SOF 
units.  
3. Navy/Marine Corps Doctrine, and Policy 
At the military service level, the Royal Netherlands Navy historically has 
produced fewer doctrine and policy documents than has the Royal Netherlands 
Army. Nevertheless, the Navy recently presented several important documents 
that describe policy concerning the employment of maritime special operations 
forces. The Maritime Strategy: The Royal Netherlands Navy in 2030, for Security 
on and from the Sea and the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps Commandant 
Vision 2015 both give general guidance and direction for the development and 
employment of maritime SOF. Furthermore, two other relevant documents also 
address Dutch maritime SOF. The study Enhancement of SOF Capabilities of the 
Royal Netherlands Navy conducted in 2009 formulates the necessity for NL 
MARSOF, and the policy proposal Restructuring Netherlands Maritime Special 
Operations Forces (NL MARSOF) Core Capacity discusses the practical 
implications of forming NL MARSOF.  
Maritime Strategy: The Royal Netherlands Navy in 2030, for Security on 
and from the Sea (2009). 
 
The Dutch Maritime Strategy is primarily based on the strategic 
environment analysis and guidance of the 2007 policy statement of the Minister 
of Defense. However, the maritime strategy also fits the later findings of the 2010 
Report on Strategic Explorations and, therefore, is still valid.  
The Maritime Strategy summarizes the maritime implications of the 
strategic environment scenarios towards 2030 as “the rise of more small and 
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large maritime powers that increase the risks in conflict on and from the sea.”149 
The strategy more concretely describes four global maritime trends. First, in 2030 
more navies will possess advanced capabilities, like nuclear-propelled 
submarines, carriers, and long-range missile systems. This continuous 
proliferation in weapon systems and technology gives state and non-state actors 
the capability to threaten Western maritime interests. Second, climate change 
can potentially alter maritime lines of communication, trade routes, and littoral 
boundaries. Third, population growth and the interconnected urbanization of 
coastal areas will carry increased security threats with them. Finally, pirates, 
criminals, and terrorists will continue to use the free maneuver space at sea for 
their particular goals.  
The Royal Netherlands Navy identifies six maritime tasks to prepare for 
these maritime trends towards 2030. These maritime tasks are listed below and 
include implications for MARSOF.150  
1. National Maritime Tasks 
Maritime SOF must be able to conduct maritime counterterrorism in the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, including the Caribbean. Furthermore, the coastguard can 
call on MARSOF for counter-drug operations (for example, maritime border 
security and interdiction). 
Within national borders, the Unit Intervention Marines (UIM), as part of MARSOF, 
must be able to counter large-scale terrorist attacks. In these operations, the 
Service Special Interventions Service (DSI) of the national police will have 
operational command.  
 
                                            
149 Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Maritime strategy: The Royal Netherlands Navy in 2030, 
for security on and from the sea [Maritieme Visie: De Koninklijke marine in 2030, voor veiligheid 
op en vanuit zee] (Den Helder, the Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Navy, March, 2009), 20. 
150 Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Maritime strategy: The Royal Netherlands Navy in 2030, 
for security on and from the sea [Maritieme Visie: De Koninklijke marine in 2030, voor veiligheid 
op en vanuit zee] (Den Helder, The Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Navy, March, 2009), Ch.4, 
26–29. 
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2. Maritime Safety Operations (MSO) 
Keeping sea trade routes clear is vital to Dutch economic interests. MARSOF 
must be able to help secure shipping through sea chokepoints against piracy, 
other criminals, and international terrorism.  
3. Humanitarian and Relief Operations 
There is no designated task for MARSOF in these operations, besides the 
general task to provide the SOF core capabilities (SR, DA, and MA) when 
needed.   
4. Conflict Prevention Operations 
MARSOF must be able to conduct strategic reconnaissance and military 
assistance from the sea into the littoral operating environment to contribute to 
maritime conflict prevention.  
5. Stability Operations 
MARSOF must be able to conduct supporting operations and advance force 
operations in support of amphibious operations. For example, beach 
reconnaissance from Dutch Navy platforms is part of those advance force 
operations. Direct action in support of upcoming security operations is another 
form of supporting operations conducted by MARSOF.  
6. National Defense 
Within their field of expertise, MARSOF must be able to contribute to the 
protection and defense of national territory and integrity of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, including the Dutch Antilles.  
Finally, MARSOF must be able to conduct special operations with the 
support of conventional Dutch Marine Corps units. These enabling elements of 
the Marine Corps will act as a force multiplier, by enhancing the sustainability 
and fighting power of MARSOF in protracted operations such as 
counterinsurgency.  
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Royal Netherlands Marine Corps Commandant Vision 2015 (2009) 
The Marine Corps Commandant’s Vision starts with a short description of 
the future operating environment of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps. This 
description does not deviate from the strategic scenarios described in the Report 
on Strategic Explorations. Noteworthy, however, are the stated importance of 
irregular warfare capability, the urbanization of the littoral, and the growing 
importance of these areas.  
The Commandant identifies six core competency sets for the Marine 
Corps of which special operations is specified as one skill set.151 MARSOF, as 
part of the Marine Corps, must be able to conduct full spectrum (maritime) 
special operations, and designated units of the Marine Corps must be able 
function as a force multiplier for MARSOF in these special operations. To explore 
the best options for this cooperation between MARSOF and conventional Marine 
Corps enablers, a working group developed the best practices and organizational 
structure. 
Besides guidance to conduct full spectrum (maritime) special operations 
and cooperation with conventional Marine Corps units, the Commandant’s Vision 
does not give further detailed guidance to MARSOF.  
Study: Enhancement of SOF Capabilities of the Royal Netherlands Navy 
(2009) and Restructuring Netherlands Maritime SOF Core Capacity (2010) 
The short study on enhancement of SOF capabilities addressed efficiency 
and effectiveness problems of the maritime SOF capability in the Royal 
Netherlands Navy. Section 1A discusses these problems in detail, which 
ultimately led to the creation of NL MARSOF.  
                                            
151 The six competency sets for the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps are: (1) amphibious 
expertise, (2) expeditionary capability, (3) self-supporting operations with small units, (4) complex 
military operations, (5) operations in extreme environments, and (6) special operations. Source: 
Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps Commandant vision 2015 
[De Visie van de Commandant van het Korps Mariniers op de Ontwikkeling van het Korps tot 
2015] (Den Helder, The Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Navy, 2008), Ch. 2. 
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Even though the study was an important first step in forming MARSOF, it 
lacked one vital part. The study makes no effort to formulate specific “roles and 
missions” for NL MARSOF.152 The study leaves this question to follow-up studies 
in rethinking and reorganizing Dutch maritime SOF.  
The policy proposal for NL MARSOF Restructuring Netherlands Maritime 
SOF Core Capacity states that there is no significant change in the original 
tasking of the former units that now form NL MARSOF. Therefore, NL MARSOF’s 
tasks are the sum of the tasks of the former units. The policy proposal sums up 
these main tasks as follows. NL MARSOF must be able to conduct full spectrum 
(maritime) special operations and support expeditionary (amphibious) operations 
of the Royal Netherlands Navy.153 Furthermore, NL MARSOF must be able to 
conduct domestic counterterrorism operations.  
When elaborating on these aforementioned tasks, NL MARSOF’s task of 
full spectrum special operations means no less than the ability to conduct special 
reconnaissance, direct action, military action and additional activities according to 
NATO doctrine. The support of expeditionary (amphibious) operations is divided 
into supporting operations, advance force operations and pre-assault 
operations.154 In the case of support operations, NL MARSOF is not under 
                                            
152 The military roles of SOF are defined by the broad and enduring purposes (implementing 
national policy) for which Congress established SOCOM and the missions are the more specific 
tasks assigned to combatant commanders. “SOF have the strategic role to attack adversaries 
and targets not vulnerable to conventional forces, and that unconventional warfare is a mission 
that supports role.” Source: David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, United States Special 
Operations Forces (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 143. 
153 An amphibious operation is a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious 
force embarked in ships and or crafts with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force (LF) 
ashore to accomplish the assigned mission. Source: Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Policy 
proposal: restructuring Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces (NL MARSOF) core 
capacity [Beleidsvoornemen: Herschikken kerncapaciteit Netherlands Maritime Special 
Operations Forces (NL MARSOF)] (Den Helder, The Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Navy), 
2011. 
154 Supporting Operations are conducted by forces other than the amphibious force in 
support of the amphibious operation, ordered by higher authorities on request from amphibious 
force commanders. These operations may set conditions for the advance force to move into the 
operational area (strategic and operational targets in the operational area).  
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operational command of the amphibious task force, but instead is under 
command of a Combined Joint Special Operations Component Command 
(CJSOCC). In the other two cases, NL MARSOF is under the command of the 
Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF). The specific command structure 
has impact on the particular type of mission assigned and the available assets, 
but practically it does not change the requirement of the core capabilities of NL 
MARSOF, namely SR, DA, and MA. For instance, the particular skill-set needed 
for direct action does not differ when conducted under CATF or CJSOCC 
command. Finally, domestic counterterrorism operations are one of NL 
MARSOF’s core tasks because it was (and still is) the primary task of the Unit 
Intervention Marines.  
At the time of this research, the policy proposal is still an advanced draft 
version. Nevertheless, the summary of tasks that have to be conducted by NL 
MARSOF gives a general idea of the required strategic utility from the 
perspective of the Royal Netherlands Navy.  
In summary, the analysis of the Maritime Strategy 2030, the Marine Corps 
Commandant’s Vision 2015, and the two policy documents reveals no disconnect 
in required strategic utility for NL MARSOF. However, the formulation of roles 
and mission for NL MARSOF remains generic. These roles (defined by the broad 
 
 
                                            
Advance Force Operations are conducted in the operational area by a task-organized 
element of the amphibious force, prior to the arrival of the amphibious force in the operational 
area, to shape the battle space in preparation for the main assault or other operations of an 
amphibious or Joint force. Advance Force Operations provide battle space awareness and entail 
such operations as reconnaissance, seizure of supporting positions, preliminary bombardment 
and air support (Amphibious Force Objectives). 
Pre-Assault Operations are conducted by the amphibious force upon its arrival in the 
operational area and prior to the time of the assault or decisive action, normally delineated by H- 
and L-hour (final preparations of the landing area).  
Source: Royal Netherlands Navy Staff, Policy proposal: restructuring Netherlands Maritime 
Special Operations Forces (NL MARSOF) core capacity [Beleidsvoornemen: Herschikken 
kerncapaciteit Netherlands Maritime Special Operations Forces (NL MARSOF)] (Den Helder, The 
Netherlands: Royal Netherlands Navy), 2011. 
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enduring purpose stated in national policy) and missions (defined in specific 
tasks assigned to NL MARSOF) have not been formalized in a mission 
statement.  
When looking at the dimensions of the 3-D cube, Royal Navy policy clearly 
emphasizes the maritime character and distinct capability of NL MARSOF and 
places NL MARSOF more to that end of Dimension I (i.e., Special Operations 
Geographic Environment). With its domestic counterterrorism task, NL MARSOF 
operates within the political domain of the Ministry of Defense as well as the 
Ministry of Justice, placing it on the full length of Dimension II (i.e., Special 
Operations Political Domain). As for Dimension III (i.e., Spectrum of Special 
Operations), Royal Navy policy does not give specific guidance for NL MARSOF. 
Instead, Navy policy states that NL MARSOF has to be able to conduct full 
spectrum special operations, in which no prioritization between the different core 
SOF tasks (SR, DA, and MA) is given. 
4. The Required Strategic Utility for NL MARSOF   
This governing document analysis provides answers to each of the 
questions stated in the beginning of the analysis. 
  
 Is there a connection between the theoretical analysis of strategic utility (3-D 
cube) and NL MARSOF’s required strategic utility?  
The analysis, on the one hand, shows that governing documents all categorize 
SOF geographically and by political domain. On the other hand, the conceptual 
approach of dividing special operations into direct and indirect missions is not 
used. The national governing documents do not give specific guidance to Dutch 
SOF units concerning direct and indirect special operations, and neither do the 





 Is there a connection in NL MARSOF’s required strategic utility between the 
different levels of governing document analysis?  
The analysis shows no disconnect in required strategic utility for NL MARSOF at 
the international level (NATO), the national level, and the unit level (Royal 
Netherlands Navy). The required strategic utility for NL MARSOF is grounded in 
national and international policy documents. However, the formulation of roles 
and missions for NL MARSOF remains generic. Neither roles nor missions has 
been formalized in any kind of mission statement. 
 
 Is there a connection between the future scenarios on political stability and 
NL MARSOF’s required strategic utility?  
The analysis of the projections in future political stability around the world 
indicates a focus on the Dutch armed forces’ strategic role of conflict anticipation, 
prevention and stabilization. The Dutch National Military Strategy 2010 and 
Maritime Strategy 2030 also emphasize this growing importance in anticipation, 
prevention and stabilization. Within these strategic roles, the SOF principal tasks 
of special reconnaissance (SR) and military assistance (MA) are most useful. 
Nevertheless, neither the national nor the Navy governing documents focuses NL 
MARSOF on SR or MA. 
  
 Does the required strategic utility for NL MARSOF give priorities in missions 
and does it allow for division of labor?  
Royal Netherlands Navy policy documents emphasize NL MARSOF’s maritime 
character, its unique maritime capability, and its domestic counterterrorism task. 
Navy policy also clearly states that NL MARSOF needs to be able to conduct 
missions within the full spectrum of special operations. This unit guidance is not 
surprising, considering the fact that the Navy does not want to exclude NL 
MARSOF up front from any potential SOF mission. However, based on the 
Report on Strategic Explorations for the next two decades, the Royal 
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Netherlands Navy and Marine Corps nevertheless left out the option to add 
additional guidance to NL MARSOF to better anticipate future national needs.  
Lastly, the Navy does not prioritize between domestic counterterrorist and other 
special operations tasks for NL MARSOF. In the event of limited time, personnel, 
or resources, NL MARSOF leadership must make this prioritization themselves.  
Figure 23 summarizes the findings of the governing document analysis. 
The table gives the guidance for required strategic utility of Dutch SOF in general 
and NL MARSOF for each dimension of the 3-D cube. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Governing Document Analysis in Relation to the 3-D cube 
Framework 
In summary, according to the governing documents analysis, NL 
MARSOF needs to be able to conduct full-spectrum special operations, 
predominantly in a maritime environment, and conduct counterterrorist 
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operations within the borders of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The next 
section examines the historical employment of Dutch maritime SOF to determine 
whether their deployments fit the required strategic utility stated by policy 
documents.  
C. HISTORICAL EMPLOYMENT OF NL SOF  
1. NL MARSOF 
The employment of Dutch maritime SOF elements has varied. These 
special operations date back almost thirty years ago. In addition, Dutch maritime 
SOF personnel were heavily involved in conventional operations of the Royal 
Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC). Dutch maritime SOF personnel were part 
of regular marine fighting units during different UN peacekeeping, UN peace 
enforcing and NATO missions. This has been an ongoing policy of the RNLMC to 
ensure experience and quality within all regular marine units.   
The analysis of historical employment of NL maritime SOF looks only at 
the conducted special operations, not at participation in purely conventional 
operations. All these conducted special operations are positioned on their 
respective dimensions of the 3-D cube. This generates a visualization of the 
operational focus of Dutch maritime SOF over the last three decades.  
Dutch maritime SOF deployments and engagements date back thirty 
years. The first national missions started in the mid-seventies when terrorism 
started to rear its head in Europe. The first international missions started in the 
early nineties. The list below gives a chronological summary of all (declassified) 
conducted special operations by maritime SOF. When looking at the list, keep in 
mind that, until recently, two maritime forces were separate units: the domestic 
counterterrorism component (currently M-Squadron or UIM) and the international 
SOF component (currently the C-Squadron or MSO-Coy). 
 September 1974: Japanese Red Army (JRA) terrorists entered the 
French Embassy in The Hague and took the people inside hostage. 
This was the first time the Dutch counterterrorist unit (now called UIM) 
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was alerted for action. After a week of negotiations, the hostage 
situation ended without the intervention of the unit. 
 October 1974: Dutch inmates of the penitentiary facility in 
Scheveningen took twenty-two people hostage. The UIM intervened 
and freed the hostages without bloodshed. 
 December 1975: Moluccan terrorists almost simultaneously hijacked a 
train in Wijster and seized the Indonesian Consulate in Amsterdam. On 
the train, they killed three passengers and took the rest hostage. At the 
Consulate one hostage was killed. Even though the UIM was ready to 
intervene, the negotiators finally convinced the terrorists to surrender.  
 May 1977: Moluccan terrorists hijacked another train at De Punt, taking 
almost one hundred people as hostages. After several weeks of 
negotiations, the UIM intervened, killing most of the hijackers and 
rescuing all but two hostages, who were unfortunately killed during the 
firefight.  
 May 1977: Moluccan terrorist took more than hundred children hostage 
in a school in Bovensmilde. After negotiations failed, the UIM 
intervened without bloodshed, saving the children. 
 March 1978: Three Moluccan suicide terrorists seized the County Hall 
in Assen, killing one person and taking seventy employees hostage. 
The UIM intervened. They rescued all but one of the hostages, who 
was fatally injured during the rescue attempt.  
 1992 until 1996: Teams from the UIM continuously deployed boarding 
teams aboard Dutch Navy Frigates to conduct maritime interdiction 
operations in the Adriatic Sea.  
 March 1997: The UIM conducted a non-combatant evacuation 
operation in Albania to secure the safe return of national citizens.  
 1997: The MSO-Coy and the UIM conducted operations in Bosnia to 
capture several persons Indicted for War Crimes (PIFWCs). 
 1998: Again, the UIM deployed boarding teams aboard Dutch Navy 
Frigates, to conduct maritime interdiction operations in the Persian 
Gulf.  
 February 1999: Kurdish PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan) terrorists 
seized the residency of the Greece Embassy in The Hague, 
threatening to burn the hostages. The UIM was ready to intervene, but 
after negotiations, the terrorists surrendered.  
 In December 1999: The UIM prevented the break out of several violent 
high-level criminals at the maximum-security penitentiary facility in 
Vught. This operation went without bloodshed.  
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 2000 until 2001: The MSO-Coy and UIM deployed members as Joint 
Commissioned Observers (JCOs) in Bosnia.  
 2001: After the 9/11terrorist attacks in the United States, the 
Netherlands was on high security alert. During these times, the UIM 
conducted several security operations in and around the city of 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam.  
 2003 until 2004: Field Liaison Teams (FLT’s) of the MSO-Coy and the 
UIM deployed to Iraq as part of Stabilization Force Iraqi Republic 
(SFIR). These teams conducted HUMINT operations and direct 
actions.  
 2004: The MSO-Coy and the UIM conducted operations in Bosnia to 
capture Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs).  
 September 2004: Members of the radical Islamic Hofstad Group 
wounded regular police SWAT units in a firefight in a house in The 
Hague. After a standoff, members of the UIM intervened, capturing all 
the Hofstad group members.  
 2005: Small teams of the UIM arrested key members of the radical 
Islamic Hofstad group, dismantling their terrorist organization in the 
Netherlands.  
 2005–2006: Boarding teams of the MSO-Coy conducted maritime 
interdiction operations as part of the Naval Flotilla CTF-150, Combined 
Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).  
 2005–2006: Teams from the MSO-Coy and UIM, together with Dutch 
Army SOF, formed Task Force Orange in Kandahar, Afghanistan as 
part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  
 2006: Field Liaison Teams (FLTs) of the MSO-Coy deployed to the 
northern parts of Afghanistan as part of International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF). These teams conducted HUMINT operations 
and direct actions.  
 2006–2007: Teams from the MSO-Coy and UIM, together with Dutch 
Army SOF, formed SOTU Viper to conduct operations in the province 
of Uruzghan, Afghanistan as part of ISAF SOF. 
 2008–2010: MARSOF teams, together with Dutch Army SOF, formed 
Task Force-55 to conduct operations in the province of Uruzghan, 
Afghanistan as part of ISAF SOF. 
 2008–present: MARSOF teams are conducting continuous counter-
piracy operations in the Horn of Africa as part of NATO Operation 
Allied Protector, and Atlanta. 
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A general observation from this list is that the maritime SOF units started 
to conduct special operations abroad only from the early ‘90s, and the frequency 
of deployments increased significantly after the 9/11 attacks in the United States. 
Before the early nineties, the maritime SOF units were more heavily involved in 
national counterterrorism activities.  
To visualize the strategic range of the conducted operations of maritime 
SOF, these special operations are positioned along the three dimensions of the 
cube. The position of the conducted operations along each dimension gives a 
general idea of the main focus of that mission. Figure 24 displays the positions of 
the conducted operations along the spectrum of special operations (Dimension 




Figure 24.   Conducted Missions Placed along the Spectrum of Special 
Operations 
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Figure 25 displays the position of the conducted operations along the 
dimension of geographic environment (Dimension I). It shows that the maritime 
units operate just as much—if not more—on land as they do in maritime 
environments. This, however, is in line with NATO doctrine that emphasizes the 
need for maritime SOF units to be able to operate on land.  
 
 
Figure 25.   Conducted Missions Placed along the Dimension of Geographic 
Environment 
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Figure 26 displays the position of the conducted operations along the 
dimension of political domain (Dimension II.). It shows that maritime SOF has 
conducted various missions domestic and abroad. The frequency of missions 
abroad has significantly increased after 9/11, but the domestic missions remain 
sporadic in nature.  
 
Figure 26.   Conducted Missions Placed along the Dimension of Political Domain 
In summary, one can draw three conclusions from the analysis of the 
historic employment of Dutch maritime SOF units. First, it shows a rapid increase 
in special operations, especially after the 9/11 attacks. This growing demand in 
SOF capability will not diminish over the ensuing years, but most likely will grow. 
Second, it shows that MARSOF’s conducted missions range in geography and 
political domain. This outcome is expected, given the nature of the original 
tasking of the maritime SOF units (MSO-Coy and UIM). The third and most 
interesting conclusion is that all special operations took place on the direct action 
side of the spectrum of special operations. 
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2. NL MARSOF Comparison to NL Army SOF 
The next section places the MARSOF missions on each dimension within 
the 3-D cube, but this visualization would not be complete without a comparison 
to the Dutch Army SOF counterpart of MARSOF. Dutch Army SOF, named Korps 
Commando Troepen (KCT), are about three times the size of MARSOF, and they 
focus on land-based special operations. The KCT consists of four operational 
companies, each having a different specialization. For instance, one company 
specializes High-Altitude-High-Opening (HAHO) parachute teams and another 
company specializes in mountain warfare. The Army does not have a domestic 
counterterrorism mission, as does MARSOF, but does train for CT missions 
abroad. In the last thirty years, they predominantly conducted missions in the 
former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan. Because of their sheer size, they are 
responsible for a much larger contribution to joint Dutch SOF deployments than 
is MARSOF.  
Figure 27 shows KCT’s historic focus on all three dimensions, compared 
to NL MARSOF. A detailed analysis of all the conducted missions of KCT the last 
thirty years is not necessary for the purpose of this comparison. The comparison 
is only meant to show general differences in focus between NL MARSOF and 
KCT, and visualize the total strategic range of Dutch SOF units. One important 
note is that the graph is not indicative of the number of troops or frequency of 
deployments. That would give a distorted picture of reality, because obviously the 




Figure 27.   MARSOF Compared to the KCT (Army SOF) on Each Dimension 
The 3-D cube (Figure 28) visualizes these three dimensions and the actual 
strategic utility of MARSOF in comparison to KCT. The cube indicates a large 
overlap in missions of MARSOF and KCT and a gap in potential indirect special 
operations utility. These observed overlaps and gaps between MARSOF and 
KCT beg the question of whether a more efficient division of labor is needed in 
order to expand the total strategic range of Dutch SOF. 
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Figure 28.   The Strategic Utility of MARSOF within the Strategic Range of 
Special Operations 
The mission overlap in geographic environment is not surprising, given the 
locations of recent theaters of operation. Afghanistan, for instance, is a land-
locked country, but this area has seen the largest demand for Dutch SOF. Future 
conflict areas, for instance in Africa, might have a maritime character, but most 
likely the largest demand for SOF will be in land-based operations. Therefore, the 
overlap in land-based operations of KCT and MARSOF will remain. This also 
aligns with the Dutch defense forces intent of joint conduct of all Dutch special 
operations.  
Overlap in the political domain abroad is also not surprising because 
MARSOF as well as KCT predominantly conduct operations abroad. As for 
domestic (CT) operations, there is a clear division of tasks within Dutch SOF. 
Dutch Police law Articles 59 and 60 state that Defense forces can be utilized for 
domestic police tasks, but does not nominate particular forces. However, within 
the Dutch SOF, the Unit Intervention Marines (UIM), as part of MARSOF, is 
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responsible for this domestic counterterrorism task under operational command 
of the Special Intervention Service of the national police (DSI). Finally, within the 
spectrum of special operations, an overlap can be observed on the direct side. 
MARSOF, as well as its Army counterpart, have predominantly conducted 
missions more aligned to the direct side of special operations. The most recent 
deployments in Afghanistan (SF Task Group Orange and SOTU Viper) were 
focused on independent offensive operations to disrupt and destroy Taliban 
resistance. These operations fall into the category of direct special operations. 
The last deployment (Task Force 55) had a more indirect focus, because it also 
included the mission to train, advise, and mentor indigenous Afghan forces. 
Due to the recent deployments of Dutch SOF in general and MARSOF in 
particular, training and pre-deployment preparation are increasingly focusing on 
the conduct of direct special operations (i.e. Direct Action and Special 
Reconnaissance). Consequently, training and readiness in indirect special 
operations has received less focus and attention. This imbalance between direct 
and indirect special operations creates a gap in the strategic utility of Dutch SOF. 
One can interpret this gap in two ways: either there is no Dutch MoD demand for 
indirect special operations capacity, or this gap represents a window of 
opportunity for Dutch SOF. In the former view, it makes sense that MARSOF is 
not dedicating valuable training time and resources to prepare for these kinds of 
operations. In the latter view, MARSOF needs to reconsider tasks, training goals 
and focus.   
As demonstrated in the governing document analysis, a lessening 
demand for indirect special operations capability seems unlikely. International as 
well as national documents and studies point towards growing importance in 
conflict prevention and stabilization. This indicates a growing importance for 
(maritime) SOF to conduct special reconnaissance and military assistance.  
In summary, one can draw the following conclusions from the governing 
document analysis compared to the historic employment of Dutch (maritime) 
SOF. Dutch SOF units (MARSOF and KCT) have overlapping missions that are 
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partly necessary and partly debatable. In addition, Dutch SOF has focused 
primarily on direct special operations, leaving a gap in indirect special operations. 
There seems to be room for improvement in the division of labor between 
MARSOF and KCT in order to expand the range in strategic utility of Dutch SOF 
as a whole. This improvement is getting more urgent after the recent heavy 
budget cuts in Dutch defense forces.  
Looking at MARSOF specifically, its maritime SOF deployments only 
partly fit the required strategic utility stated by policy documents. That begs the 
question if MARSOF needs to focus more on indirect special operations. 
However, the answer also depends on the focus of Dutch Army SOF as well. 
MARSOF can either wait for guidelines from the Dutch MoD, or take the initiative 
with a bottom-up proposal for allocation of specific SOF core tasks.  
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IV. UNIT CULTURE REVEALED 
A. FROM ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE TO UNIT CULTURE 
“Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual.” 
– James Q. Wilson155 
 
To build a theoretical framework that supports the assumed positive 
relation between organizational culture and organizational effectiveness, this 
section reviews organizational culture in relation to organizational effectiveness. 
The literature on organizational culture is vast. Researchers from different 
disciplines such as anthropology, psychology, sociology, and organizational 
behavior have approached the study of organizational culture in different ways. 
However, the literature on organizational culture within military SOF units is more 
limited. Recent literature as well as the more historical work is used to: define 
organizational culture in general and military unit culture in particular; look at 
different models to measure organizational culture; and point out the positive 
relationship between organizational culture and effectiveness.  
Based on the literature review, Figure 29 summarizes the theoretical 
framework for unit culture in relation to organizational effectiveness. The 
framework also connects the literature to a specific measurement model for 
organizational culture: Daniel Denison’s model of four cultural traits.  
                                            
155 James Q Wilson. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It. 
(New York: Basic Books, 1989), 91. 
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Figure 29.   Theoretical Framework of Unit Culture in Relation to Organizational 
Effectiveness 
1. Organizational Culture 
The term culture has been used for over a hundred years; today, as many 
as 250 different definitions exist.156 From this multitude of definitions, one 
                                            
156 Allen D. English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 15. 
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naturally finds much variation in definitions of organizational culture as well. The 
systematic application of the term did not emerge until the early 1980s.157  
In an extensive study in 1984, the Canadian researchers Yvan Allaire and 
Mihaela Firsirotu were among the first researchers who meshed different notions 
of organizational culture and developed an integrative concept for understanding 
the processes of decay, adaptation, and radical changes in organizations.158 The 
concept comprised three elements: a socio-structural system, a cultural system, 
and individuals. Allaire and Firsirotu proposed using this concept to understand 
processes of behavior and adaptation to changes within organizations.  
Also in 1984, the behavioral scientists Harrison Trice and Janice Beyer 
defined organizational culture in terms of two basic components. The first 
consisted of ideologies, norms, and values. The second consisted of the 
practices by which the former were expressed. They argued that a focus on rites 
and ceremonies offered a practical approach for studying and identifying 
characteristics of organizational culture. Their research is important, because it 
offered a first step in conceptualizing culture and examining how organizational 
culture affected organizations. Nevertheless, it did not yet address or argue for 
specific influences of culture on effectiveness.159  
In 1990, the Dutch and Danish behavioral scientists Geert Hofstede, Bram 
Neuijen, Denise Ohayv, and Geert Sanders tried to define, operationalize and 
measure organizational culture quantitatively. They classified culture as having 
four categories: symbols, heroes, rituals, and values. The first three can be 
subsumed as practices. They defined practices in terms of what people think “is” 
while values refers to what the people think “should be.” These researchers 
                                            
157 Calvin Morrill, “Culture and Organization Theory.” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 619, (Sep, 2008): 15–40. 
158 Yvan Allaire and Firsirotu, M., “Theories of Organizational Culture,” Organization Studies 
5, no. 3 (1984). 
159 Harrison M. Trice and Janice M. Beyer, “Studying Organizational Cultures through Rites 
and Ceremonials,” Academy of Management – the Academy of Management Review, 9, no. 
000004 (Oct, 1984). 
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operationalized corporate culture in a six-dimensional model: (1) process-
oriented vs. results-oriented; (2) employee-oriented vs. job-oriented; (3) loose vs. 
tight; (4) parochial vs. professional; (5) open system vs. closed system; and (6) 
normative vs. pragmatic. These six dimensions can be seen as a checklist for 
cultural variation within organizations.160 Their life-long research remains one of 
the most influential European works in organizational culture. 
Edgar Schein’s influential book Organizational Culture and Leadership 
defines organizational culture as “[a] pattern of shared assumptions that the 
group learned as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration that worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation 
to these problems.”161 He posits three levels of culture: artifacts (the most visible 
element of culture, e.g., language, physical layout, and behavioral customs), 
values (what “ought” to be rather than what is), and assumptions (basic beliefs 
about the way things really are, and the result of solutions, which have worked 
repeatedly and have become taken for granted). Within these three conceptual 
levels of culture, assumptions are the least observable aspect of culture, but they 
give meaning to values and artifacts and ultimately guide behavior. However, 
Schein also cautions that interaction among diverse individuals does not 
immediately produce shared understanding or culture. It takes time, common 
experiences, and effort to work through a variety of potential tensions before an 
organizational culture is developed.  
In his book Corporate Culture and Organizational Effectiveness, Daniel 
Denison provides another good definition of organizational culture. He views 
culture as “the underlying values, beliefs, and principles that serve as a function 
for an organization’s management system as well as the set of management 
                                            
160 Geert Hofstede, Bram Neuijen, Denise Daval Ohayv, and Geert Sanders, “Measuring 
Organizational Cultures: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study across Twenty Cases,” 
Administrative Science Quarterly 35, no. 2 (Jun, 1990). 
161 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, The Jossey-Bass Business & 
Management Series. 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 17. 
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practices and behaviors that both exemplify and reinforce those basic 
principles.”162 Nevertheless, he acknowledges that no generally accepted 
definition of organizational culture exists.  
The specific definitions vary, but most researchers seem to agree that 
organizational culture generally refers to a set of values, beliefs, and behavior 
patterns that form the core identity of an organization.163 This thesis adopts that 
definition. Values are global beliefs that guide actions and judgments across a 
variety of situations, beliefs are assumed facts about the world that do not involve 
evaluation, and behavior is the product of related value and belief.164 
Strong culture was first mentioned by Thomas Peters and Robert 
Waterman as a characteristic of an excellent company. Their research 
concluded: “without exception, the dominance and coherence of culture proved 
to be an essential quality of excellent companies.”165 They argued that the 
stronger the culture, the less need there was for standard operating procedures, 
and the more people knew what to do in certain situations. “Strong” in this sense 
means that the set of values, beliefs, norms and behavior patterns are widely 
shared and strongly held throughout the organization. Even though this research 
has been criticized over the years, it remains popular. Over the last decades, this 
understanding of strong culture has also been used by well-established 
organizational culture researchers such as Daniel Denison,166 Edgar Schein,167 
                                            
162 Daniel R. Denison, Corporate Culture and Organizational Effectiveness  (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1990), 2. 
163 Daniel R. Denison, “Bringing Corporate Culture to the Bottom Line,” Organizational 
Dynamics (New York: American Management Associations, 1984). 
164 Allen D. English, Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective. (Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004). 
165 Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence: Lessons from 
America’s Best-Run Companies (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 75. 
166 Daniel R. Denison, “Bringing Corporate Culture to the Bottom Line,” Organizational 
Dynamics (New York: American Management Associations, 1984). 
167 Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, The Jossey-Bass Business & 
Management Series, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004). 
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Aneil Mishra,168 John Kotter and James Heskett,169 George Marcoulides and 
Ronald Heck,170 Jesper Sorensen171 and Carl Fey and Daniel Denison.172 
Therefore, this thesis adopts the same definition: Strong organizational culture 
means that the set of values, beliefs, norms and behavior patterns are widely 
shared and strongly held throughout the organization.  
2.  “Organization versus Corporation” and “Culture versus 
Climate” 
In many research studies, the terms organizational culture and corporate 
culture are used interchangeably. The word “corporate” generally refers to private 
business organizations, but both terms (organizational and corporate) are used 
for the same concept of culture. Distinct organizations within the military are 
generally called units. Therefore, this thesis uses the terms organizational culture 
and unit culture interchangeably, referring to smaller, distinct organizations within 
the military.  
Literature on organizational behavior sometimes shows an 
interchangeable use of the terms culture and climate. This thesis also does not 
distinguish between organizational climate and organizational culture. As Orvil 
Hause demonstrated in his dissertation Relationships between Organization 
Culture Strength and Organizational Effectiveness in an Electrical Utility 
Company, there is no utility in an artificial separation of climate and culture.173 In 
                                            
168 Aneil K. Mishra and Daniel R. Denison, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Culture and 
Effectiveness.” Organization Science 6, no. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1995): 204–223. 
169 John P. Kotter and James L. Heskett, Corporate Culture and Performance (New York: 
Free Press, 1992). 
170 George A. Marcoulides and Ronald H. Heck, “Organizational Culture and Performance: 
Proposing and Testing a Model,” Organization Science 4, no. 2 (May, 1993): 209–225. 
171 Jesper B. Sorensen, “The Strength of Corporate Culture and the Reliability of Firm 
Performance.” Administrative Science Quarterly 47, no. 1 (Mar, 2002): 70–91. 
172 Carl F. Fey and Daniel R. Denison, “Organizational Culture and Effectiveness: Can 
American Theory be Applied in Russia?” Organization Science 14, no. 6 (Nov–Dec, 2003): 686–
706. 
173 Orvil Ragin Jr. Hause, “Relationships between Organizational Culture Strength and 
Organizational Effectiveness in an Electrical Utility Company” (Ph.D. Diss., Georgia: University of 
Georgia, 2000), 25. 
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1996, Daniel Denison also argued that the difference between culture and 
climate lies more in the executive management interpretation of the same 
phenomenon than an actual distinction in phenomenon.174 This conclusion 
provides strong rationale for integration of quantitative and qualitative methods of 
organizational culture and climate research.  
3. Military Culture and Operational Effectiveness 
Don Snider, a political science professor at the U.S. Military Academy, 
broadly defines military culture as “the deep structure of organizations, rooted in 
the prevailing assumptions, norms, values, customs, and traditions which 
collectively, over time, have created shared individual expectations among the 
members. It is essentially the glue that makes the organization a distinctive 
source of identity and experience.” 175 What distinguishes military culture from 
other organizations is its attempt to deal with the uncertainty of conducting 
combat operations. Through a process of socialization, meaning is passed on to 
new members, and organizational behavior is defined by shared values and 
beliefs.  
According to Don Snider and James Burk, the four essential elements of 
military culture are discipline, professional ethos, ceremony & etiquette, and 
cohesion & esprit de corps.176 The first element is discipline, which imposes 
order and reduces confusion, and ritualizes the violence in war. The second 
element is a professional ethos, defined as that “set of normative self-
understandings which for the members define the profession’s corporate identity, 
                                            
174 Daniel R. Denison, “What is the Difference between Organizational Culture and 
Organizational Climate? A Native’s Point of View on a Decade of Paradigm Wars.” The Academy 
of Management Review 21, no. 3 (Jul, 1996): 619–654. 
175 Don M. Snider, “An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture.” Orbis 43, no. 1 (Winter, 
1999): 14. 
176 James Burk, “Military Culture,” in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, vol. 2, 
ed., Lester R. Kurtz and Jennifer Turpin (San Diego: Academy Press, 1999): 447–461. See also 
Walter P. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, T. O. Jacobs, and Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (Washington, D.C.), American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century : A Report of 
the CSIS International Security Program. CSIS Report. (Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 2000). 
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its code of conduct and its social worth.” The third element of military culture 
consists of the ceremonial displays and etiquette that pervade military life, and 
the fourth element of military culture is cohesion and esprit de corps, which are 
the measures of a unit’s morale, its willingness to perform a mission, and its 
willingness to fight. This last element is a critical element with respect to the 
positive relation between military culture and the operational effectiveness of 
military units.  
In 2000, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in 
Washington, D.C., conducted an extensive survey within the U.S. military on a 
variety of matters concerning military culture in relation to military 
effectiveness.177 CSIS defined military culture as “the way things are done in a 
military organization.” It is a shared institutional ethos of values, customs, 
traditions, and beliefs. The driving imperative behind military culture is combat, 
and to conduct this core task, order and discipline are prominent in the military 
culture. Like Snider and Burk, CSIS characterized military culture by the same 
four essential elements. 
Joseph Soeters, a professor of organizational behavior at the Dutch 
Military Academy, describes culture in uniformed organizations as a culture 
derived from the occupation (soldier) that is a distinct blend of the organization’s 
culture and national culture.178 He points out three specific cultural aspects of 
military organizations. The communal control in military organizations is different 
from other organizations, which extends to various aspects of its members’ 
personal lives. This form of institutionalization appears to be an overarching 
international and homogeneous military culture. The degree of hierarchy in 
military organizations unsurprisingly tends to be more coercive compared to 
                                            
177 Walter F. Ulmer, Joseph J. Collins, T. O. Jacobs, and Center for Strategic and 
International Studies Washington, D.C., American Military Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Report of the CSIS International Security Program. CSIS Report. (Washington, D.C: Center for 
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178 Joseph L. Soeters, “Culture in Uniformed Organizations,” in Handbook of Organizational 
Culture & Climate, edited by Neal M. Ashkanasy, Celeste Wilderom and Mark F. Peterson, 
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business organizations, and finally, military organizations generally accept 
functional and formal discipline (the extent of compliance with rules, the 
acceptance of orders and authority, and the way the organization deals with 
disobedience through overt punishment).  
The author of Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special 
Operations Forces, Susan Marquis, recognized that SOF are a unique 
community within the military.179 Their distinct organizational culture enables 
them to survive the “bureaucratic predators” over time. Marquis describes the 
organizational character that has resulted from SOF’s history and rigorous 
member selection, and she emphasizes the necessity for these distinctive 
cultural characteristics. John M. Collins, a leading analyst on military and defense 
issues at the Congressional Research Service, summarizes the unique 
characteristics found in successful special operators as follows: 
Innate intelligence, physical strength, agility, stamina, and standard 
training are not enough. Temperament also must combine 
resourcefulness, ingenuity, pragmatism, and patience with self-
discipline and dependability to extraordinary degrees. Area 
orientation is a universal requirement, for psychological warriors as 
well as those with lethal weapons, whether operations take place 
on native or foreign soil. Even common tasks call for uncommon 
skills applied under uncommon circumstances. [For example] …any 
rifle company can conduct conventional raids and ambushes, but it 
cannot do well indefinitely, [and] while [it is] living off hostile land, 
safely relieve an enemy convoy of volatile cargo, or accomplish 
many other special mission.180 
Even though Collins’ description fits the unique characteristics and 
competencies of special operations forces, Marquis does not give a distinctive 
definition of SOF unit culture. The anthropologist and professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School Anna Simons has specifically looked at unit culture within 
U.S. Army Special Forces (USSF). She argues that the ambiguity embedded in 
                                            
179 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces 
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997). 
180 As cited by Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special 
Operations Forces (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997), 46. 
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the USSF organizational structure helped account for the excellence of the 
teams.181 She identifies the various distinct ways of doing things within USSF 
teams and the relation between these teams and higher command that differs 
from the rest of the Army. Nevertheless, Simons also does not give a separate 
definition for SOF unit culture. 
Except for obvious differences in degree of institutionalization, hierarchy, 
discipline, and organizational purpose, both Snider’s and Soeters’ definition of 
military culture fit the earlier-stated broad definition of organizational culture. 
Furthermore, there seems to be no distinct definition for SOF unit culture. 
Therefore, this thesis adopts the following definition of unit culture: Unit culture is 
a distinct set of values, beliefs, and behavior patterns that form the core identity 
of a military organization. 
4. Military Culture versus Military Cohesion 
As explained by Joseph Soeters, NL MARSOF needs to be effective on 
the hot as well as the cold side of uniformed organizations in order to survive at 
birth. Therefore, examining military cohesion only in relation to operational 
effectiveness in combat (the hot side of the organization) is too narrow. That 
said, military cohesion still is an important part of military culture. The next 
section defines military cohesion by reviewing different American and European 
perspectives. These perspectives all agree that strong military cohesion 
positively effects operational effectiveness in combat. 
Group cohesion can be defined as trust among group members (e.g., to 
watch each other’s backs) together with the capacity for teamwork (e.g., pulling 
together to get the task or job done).182 Military researchers and authors share 
the general view of military cohesion being a vital element for high-level 
                                            
181 Anna Simons, “How Ambiguity Results in Excellence: The Role of Hierarchy and 
Reputation in U.S. Army Special Forces.” Human Organization 57, no. 1 (Spring, 1998): 117–123. 
182 Guy L. Siebold, “The Essence of Military Group Cohesion.” Armed Forces and Society 
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operational effectiveness183 in which operational effectiveness generally refers to 
the conduct of successful military combat operations (the hot side of uniformed 
organizations).184 Within this general view, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense and National Defense University lecturer John H. Jones defined military 
cohesiveness as “the bonding together of members of an organization/unit in 
such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and 
the mission,” highlighting the institutionalized positive effect of cohesion in 
achieving military goals.185  
Anthony King, a sociologist at the University of Exeter, studied cohesion 
within the British Royal Marines. His ethnographic analysis is relevant to this 
thesis, because NL MARSOF draws its personnel from the Royal Dutch Marines, 
and they have long historical ties with the British Royal Marines in training and 
organization. Anthony King makes the argument that the decisive rituals that bind 
military groups together are the formal processes of military training, and this 
social cohesion positively relates to operational performance. Therefore, 
collective military practice is a precondition for cohesion. Social psychology 
literature also refers to this as task cohesion, consisting of common commitment 
to a particular task or goal that demands group cooperation.186   
Contrary to King, Guy Siebold, a fellow from the U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, argues that military cohesion is 
not solely the results of military practices, but can be accomplished by bonding, 
meaning the weak or strong social relationship between service members and 
their group, organization and service institutions. He proposes a standard model 
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of military group cohesion that “consists of four related, interacting components 
based on different structural relationships: peer (horizontal), leader (vertical), 
organizational, and institutional bonding.”187 In this model peer and leader 
bonding forms the primary group cohesion, and organizational and institutional 
bonding forms the secondary group bonding. Siebold, therefore, emphasizes 
cohesion built on interpersonal trust and teamwork, including training.188  
Charles Kirke, a senior lecturer at the UK Defense Academy, studied 
King’s and Siebold’s work and presents a model of four separate social 
structures that can be used to visualize cohesion as the product of positive 
interaction: (1) the formal command structure expressed in the hierarchy of rank 
and mechanisms of enforcement of discipline; (2) the informal structure of 
unwritten conventions of behavior; (3) the loyalty/identity structure of “belonging”; 
and (4) the functional structure of attitudes and expectations connected to the 
military profession. Each of these four social structures can be the appropriate 
“operating structure” of the moment, relevant to the context of the situation. The 
same group can thus display a different degree of cohesion in a different context. 
The understanding of this context is an important element in understanding and 
evaluating cohesion within military groups. Thus, a highly cohesive military group 
“can be expected to have a clear command structure…, a network of durable 
informal bonds within and among ranks…, feeling of belonging to and loyalty 
towards the group and to any other appropriate group the members may 
belong…, and positive attitudes towards military tasks and conventions of 
behavior.”189 
In summary, experts and practitioners agree that unit cohesion is 
important in military organizations. The majority of research in military cohesion 
in relation to operational effectiveness has focused on the hot side of military 
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organizations. Even though the hot side is an important side, and arguably the 
most important side, of military organizations, this thesis takes the broader view 
of unit culture. It looks at unit culture in relation to operational effectiveness on 
the cold as well as the hot side of the organization. This broad view of unit culture 
also allows the use of a variety of research models used in civilian organizations 
to measure culture and effectiveness.  
5. Organizational Culture in Relation to Effectiveness 
Many researchers have studied the question of how organizational culture 
affects organizational performance, or more broadly defined, organizational 
effectiveness. Over the years of organizational behavior study, researchers have 
generally agreed on a positive relationship between culture and effectiveness, 
and postulated that cultural factors play a role in determining levels of 
organizational outcomes. Many researchers proposed theoretical models that 
capture the relationship between organizational culture and effectiveness. Even 
though these theoretical models have value, a more practical measurement 
model is needed to measure the culture within NL MARSOF. In search of this 
measurement model, this section explores a selection of some of the most 
influential studies. A measurement model should be easy to grasp for end-users 
and provide standardized user-friendly measurement tools (surveys). The review 
of studies will demonstrate that most offer only theoretical models of the positive 
relationship between culture and effectiveness.      
In their popular book In Search of Excellence: Lessons from America’s 
Best-Run Companies, Thomas Peters and Robert Waterman identified eight 
attributes of corporate culture that characterize excellent, innovative companies. 
They defined excellent companies by objective measures such as growth rate 
and return on investment as well as by subjective measures like prestige. The 
eight attributes Peters and Waterman named are: (1) a bias for action; (2) 
closeness to the customer; (3) autonomy and entrepreneurship; (4) productivity 
through the people; (5) hands-on, value driven; (6) stick to the knitting; (7) simple 
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form and lean staff; and (8) simultaneous loose-tight properties.190 Their 
argument was that companies could shape these attributes (the corporate 
culture) in order to become more successful. Others later added to the research’s 
credibility by claiming the work of Peters and Waterman applied in both the 
private and public sectors. 
By comparing survey and objective organizational performance data, the 
organizational behavior professor from University of Michigan Business School 
Daniel Denison showed that organizations with a high level of involvement, also 
called a participative corporate culture, have better performance records than 
those that do not.191 The survey specifically focused on the respondents’ 
perceptions of organizational climate, leadership, peer relations, group process, 
work design, and satisfaction. Denison measured the degree of involvement that 
individuals have in decisions that affect them and the extent to which information 
is shared across levels of an organization in a way that brings the best 
information possible to decision makers. This degree of involvement was found 
to be positively related to the performance of the organization. Denison proposed 
four reasons for this causal relationship. First, a participative culture encourages 
a higher degree of inclusion of the individual. Second, coordination becomes 
natural, so people interactively seek collective interests. Third, participation 
enhances the development of responsible individual work habits. Finally, 
complex problems are better solved by groups than by individuals. Over the next 
decade Denison refined his research and he developed his model of four cultural 
traits in organizations.192  
Harvard Business School professors John Kotter and James Heskett 
empirically studied the influence of corporate culture on economic performance. 
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In their book Corporate Culture and Performance, their main argument is that 
strong cultures create excellent organizations, and this relationship is empirically 
supported by their research.193 However, they also stated that strong, but 
strategically inappropriate, cultures also can lead to low performance. Therefore, 
the cultural content is more important than the cultural strength. That is why 
adaptive cultures, in which a higher priority is placed on innovation and change to 
the environmental needs, outperformed less adaptive cultures.  
Organizational researchers George Marcoulides and Ronald Heck 
proposed a similar explanatory model of how an organization’s culture affects 
organizational effectiveness.194 Their work builds on the general hypothesis that 
“strong” culture within organizations is, at least in part, positively related to higher 
levels of performance. Their results were again consistent with previous research 
suggesting that variables associated with organizational culture are predictive of 
organizational performance.  
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) professor Edgar Schein 
claimed that if the organization is to survive, it must have consensus on the 
problems of external adaptation (e.g., mission and strategy, goals, measurement, 
etc.) and internal integration (common language, criteria for power and status, 
etc.). From his point of view, culture is created largely through the efforts of its 
founders and senior executive. “These dynamic processes of culture creation 
and management are the essence of leadership and make one realize that 
leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin.”195 Like Peters & 
Waterman and Kotter & Heskett196 before him, he also argues that a strong 
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culture, when combined with sound strategy, creates enabling conditions that 
have a positive relation to organizational performance.  
Professor Jesper Sorensen of the Stanford University Business School 
also builds on the prevailing research in the positive relation between strong 
culture and organizational performance.197 He particularly used Kotter & 
Heskett’s research198 and asserted that strong cultures have three specific 
performance-enhancing effects: (1) better coordination and control within an 
organization; (2) improved goal alignment between organization and members; 
and (3) increased employee effort. However, like Kotter & Heskett, Sorensen 
also argued that a strong culture encounters more difficulties in an unpredictable 
(volatile) environment. His empirical research only partly supports his argument, 
but it gives insight into the potential weaknesses of strong cultures. 
In 1995, Professor Daniel R. Denison and Professor Aneil Mishra 
developed a model of four cultural traits–Involvement, Consistency, Adaptability, 
and Mission–that positively correlate with perceptions of organizational 
performance.199 This model is a follow-up on Denison’s prior study showing the 
close relationship between the level of involvement and performance.200 Each of 
the four traits shows significant positive association with both subjective and 
objective measures of organizational effectiveness, in which the different cultural 
traits contribute to different criteria of effectiveness. Two recognized limitations in 
their research are the fact that culture is not limited to these four traits, and the 
possibility that over time effectiveness actually determines culture. 
As a follow-up to earlier research, Daniel R. Denison, Stephanie Haaland 
and Paulo Goelzer Denison examined the relationship between organizational 
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culture and effectiveness transnational.201 They empirically argued that it is 
possible to measure and compare the four cultural traits and their relationship to 
organizational effectiveness across nations.202 Even though their research shows 
that measuring the four organizational traits is useful in predicting effectiveness 
transnationally, they acknowledge that these traits may have different meanings 
in different national contexts.  
In summary, multiple researchers have studied organization culture in 
relation to effectiveness. Daniel Denison, however, is one of the few who 
developed a user-friendly model to measure organizational culture. The model 
links culture to effectiveness and empirically proves this relationship with a 
normative database. Furthermore, it offers a practical tool (survey) to measure 
culture within organizations, providing the opportunity to assess an organization’s 
effectiveness. Undoubtedly, there are other measurement models of culture, but 
for the purpose of this thesis, Denison’s model offers good utility. Therefore, this 
thesis adopts Denison’s model of four organizational cultural traits–Involvement, 
Consistency, Adaptability, and Mission–to assess MARSOF’s unit culture.  
                                            
201 For previous research, see: Daniel R. Denison, “Bringing Corporate Culture to the 
Bottom Line,” Organizational Dynamics (1984): 5–22, and Daniel R. Denison, Corporate Culture 
and Organizational Effectiveness (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990), and Daniel R. Denison 
and Aneil K. Mishra, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness,” Organization 
Science 6, no. 2 (Mar–Apr, 1995): 204–223. 
202 Daniel R. Denison, S. Haaland, and P. Goelzer, “Corporate Culture and Organizational 
Effectiveness: Is there a Similar Pattern Around the World,” Advances in Global Leadership 3, 
(2003): 205–227.  
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6. Denison’s Model of Four Cultural Traits 
The Denison model of organizational culture highlights four key traits 
(Mission, Consistency, Involvement, Adaptability) that an organization should 
master in order to be effective.203 Each trait breaks down into three more specific 
indices for a total of twelve indices, and each of these is measured with five 
survey items. 
 
Figure 30.   Daniel Denison’s Organizational Culture Model (From204) 
                                            
203 The presented Denison Organizational Culture Model description in this section is based 
on articles and working papers from Daniel R. Denison. See Aneil K. Mishra and Daniel R. 
Denison, “Toward a Theory of Organizational Culture and Effectiveness.” Organization Science 6, 
no. 2 (Mar. - Apr., 1995): 204–223; Daniel R. Denison, Corporate Culture and Organizational 
Effectiveness  (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990); Daniel R. Denison, “Bringing Corporate 
Culture to the Bottom Line,” Organizational Dynamics (New York: American Management 
Associations, 1984); Daniel R. Denison, S. Haaland, and P. Goelzer, “Corporate Culture and 
Organizational Effectiveness: Is there a Similar Pattern Around the World,” Advances in Global 
Leadership 3, (2003): 205–227; Denison, Daniel R., Jay Janovics, Joana Young, and Hee Jae 
Cho. “Diagnosing Organizational Cultures: Validating a Model and Method.” (working paper, 
International Institute for management Development, Lausanne Switzerland, January, 2006) and 
Daniel R. Denison, “Denison Culture Model,” Denison Corporation, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/advantage/researchModel/model.aspx  
204 Daniel R. Denison, “Denison Culture Model,” Denison Corporation, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/advantage/researchModel/model.aspx 
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Each of the four traits is represented by a color on the circumplex model 
presented in Figure 30. As mentioned earlier, Denison’s empirical research has 
demonstrated that effective organizations have high scores in all four traits. 
Organizations that score better in the model perform better than organizations 
that score lower. Thus, “effective organizations are likely to have cultures that are 
adaptive, yet highly consistent and predictable, and that foster high involvement, 
but do so within the context of a shared sense of mission.”205  
At the center of the model in Figure 30 is “Underlying Beliefs and 
Assumptions.” This addition to the model recognizes that the “deeper” levels of 
organizational culture are difficult to measure using comparative methods. 
Nonetheless, they provide the foundation from which behavior and action spring. 
Values and behavioral norms are linked to these underlying assumptions, but it is 
far more difficult to make comparative generalizations about the underlying 
assumptions than it is to make generalizations about organizational cultures at 
the level of values and behavior. 
The four traits are organized into a framework designed to acknowledge 
two contrasts: the contrast between internal integration and external adaptation, 
and the contrast between change and stability. Involvement and consistency 
focus on the dynamics of internal integration, while mission and adaptability 
address the dynamics of external adaptation (internal focus vs. external focus). In 
addition, involvement and adaptability describe traits related to an organization’s 
capacity to change, while consistency and mission are more likely to contribute to 
the organization’s capacity to remain stable and predictable over time (flexible vs. 
stable).  
None of the four cultural traits is unique to the model. The four traits are 
also well represented in the broader literature on organizational theory and 
organizational behavior. The Denison organizational culture model serves to 
                                            




integrate these concepts. This connection to other research literature gives the 
model a strong theoretical foundation.  
Organizations represented in the normative database come from a wide 
variety of countries and industries. Denison’s research indicates that different 
industries, from finance to pharmaceuticals, from private to public, and even in 
different countries chalk up very similar results in the global database. The model 
translates effectively to different national cultures and environments. Denison 
generates results by comparing a given organization’s results to the results of 
more then thousand other organizations in their normative database. The 
percentile scores indicate how well the organization ranks in comparison to the 
other organizations in the database. Using percentiles provide meaning and 
context to the results. This thesis builds on these research findings and uses the 
normative database to show NL MARSOF’s level of effectiveness compared to 
other organizations. 
Involvement 
The trait involvement is the degree to which organizations empower and 
engage their people (Figure 31). It is based on research literature showing that 
effective organizations empower and engage their people, build their 
organization around teams, and develop human capability at all levels. 
Organizational members are committed to their work and feel a strong sense of 
ownership. In high involvement organizations, the members at all levels feel that 
they have input into decisions that will affect their work and feel that their work is 
directly connected to the goals of the organization. These organizations rely on 
informal, voluntary, and implicit control systems, rather than formal, explicit, 
bureaucratic control systems.  
 121 
 
Figure 31.   Involvement (From206) 
In the model, involvement is measured with three indices. First, 
Empowerment means that individuals have the authority, initiative, and ability to 
manage their own work. The leadership clarifies those areas in which employees 
can make decisions or those areas beyond employee’s scope of responsibility. 
This creates a sense of ownership and responsibility toward the organization. 
Second, Team Orientation means that value is placed on working cooperatively 
toward common goals, so that creative ideas are captured. The organization 
relies on team effort to get work done. Third, Capability Development means the 
organization continually invests in the development of people’s skills (training, 
coaching, exposure to new responsibilities) in order to stay competitive and meet 
operational requirements. 
Consistency 
The trait Consistency is the degree to which an organization has a system 
of values and behavior that is concise and integrated (Figure 32). It is based on 
research literature showing that organizations are effective when their members’ 
behavior is rooted in a set of core values, leaders and followers are skilled at 
reaching agreement and incorporating diverse points of view, and the 
organization’s activities are well coordinated and integrated. Consistent 
                                            
206 Daniel R. Denison, “Denison Culture Model,” Denison Corporation, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/advantage/researchModel/model.aspx 
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organizations develop a mindset and create organizational systems that rely on 
implicit, consensual support rather than explicit rules and regulations. It creates a 
strong culture based on a shared system of beliefs, values and symbols that are 
widely understood by members of an organization. This type of consistency is a 
powerful source of stability and internal integration. 
 
Figure 32.   Consistency (From207) 
In the model, consistency is measured with three indices. First, Core 
Values means that members of the organization share a set of values (which 
creates a sense of identity) and a clear set of expectations. Second, Agreement 
means that members of the organization are able to reach agreement on critical 
issues. This includes the ability to reconcile differences by engaging in open 
dialogue. Third, Coordination and Integration means that different functions and 
units of the organization are able to work together well to achieve common goals. 
Organizational boundaries do not interfere with getting work done. 
Adaptability 
The trait Adaptability is the degree to which an organization can translate 
environmental demands into action and have the capability and experience to 
change to appropriate goals and objectives (Figure 33). Adaptable organizations 
                                            
207 Daniel R. Denison, “Denison Culture Model,” Denison Corporation, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/advantage/researchModel/model.aspx 
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take risks, learn from their mistakes, and have capability and experience at 
creating change. They are continuously improving the organization’s ability to 
provide value to its stakeholders (for instance, higher command).  
 
Figure 33.   Adaptability (From208) 
In the model, adaptability is also measured with three indices. First, 
Creating Change means the organization is able to create adaptive ways to meet 
changing needs. The organization welcomes new ideas and is willing to try new 
approaches to doing things. It is able to read the operating environment and 
anticipate future changes. Second, Customer Focus means the organization 
understands and reacts to their stakeholders and anticipates their future needs. It 
is critical and reflects the degree to which the organization is driven to satisfy all 
their stakeholders. Third, Organizational Learning means the organization 
receives, translates, and interprets signals from the environment into 
opportunities for encouraging innovation and developing capabilities. The 
organization gains knowledge from its successes and failures. 
Mission 
The trait Mission is the degree to which organizations have a clear sense 
of purpose and direction, defined in organizational goals and strategic objectives 
                                            
208 Daniel R. Denison, “Denison Culture Model,” Denison Corporation, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/advantage/researchModel/model.aspx 
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(Figure 34). Successful organizations have a clear sense of purpose and 
direction that defines an appropriate course of action and expresses a vision of 
what the organization will look like in the future. A sense of mission provides 
purpose and meaning and allows an organization to shape current behavior by 
envisioning a desired future state.  
 
Figure 34.   Mission (From209) 
In the model, mission is measured by three indices. First, Strategic 
Direction and Intent means that clear strategic intentions and priorities convey 
the organization’s purpose and “operationalize” the vision. Second, Goals and 
Objectives means that a clear set of goals and objectives can be linked to the 
mission, vision, and strategy, and provide everyone with a clear direction in their 
work. Third, Vision means that the organization has a shared view of a desired 
future state. It is the ultimate reason for the existence of the organization, its 
purpose.  
Interconnection between cultural traits 
Ideally, organizations should be strong in all four traits. However, 
organizations regularly show strengths in specific cultural traits. Organizations 
with strengths in two of the traits often share certain orientations and outcomes. 
                                            
209 Daniel R. Denison, “Denison Culture Model,” Denison Corporation, 
http://www.denisonconsulting.com/advantage/researchModel/model.aspx 
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An organization with a strong external focus (Adaptability + Mission) is focused 
on adapting and changing in response to the external environment. It has a 
constant eye on the operating environment and a strong sense of where it is 
headed. An organization with a strong internal focus (Involvement + Consistency) 
is focused on the dynamics of the internal integration of systems, structures, and 
processes. It values its people and prides itself on the quality of its products or 
services. A strong internal focus has been linked to higher levels of quality, good 
resource utilization, and high employee satisfaction. 
A flexible organization (Adaptability + Involvement) has the capability to 
change in response to the environment. Its focus is on the operating environment 
and its people. A flexible organization is typically linked to higher levels of 
product and service innovation, creativity, and a fast response to changing 
demands and requirements. A stable organization (Mission + Consistency) has 
the capacity to remain focused and predictable over time. A stable organization is 
typically linked to strong internal management. 
In summary, the Denison Cultural model presents clearly defined and 
measurable traits that are applicable to this thesis’ area of study. In relation to 
both hypotheses of the thesis, the model’s internal focus (involvement and 
consistency) emphasizes the elements of unit culture, and the external focus 
(mission and adaptability) emphasizes the strategic utility. Figure 35 illustrates 
the connection between the two hypotheses (unit culture and strategic utility) and 
Denison’s model of the four cultural traits.  
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Figure 35.   The Denison Cultural Model in Relation to Hypothesis 1 and 2 
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V. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
The empirical portion of this research consists of two methods: (1) surveys 
to collect quantitative data on NL MARSOF’s culture and strategic utility, and (2) 
interviews to collect qualitative data via open-ended questions on NL MARSOF’s 
culture and strategic utility. This combination of collecting, analyzing, and mixing 
both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study is referred to as mixed 
methods research. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and 
qualitative approaches in combination provides a better understanding of 
research problems than does either approach alone.210  
There are three ways in which mixing can occur: merging or converging 
two datasets by actually bringing them together; by embedding one dataset 
within the other in a supportive role; or by connecting two datasets by having one 
build on the other.211 This research uses the last type of mixed methods 
research, connecting the data. The research collected data using a quantitative 
survey instrument, then followed up with interviews with a few selected members 
of NL MARSOF who participated in the survey to learn more detail about the 
survey responses. The qualitative data helps explain and builds upon the initial 
quantitative results. This is also referred to as the explanatory design in mixed 
methods research.212 This two-phased method is the most straightforward of the 
mixed methods research types.  
Mixed methods research adds value that quantitative or qualitative 
research alone does not provide. The historical argument has been that mixed 
methods research provides strengths that offset the weaknesses of both 
quantitative and qualitative research. Thus, mixed methods research provides 
more comprehensive evidence for studying this particular research problem than 
                                            
210 John W. Creswell and Vicki L. Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods 
Research (Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications, 2007), 5. 
211 Ibid., 7. 
212 Ibid., 71. 
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either quantitative or qualitative research alone. Figure 37 depicts the mixed 
methods research explanatory design and its connection to the overall research 
strategy of the thesis (Review Chapter I for an explanation of the research 
strategy.). The explanatory design consists of two phases that are subdivided in 
six stages as seen in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36.   Mixed Methods Research Explanatory Design 
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The first phase of the mixed methods research for NL MARSOF is the 
quantitative research: the survey. The quantitative research follows the first four 
stages to assure a correct questionnaire construction, implementation, and 
analysis. The survey is cross-sectional over the entire survey population to 
minimize coverage error, sampling error, and non-response error. Stage 1 is the 
construct of the survey instrument and identification of the target sample. Stage 2 
is the pretest and the adjustments and improvements to the survey that follow 
from it. This particular stage addresses survey concerns summarized by David 
Folz in the following quote: “Know what you want to ask and why you want to ask 
it; compose clear, unambiguous questions; keep the survey as brief as possible; 
and have a plan for analyzing the results before the instrument is 
administered.”213 Stage 3 is the implementation of the survey, and Stage 4 is the 
analysis of the data and discussion of the survey results.  
Phase 2 of the mixed methods research is the qualitative research: the 
debrief and follow-up interviews. Stage 5 is the debriefing of the survey results to 
all respondents prior to the follow-up interviews. Stage 6 is the follow-up  
interviews, which follow a protocol of semistructured questions to allow more 
freedom of discussion on specific topics. Interviewees are chosen from the pool 
of survey respondents.  
A. NL MARSOF SURVEY 
This section covers the quantitative part of the mixed methods research: 
the survey. Subsequently, the section will discuss Stages 1 through 4 of Phase 1 
of the explanatory design (Figure 36).  
                                            
213 David H. Folz, Survey Research for Public Administration (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1996), 79–80. 
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1. Stage 1: Planning and Development of the Survey 
a. Respondents 
NL MARSOF command approved administering the survey to all its 
members. The members are all males between the age of 22 and 50 having 
different specialties, such as frogmen, mountain leader, and intervention 
specialist. It was important that both the MSO and the UIM were equally 
represented in the total survey respondents. The intention was to allow each 
member of NL MARSOF to give his opinion and thus create wide support for the 
results of the survey.  
b. Survey Instrument 
The survey consists of the Denison Organizational Culture Survey 
(DOCS), supplemented by specific questions developed by this researcher. As 
mentioned earlier, Daniel Denison developed the DOCS from his research-based 
model of four cultural traits. The DOCS survey measures the present unit culture. 
The value of using this existing survey is that its reliability and validity has been 
thoroughly tested in a number of research studies. Each of the four cultural traits 
is measured by three five-item indexes, resulting in sixty items. A 5-point Likert-
scale measures the respondents’ agreement to each of these items.  
The added questions in the survey measure the preferred unit 
culture and the perceived organizational effectiveness, and collect demographic 
data. A holistic approach is used to construct the supplemented questions, and 
they consist of a variety of open- and closed-ended questions. The open-ended 
questions allow unstructured response, giving more in-depth information. The 
closed-ended questions make use of both structured answers and scales. Each 
of the added questions is connected to one of the cultural traits of the Denison 
research-based Model.  
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In ordering the questions, the survey follows basic principles 
described by Don Dillman to avoid unintended question order effect.214 The 
questionnaire consists of six sections: (1) a section on Involvement; (2) a section 
on Consistency; (3) a section on Adaptability; (4) a section on Mission; (5) a 
section on Effectiveness; and (6) a section with demographic questions. 
Appendix A shows the English version of the questionnaire. 
2. Stage 2: Pretest and Final Survey Design 
Before conducting the survey on the entire population, the survey was 
pretested on eight persons selected to represent the NL MARSOF population in 
rank, unit background, and seniority. The purpose of this pretest was threefold. 
First, this selected test group of NL MARSOF has to translate the Dutch 
questions of the DOCS back in English. This back-translation process was 
necessary to ascertain the correctness of the Dutch translation of the original 
English questions. Secondly, the specific cognitive interview method concurrent 
verbal probing was used during the interviews of the individual test group 
members. The purpose of cognitive interviewing is to ascertain that the survey 
population understands and interprets the questionnaire as intended by the 
investigator. The interviews provided information to streamline and improve 
survey procedures and identify problem questions. Thirdly, the pretest gave the 
test group the opportunity to raise other, research-related issues, which were 
incorporated in the actual survey to improve leadership commitment to the 
survey results. After the final survey design and planning, the survey was 
distributed to the entire population for data collection. 
3. Stage 3: Implementation of the Survey and Data Collection 
Questionnaires were distributed to all members of NL MARSOF at two 
different sites. The first site was the UIM location; the second was the MSO 
location. Before distributing the questionnaire, the researcher gave a 
                                            
214 Don A. Dillman, Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method. 2nd, 2007 
update with new Internet, visual, and mixed-mode guide ed. (Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2007). 
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presentation on the purpose of the research and explained the survey procedure 
to the respondents. The medium of the survey is a paper questionnaire, 
administered by gathering the respondents in classrooms at their unit’s location 
during regular working hours. While the respondents filled in the questionnaires, 
the researcher was present or nearby to explain the purpose of the survey and 
assist respondents if needed.  
The considerations for the chosen survey medium and mode are 
pragmatic. A paper questionnaire does not depend on technological or web-
based access and, therefore, can be given at any location and time. This 
provides flexibility to adjust to last minute changes in respondents training 
schedules. The in-person approach assures a high response rate and allows 
respondents to clarify any issues during the survey. The chosen medium, 
therefore, diminishes nonresponsive and measurement errors.215 The in-person 
survey mode also is a subtle but powerful method to motivate people to respond 
to the survey to their best ability.216  
A potential weakness of the chosen survey mode is the potential for 
biased response due to the mere nature of the formal military environment and 
organization. However, potential risks in response bias do not outweigh the 
benefits of the chosen survey mode. During the explanation of the survey 
procedure, the researcher emphasized the voluntary nature of responding to the 
                                            
215 Non-responsive error occurs when the people selected for the survey who do not 
respond are different from those who do respond in a way that is important to the study. 
Measurement error is when a respondent’s answer is inaccurate or imprecise because of 
misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the question. Source: Don A. Dillman, Mail and Internet 
Surveys: The Tailored Design Method. 2nd, 2007 update with new Internet, visual, and mixed-
mode guide ed. (Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2007). 
216 Social exchange is a subtle but powerful method for motivating people to respond to 
surveys and is particularly useful for surveyors, because the rewards that they can typically offer 
are relatively small. The in-person survey mode increases the benefits of participation, by 
providing convincing information about the survey in person, appealing to people’s helping 
tendencies or social norms of responsibility, by informing the people that opportunities to respond 
to this certain topic is limited, and by providing social validation. The method also decreases the 
costs of participation by making it easy for people to respond. Finally, the survey mode 
establishes more trust by emphasizing the command’s need for this particular research as 
authoritative source, end by ensuring confidentiality and security of the information. Source: Don 
A. Dillman, Mail and Internet Surveys: The Tailored Design Method, 2nd, 2007 update with new 
Internet, visual, and mixed-mode guide ed. (Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2007). 
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survey, as well as the confidentiality and security of the provided information to 
mitigate the potential risk of “forced” response. 
4. Stage 4: Analysis and Discussion of Survey Results 
This survey’s response rate is considered high by normal polling 
standards. The exact number of NL MARSOF personnel is classified, but the 
response rate was greater than 90 percent. The collected data also equally 
represented the sub-units (UIM and MSO) as well as the different ranks. 
Because of this high response, the analysis was based not on a sample, but on a 
census of the entire NL MARSOF population. Thus, no statistical methods were 
used to determine the significance of the survey data for the entire population. 
This eliminates most of the doubts one might have about the survey results. 
People not familiar with survey research sometimes question conclusions based 
on results from only a sample of the population. For the NL MARSOF survey, the 
survey canvassed the vast majority of the group, making the results of the NL 
MARSOF more compelling.  
The data received from the questionnaires was coded and filed according 
to Daniel Denison’s coding system, to allow comparative analysis. The analysis 
consisted of two different methods: comparative and descriptive analysis. The 
results from the sixty Denison Organizational Cultural Survey (DOCS) items were 
compared to the Denison normative database of more than thousand 
organizations worldwide. In addition, the analysis of the added closed- and open-
ended questions used relatively simple, descriptive statistical techniques.  
The next section starts with the analysis and discussion of the general 
DOCS results. After that, each following section separately analyzes and 
discusses the survey results of the DOCS and the added questions per cultural 
trait. The final section analyzes and discusses the results on the effectiveness 
questions of the survey. 
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a. NL MARSOF General Results on the Denison 
Organizational Culture Survey  
Figure 37 shows the percentile scores on each of the twelve 
indexes of the cultural traits. The percentile scores indicate how NL MARSOF 
ranks in comparison to the other organizations in the database. For example, 
NLMARSOF has a percentile score of 23 in the Vision index, meaning that it 
scored higher than 23 percent of the 5,000 organizations in the Denison 
normative database.  
 
Figure 37.    Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) Results NL 
MARSOF (From217) 
An initial review of the scores reveals a low total score on the 
DOCS. Denison’s empirical research has demonstrated that effective 
organizations have high culture scores in all four traits. In other words, 
                                            
217 Daniel R. Denison, Circumplex Report NL MARSOF (Denison Corporation, 25 July 
2011). 
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organizations that score better in the model perform better than organizations 
that score lower. Judging from the percentiles, one can conclude that NL 
MARSOF’s culture does not promote optimal organizational effectiveness. For 
most indexes, the majority of the organizations in Denison’s database have 
scored better than NL MARSOF. For instance, NL MARSOF scores better than 
only 2 percent of the other organizations on the index Agreement. From a 
positive perspective, this means that there is a lot of room for improvement in the 
organizational culture of NL MARSOF. However, as a fully operational Special 
Operations Force, conducting high-risk missions, NL MARSOF needs to be 
performing at high levels continuously. After debriefing the survey results to NL 
MARSOF cadre, the overall sentiment is that MARSOF has to improve its 
organizational culture to achieve higher operational effectiveness.  
When examining the DOCS results more closely, they reveal a 
better score on the flexible traits (Adaptability and Involvement) than on the 
stable traits (Mission and Consistency). This indicates that NL MARSOF has a 
very low capacity to remain stable and predictable over time. On the other hand, 
it has a better capacity to change in response to the environment. In other words, 
NL MARSOF as an organization is fairly flexible, but lacks capacity for long-term 
stability.  
When comparing the DOCS results of the M-Squadron (UIM) and 
C-Squadron (MSO), no significant differences in the scores on cultural traits are 
present. Both sub-units score low on the stable traits (Mission and Consistency) 
and score average on the flexible traits (Adaptability and Involvement). The only 
significant difference is that the MSO scores considerably better on the indexes 
of the trait Involvement. On the index Empowerment, the MSO scores 71 percent 
compared to the 23 percent score of the UIM. On the index Team Orientation, 
the MSO scores 30 percent compared to the 19 percent score of the UIM. On the 
index Capability Development, the MSO scores 81 percent compared to the 47 
percent score of the UIM. Therefore, it is fair to say that the MSO members feel 
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more empowered and engaged than the UIM members. Figure 38 shows the 
percentile scores of the UIM and the MSO.  
 
Figure 38.   Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) score for the UIM 
(M-Squadron) and the MSO (C-Squadron) (From218) 
When comparing the DOCS results of the officers against the 
senior NCOs and the enlisted men, there are again no significant differences in 
scores on cultural traits. All ranks score low on stable traits (Mission and 
Consistency) and score average on the flexible traits (Adaptability and 
Involvement). The analysis, however, reveals that the higher the rank, the more 
positive are the percentile scores on Adaptability and Involvement. In other 
words, officers tend to be more positive about the Adaptability and Involvement 
of NL MARSOF than senior NCOs, and senior NCOs in turn tend to be more 
positive than the corporals and marines. Figure 39 shows the percentile scores of 
the officers, the senior NCOs, and the enlisted men. 
                                            




Figure 39.   DOCS Score for the Marines and Corporals, Senior NCOs and 
Officers (From219) 
 
                                            
219 Daniel R. Denison, Circumplex Report NL MARSOF (Denison Corporation, 25 July 
2011). 
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The only exception to the trend in positivity is the score on the 
index Vision (the shared view of a desired future state). Contrary to expectation, 
the marines and corporals score 29 percent on Vision, compared to the senior 
NCOs and officers that score only 16 percent and 9 percent. Thus, more so than 
the officers, the lower ranks seem to think that there is a shared view of a desired 
future state. On the one hand, this result can be seen as positive, because it 
indicates a degree of trust of the lower ranks in the vision of NL MARSOF 
leadership. On the other hand, the fact that the officers and senior NCOs indicate 
an overall lack of Vision, Strategic Direction, and Goals & Objectives is very 
troubling. The section on the cultural trait Mission analyzes these results in detail.  
From the DOCS results, the five items with the highest scores and 
the five items with the lowest scores give a better sense of the areas where NL 
MARSOF members think the organization is doing well or poorly. A high 
percentile score means that the majority of the population (strongly) agrees on 
these items and a low percentile score means that the majority (strongly) 
disagrees on these items. Figure 40 shows the items with the highest scores for 
the whole population of NL MARSOF, the UIM, and the MSO. The figure reveals 
that the highest scores are all items on Adaptability and Involvement, the flexible 
side of culture. It also shows that the UIM and the MSO do not differ significantly 
in scoring results. 
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Figure 40.   The Items with the Highest Scores for NL MARSOF, UIM, and MSO 
(From220) 
Figure 41 shows the five items with the lowest scores for the whole 
population of NL MARSOF, the UIM, and the MSO. The UIM scores lowest in the 
trait Consistency, and the MSO scores lowest in the trait Mission. Some of the 
lowest scores are also items on Adaptability and Involvement. Closer 
examination of the items reveals that these particular low scores in Adaptability 
and Involvement all relate to a perceived lack of cooperation between the UIM 
and the MSO.  
                                            




Figure 41.   The Items with the Lowest Scores of NL MARSOF, UIM, and MSO 
(From221) 
The DOCS results give a “snapshot” of the NL MARSOF unit 
culture as perceived by its members. To confirm these results, the respondents 
were asked to rank order the presence of the four cultural traits in NL MARSOF 
from strongest to least strong. In addition, the respondents also rank ordered the 
four cultural traits from most important to least important. Figure 42 depicts both 
results.  
                                            




Figure 42.   Cultural Traits: Presence Compared to Importance  
From the figure, one can conclude that the rank order in present 
cultural traits confirms and strengthens the DOCS results. Involvement is 
considered most present, followed by Adaptability, Mission, and Consistency. 
The only significant difference between the subunits is that the MSO members 
believe Involvement is substantially more present within their sub-unit than do 
UIM members, but this again is consistent with the DOCS results for the MSO. In 
addition, the figure shows that the trait Mission predominantly ranks most 
important (55 percent), followed by Adaptability, Involvement, and Consistency. 
Comparing the most present to the most important illustrates the contrast that NL 
MARSOF members indicate: Mission is most important, but Involvement is most 
present within their organization.  
In summary, the analysis of the DOCS offers several preliminary 
conclusions. First, NL MARSOF scores low to average on the DOCS. Its relative 
strength lies in its flexibility (Adaptability and Involvement), and its weakness lies 
in its stability (Mission and Consistency). Overall, these DOCS results do not 
paint a promising picture of the organizational culture of NL MARSOF. Keeping in 
mind that the survey results give a (temporary) snapshot of the organizational 
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culture, it definitely serves as a wake-up call for NL MARSOF. After briefing the 
results to the cadre of NL MARSOF, they unanimously agreed that the DOCS 
model presents a realistic mirror for the organization to see its present culture 
state. NL MARSOF cadre collectively proposed that it should address the weak 
scores in all of the four cultural traits, especially focusing on Mission. 
In addition, there is no significant difference in organizational 
culture between the sub-units or between the ranks. In all cases, the analyses for 
these subgroups show few differences. The important and promising conclusion 
is that there are no insurmountable cultural differences between sub-units or 
ranks. This gives hope that managing the identified friction points between the 
sub-units, and ultimately improving the organizational culture as a whole, will be 
successful.  
This section addressed all of the significant differences between 
sub-units and ranks. The higher ranks tend to be more positive about their unit 
culture. However, the most numerous group is the enlisted men and junior 
NCOs, so a large part of the NL MARSOF population is less positive about the 
organization than is its leadership. The model clearly brings out this difference in 
perception. Leadership now can see that the men are less positive about the 
organizations culture than are they. This is in itself is a positive step forward and 
serves as a good starting point to work on improvement. In addition, the MSO 
tends to score better on Involvement than the UIM. The differences in the 
indexes of Involvement are discussed in detail in the following section. For now 
the fact that 71 percent of the members of the MSO live together on base, 
compared to only 28 percent of the members of the UIM, has undoubtedly 
influenced MSO’s better score on Involvement. Working and living together give 
more opportunities to build relationships and commitment. 
b. NL MARSOF Results on Involvement 
This section analyzes the results of the three indices of the trait 
Involvement: (1) Empowerment, (2) Team Orientation, and (3) Capability 
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Development. To start, the respondents indicated how important the three 
indexes are to NL MARSOF. Figure 43 shows that NL MARSOF members find 
Team Orientation most important, followed by Capability Development and 
Empowerment. However, the DOCS results indicate that Team Orientation is the 
least present index (22 percent). Thus, in order to improve Involvement, NL 
MARSOF must work on Team Orientation. 
 
Figure 43.   Degree of Importance of Involvement Indexes for NL MARSOF 
To improve Team Orientation, the respondents described what they 
believed to be the best ways to stimulate teamwork within NL MARSOF. All the 
respondents’ answers on the open questions have been clustered in distinct 
categories. The categories will help NL MARSOF leadership in choosing the 
actions they can take to improve teamwork. Figure 44’s bar chart depicts the best 
ways to stimulate teamwork. The selection of quotes gives a better sense of the 
general sentiment within NL MARSOF on teamwork. The quotes are from 
respondents from the different sub-units and ranks.  
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Figure 44.   Team Orientation: How Can You Stimulate Teamwork? 
Mostly, respondents indicate that increasing the number of large-
scale exercises is a way to improve teamwork (43 percent), followed by better 
mutual communication (29 percent), and clear goals and uniform leadership (22 
percent). Between the sub-units, the MSO indicate social events more often, and 
the UIM indicate co-location more often. The only significant difference between 
ranks is that only marines and corporals prefer longer postings in NL MARSOF to 
have more time to build teamwork.    
The new MSOF-course is a critical first step in the Capability 
Development of NL MARSOF personnel. It is the foundation of every MARSOF 
member and, therefore, its acceptance is important. To measure acceptance, the 
respondents indicated if they think the MSOF-course is an improvement to the 
previous separate selection courses of the UIM and the MSO. From the total 
respondents, 46 percent agree that the new MSOF-course is an improvement, 
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but still almost 30 percent disagree. The fact that one in three members 
disagrees raises serious concerns about the level of acceptance of the new 
MSOF-course. Figure 45 shows the various explanations respondents give for 
their agreement or disagreement. These explanations can help leadership select 
actions to improve acceptance of the new basic course.  
 
Figure 45.   Capability Development: Is the MSOF-course an Improvement? 
The respondents who indicated that the new MSOF-course is an 
improvement generally believe that the new course delivers more versatile and 
better-equipped operators who are interchangeable between the UIM and the 
MSO. The new course also benefits new candidates, because they do not have 
to go through multiple tough selection courses any more to work in both the UIM 
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and the MSO. These reasons exactly correspond with the official arguments for 
the development of new MSOF-course. On the other hand, the respondents who 
indicated that the new MSOF-course is not an improvement predominantly 
believe that the new course delivers operators of lesser quality and “toughness.” 
Of those respondents, the large majority are the marines and corporals. Thus, 
contrary to the expectation that older members might be more prone to think that 
the new course is not an improvement, the younger members actually do. Lastly, 
members from the UIM focus more on the loss in quality, and the members from 
the MSO focus more on the loss in hardship and identity. The follow-up 
interviews clarify this outcome. 
In summary, NL MARSOF scores just about average on the trait 
Involvement. The respondents find Team Orientation the most important index 
for NL MARSOF, but it is least present (22 percent). The other indexes score 
average (43 percent and 63 percent). For Capability Development, respondents 
generally consider the new MSOF-course the way ahead. The senior members, 
however, must better inform the younger members about the reasons behind the 
new MSOF-course to gain overall acceptance of the course and see the new 
members as equals. To improve Involvement, NL MARSOF leadership can focus 
on improving Team Orientation by conducting more large-scale exercises within 
NL MARSOF, improving mutual communication between units and ranks, and 
giving clear goals and uniform leadership. 
c. NL MARSOF Results on Adaptability 
This section analyzes the results of the three indexes of the trait 
Adaptability: (1) Creating Change, (2) Customer Focus, and (3) Organizational 
Learning. To begin, the respondents indicated how important the three indexes 
are to NL MARSOF. Figure 46 shows that NL MARSOF members find Creating 
Change to be the most important index, followed by Organizational Learning and 
Customer Focus. The very low DOCS score on Customer Focus (2 percent) 
corresponds with the perceived low importance of it. The DOCS score on 
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Creating Change is below average (27 percent), while the respondents consider 
it the far most import index of the trait Adaptability. Thus, in order to improve 
Adaptability, NL MARSOF must work on the willingness and ability to change, 
while emphasizing the importance of understanding and anticipating to 
stakeholders and their future requirements. 
 
Figure 46.   Degree of Importance of Adaptability Indexes for NL MARSOF 
To improve the Creating Change index, the respondents have 
indicated what they believe to be the best ways to improve the willingness and 
ability to change within NL MARSOF. These preferred ways are clustered in 
different categories; Figure 47 shows this in a bar chart. Again, the quotes give a 




Figure 47.   Creating Change: How Can You Improve the Willingness/Ability to 
Change? 
According to NL MARSOF, the best way to improve the willingness 
and ability to change is via cross-training and personnel exchanges with other 
units (37 percent). UIM members particularly emphasize this (more than 50 
percent). In addition, the respondents mention frequent (intelligence) updates, 
seminars, and workshops as relatively simple ways to stimulate new ideas and 
approaches (24 percent). Between ranks, the sergeants predominantly mention 
an increase in staff capacity and better top-down communication as ways to 
improve the ability to read the operating environment and anticipate future 
changes. 
NL MARSOF scores average on Organizational Learning (63 
percent). However, the respondents identify several ways to further stimulate 
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organizational learning and, thus, improve the ability to receive, translate, and 
interpret signals from the environment into opportunities for innovation. Figure 48 
shows a bar chart of the identified ways and selected corresponding quotes. Of 
these ways, 37 percent of the respondents indicate that they must be given the 
opportunity to try suggested new ideas despite the risk of failure. It is a clear 
signal to leadership that this has not fully been the case. Therefore, besides 
better two-way communication in giving feedback on developments and progress 
(47 percent), actually trying out new ideas is an important way to stimulate 
creativity and organizational learning. Contrary to expectation, only 10 percent of 
the respondents indicate rewards (money) as an important incentive to stimulate 
new ideas and organizational learning. Of these respondents, the majority were 
marines, corporals, and sergeants. 
 
 
Figure 48.   Organizational Learning: How Can You Stimulate Organizational 
Learning? 
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Customer Focus for NL MARSOF is the recognized need to serve 
its stakeholders and anticipate their future needs. NL MARSOF being a military 
organization, the most important stakeholder is its higher command (the 
Commandant of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps). The Commandant 
ultimately controls the resources and assigns mission tasks. Nevertheless, the 
respondents unanimously indicate that the requirements and demands of the 
Commandant are the least important to fulfill compared to other stakeholders. 
These other stakeholders are important, but are not directly in command of NL 
MARSOF. To address this misperception, NL MARSOF leadership should inform 
personnel of the actual command relationships and the relative importance of the 
other stakeholders. Figure 49 shows the survey results’ rank order from most 
important to least important stakeholder.  
 
Figure 49.    Customer Focus: Whose Requirements Are Most Important? 
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In summary, NL MARSOF scores average on the trait Adaptability. 
Within Adaptability, the respondents find the willingness and ability to change the 
most important, but it is only minimally present (27 percent). Of the three 
indexes, the respondents consider Organizational Learning most present (63 
percent). Thus, innovation and creativity is stimulated, but respondents indicate 
that members can be motivated even more when more of their suggested ideas 
are actually tried out.  
Furthermore, NL MARSOF scores very low on Customer Focus (2 
percent). Its members need to realize that it has to serve their most important 
stakeholder, the Commandant of the Netherlands Marine Corps. Respondents 
currently consider him the least important compared to other external 
stakeholders and this results in their being unlikely to anticipate the 
Commandant’s actions and requirements. NL MARSOF leadership should 
address this misperception. To improve Adaptability overall, NL MARSOF 
leadership should focus on improving the ability and willingness to change by 
stimulating more cross-training with other (world-class) SOF units, organizing 
seminars, workshops, and (intelligence) updates, and putting effort in creating 
more capable staff members (training and education).  
d. NL MARSOF Results on Consistency 
This section analyzes the results of the three indexes of the trait 
Consistency: (1) Core values, (2) Agreement, and (3) Coordination & Integration. 
The respondents first indicated how important the indexes are to NL MARSOF. 
Figure 50 shows that NL MARSOF members find Coordination & Integration the 
most important index, followed by Core Values, and finally Agreement. NL 
MARSOF scores very low on all three indexes. Only Coordination & Integration 
scores slightly higher (22 percent); this corresponds with its perceived higher 
importance. The ranking of the three indexes by the respondents does not differ 
between sub-units or ranks. To improve the overall perception of Consistency, 
leadership can generally work on all indexes. However, to achieve most effect, 
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they should give what the respondents perceive as most important—
Coordination & Integration—the most attention.  
 
Figure 50.   Degree of Importance of Consistency Indexes for NL MARSOF 
Of the total respondents, a strong majority (85 percent) said the 
UIM and the MSO need to work together more often. Thus, there is a definite 
sense of need to cooperate more to improve Coordination & Integration. Figure 
51 shows the various beliefs about why the subunits need to work together better 
than they do now to achieve common goals. These reasons express the urgent 
feeling  that something has to change in the way NL MARSOF operates 
internally.  
Barring some nuances, there is no significant difference in what the 
members of the different sub-units have indicated in the survey. More so than 
members of the MSO, the members of the UIM mentioned improving cohesion as 
an important reason to cooperate (40 percent of the UIM compared to 20 percent 
of the MSO). On the other hand, more so than members of the UIM, the 
members of the MSO mentioned mutual learning as an important reason for 
cooperation (60 percent of the MSO compared to 40 percent of the UIM). Lastly, 
several sergeant majors and warrant officers said that the UIM and MSO should 
cooperate much less, because both sub-units have different tasks that are 
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“simply just not compatible.” Even though the UIM and MSO have different tasks, 
cooperation between both units can take many forms. Saying that the sub-units 
should not cooperate at all indicates a lack of understanding or willingness to 
make NL MARSOF a success. Coming from senior NCOs, this raises concern, 
because especially they have to carry the idea of NL MARSOF forward to their 
men. The follow-up interviews address this concern. 
 
 
Figure 51.   Coordination & Integration: How Much do We Need to Cooperate? 
According to a considerable majority (84 percent) of NL MARSOF, 
the ability to reach agreement is necessary. However, they all realize that it is 
impossible to get agreement within NL MARSOF on every issue. Agreement is 
necessary only on specific, important issues and the respondents most often 
indicated that agreement is most necessary on the mission (48 percent), followed 
by procedures (TTPs) and training (33 percent). This perception is equal among 
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sub-units and ranks. Figure 52 shows the important issues on which NL 
MARSOF members believe agreement is necessary. Based on these results, the 
next logical question is whether agreement on these issues actually exists within 
NL MARSOF. Even though this answer is fairly predictable, the follow-up 
interviews address this question.    
 
 
Figure 52.   Agreement: On what Issues is Agreement Necessary? 
To determine whether the Core Values of the NL MARSOF 
members are equivalent, respondents chose four (out of twenty) values they 
believe need to be held in common within NL MARSOF. Each cultural trait is 
represented by five of the twenty values, so for each cultural trait the 
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respondents identified the most important value for NL MARSOF. Figure 53 
shows the distribution of the possible common values for NL MARSOF. The 
respondents chose the following five values most often: (1) teamwork, (2) quality, 
(3) unity, (4) responsibility, and (5) flexibility. Of these five values, quality 
represents the trait Mission, teamwork and responsibility represent the trait 
Involvement, unity represents the trait Consistency, and flexibility represents the 
trait Adaptability.  
The bar chart shows that a large majority of NL MARSOF believes 
that these five values need to be commonly held in NL MARSOF. For instance, 
almost 70 percent choose quality as a needed common value. Among the sub-
units and ranks, there are no significant differences in opinion. Thus, all the 
members of NL MARSOF generally believe in the same core values. This 
provides a good starting point to work on managing the friction points, because 
apparently the sub-units do not differ significantly in the things they value. Thus, 
leadership can build on these common values in developing mission statements, 
command philosophies and other command directives.  
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Figure 53.   Core Values: What Core Values Need to Be Common within NL 
MARSOF? 
In summary, NL MARSOF scores low on the trait Consistency. 
Across the board, the members believe there is no common mindset (i.e., a 
shared system of beliefs, values and symbols that are widely understood by 
members of an organization) within NL MARSOF. However, the core values 
reveal a striking resemblance between sub-units and ranks. This indicates that in 
essence all members of NL MARSOF value the same things, even though this 
fact might not be widely understood by the members. Thus, it should be feasible 
to manage the identified friction points, because they are not based on 
irreconcilable differences in values.  
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Within Consistency, the respondents find Coordination & 
Integration the most important, but it is only marginally present (21 percent). 
Thus, to improve Consistency, a large majority (85 percent) indicates that sub-
units of NL MARSOF should coordinate and integrate more. That way the sub-
units can learn from each other and improve internal cohesion, while outsiders 
will be more likely to view NL MARSOF as one unified SOF unit. Agreement is 
hardly present as a value within NL MARSOF (2 percent), but respondents 
indicate that it is most essential in areas such as  mission, training and 
procedures. Overall, the score on Consistency leaves significant room for 
improvement, but leadership can develop a common mindset by focusing their 
effort on Coordination & Integration and Agreement on essential issues.  
e. NL MARSOF Results on Mission 
This section analyzes the results of the three indexes of the trait 
Mission: (1) Strategic Direction & Intent, (2) Goals & Objectives, and (3) Vision. 
NL MARSOF scores very low on all three indexes. Only Vision scores slightly 
better (23 percent). In addition, the respondents indicated how important they 
think the indexes are to NL MARSOF. Figure 54 shows that NL MARSOF 
members find Strategic Direction & Intent the most important index, but it only 
differs slightly in degree of importance from Goals & Objectives. On the other 
hand, respondents give Vision significantly less importance. A plausible 
explanation could be that strategic direction, goals, and objectives have a more 
short-term focus than vision. Its absence, therefore, affects members’ daily work 
more than a lack of vision.  
Between the sub-units, the UIM finds Strategic Direction slightly 
more important than Goals & Objectives. For the MSO members the case is 
reversed. Among ranks, the marines and junior NCOs find Strategic Direction 
more important, compared to the senior NCOs who indicate Goals & Objectives 
as more important. That being said, these differences between sub-units and 
ranks are minor compared to the impact of the overall low score on Mission.  
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Figure 54.   Degree of Importance of Mission Indexes for NL MARSOF 
Chapter III, Strategic Utility Explored, uses the 3-D cube as a 
framework to define strategic utility. Historical data analysis showed how the 
various types of missions NL MARSOF conducted in the past fit the 3-D cube. 
The governing document analysis identified the required strategic utility for NL 
MARSOF. The survey also uses the 3-D cube to frame the questions on 
preferred strategic utility for NL MARSOF. The respondents answered questions 
related to each dimension of the 3-D cube, so it visualized the preferred strategic 
utility of the members of NL MARSOF. This result will help NL MARSOF 
leadership in aligning the preferred with the required strategic utility. This will 
ultimately give strategic direction, goals, and objectives to NL MARSOF, thus 
improving the indexes Strategic Direction and Goals & Objectives.  
On the first dimension of the 3-D cube, the respondents ranked the 
different geographic environments in which they believe NL MARSOF should 
operate. The results indicate that the largest part of NL MARSOF members think 
the littoral is the most important environment for NL MARSOF, followed by land, 
sea, and riverine area. Both sub-units’ survey data show the same outcome. One 
interesting difference between ranks, however, is that the lower the rank, the 
more important they believe it is for NL MARSOF to operate on land. This 
perception could reflect the fact that recently the largest contribution of NL 
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MARSOF was to land-based special operations in Afghanistan. Figure 55 shows 
the rank order from most important to least important geographic environment.  
 
Figure 55.   Geographic Environment: Where Should NL MARSOF Operate? 
On the second dimension of the 3-D cube, the respondents ranked 
the political domain on which NL MARSOF should focus. A large majority of the 
respondents (73 percent) indicated that international missions (special operations 
abroad) are more important for NL MARSOF than national missions (domestic 
counter-terrorism). More than 60 percent of the UIM and 95 percent of the MSO 
believe that special operations abroad are more important. The respondents 
perceive special operations as NL MARSOF’s core business in which domestic 
counter-terrorism is but one subset of operations. Interestingly, the higher the 
respondent’s rank, the more important he believes international missions are. An 
explanation could be that the UIM has more junior members than does the MSO, 
and these junior members think their specific sub-unit task of domestic counter-
terrorism is most important for the whole of NL MARSOF. Figure 56 shows the 
distribution in importance of national and international missions.   
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Figure 56.   Political Domain: What Mission Type is More Important? 
On the third dimension of the 3-D cube, the respondents ranked the 
different principal missions that NL MARSOF can conduct within the whole 
spectrum of special operations. The largest part of NL MARSOF members think it 
should focus primarily on direct action (DA), closely followed by counter-terrorism 
(CT) and special reconnaissance (SR). More than 75 percent think that military 
assistance (MA) is least important; fewer than 2 percent believe it is the most 
important. Those 2 percent are predominantly members ranking sergeant major 
or above. Between the sub-units, 55 percent of the UIM ranked counter-terrorism 
as most important compared to only 10 percent of the MSO. Nevertheless, both 
ranked direct action and counter-terrorism as the two principal missions NL 
MARSOF should conduct. The results, show that NL MARSOF members believe 
that the direct mission side of the spectrum of special operations is more 
important than the indirect mission side. Figure 57 shows the rank order from 
most important to least important principal missions. 
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Figure 57.   Special Operations Spectrum: What Principal Missions Are More 
Important? 
By placing the results of the three dimensions in the 3-D cube, the 
focus of the preferred strategic utility of NL MARSOF becomes visual. Figure 58 
shows where within the 3-D cube of strategic utility the majority of the members 
of NL MARSOF prefer their organization to focus. Leadership can now compare 
this to the required strategic utility for NL MARSOF and align the preferred with 
the required strategic utility. The overlaps and gaps are the points of attention in 
adjusting Strategic Direction and defining Goals & Objectives. 
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Figure 58.   The Preferred Strategic Utility of NL MARSOF 
To help provide strategic direction, the respondents also described 
how NL MARSOF could distinguish itself from other Dutch SOF units. Naturally, 
most respondents emphasize the maritime nature of the unit as a distinct 
capability. More interestingly, however, almost one third of the members 
indicated that NL MARSOF could distinguish itself by the quality of its personnel. 
In addition, more than one fourth of the members mentioned the advantage of 
the smaller NL MARSOF’s flexibility and innovativeness compared to the bigger 
Army SOF. These findings support the first basic truth of SOF that “humans are 
more important than hardware.” Strategic direction is important, but the people 
also need to be able (Quality) and willing (Flexibility) to follow it. Figure 59 shows 
the different ways by which NL MARSOF can distinguish itself from others.  
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Figure 59.   Strategic Direction: How Can NL MARSOF Distinguish Itself from 
Others? 
NL MARSOF’s vision is its ultimate reason for existence–its 
purpose–what the organization is ultimately trying to achieve. It is the “dot on the 
horizon” for its members, and NL MARSOF’s mission statement should clearly 
formulate this vision. Nevertheless, NL MARSOF scores marginal on the index 
Vision, doing better than only 23 percent of the other 5000 organizations of 
Denison’s normative database. To confirm the low percentile score on Vision, 
respondents are asked to describe what NL MARSOF’s mission (i.e. mission 
statement) is. Most answered this question simply by saying that MARSOF 
conducts maritime special operations and counter-terrorism. However, more than 
one third answered that they do not know what NL MARSOF’s mission or vision 
is. Those respondents include a few officers and many senior NCOs. For 
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example, eight sergeant majors said that they did not know what NL MARSOF’s 
mission is. It is fair to say that this outcome is very disturbing. If these senior 
members indicate they do not know what the mission is, they cannot inform the 
younger members or clarify matters for them, thus confusion about the mission 
perpetuates. Figure 60 shows the various answers on the question what the 
respondents think NL MARSOF’s vision and/or mission statement is. 
 
 
Figure 60.   Vision: What Is NL MARSOF’s Mission? 
In summary, NL MARSOF scores low on the trait Mission. Across 
the board, its members believe there is a lack of Vision, Strategic Direction, 
Goals, and Objectives. The members generally miss guidance that tells them 
why they are doing particular work and how they contribute to the strategic intent 
of NL MARSOF. Within the trait Mission, the respondents find Strategic Direction 
and Goals & Objectives equally important, but both are minimally present. On 
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Strategic Direction and Goals & Objectives, NL MARSOF scores better than only 
4 percent and 5 percent of the other 5000 organizations in the normative 
database.   
As for Vision, the ultimate reason for NL MARSOF’s being, one 
third of the members, including senior cadre, indicated that they do not know 
what it is. The follow-up interviews further investigated this result. The 3-D 
framework shows that the majority prefer direct missions (DA and CT), 
predominantly in an international maritime domain. However, the question 
remains whether this preferred strategic direction aligns with the required 
strategic direction. This is where NL MARSOF’s leadership needs to give 
guidance and realign if necessary. Furthermore, a large part of the respondents 
indicated that besides maritime and counter-terrorism capability, NL MARSOF 
could distinguish itself with the quality and creativity of its people. Therefore, 
investing in personnel capability and skills will probably have a positive effect on 
the confidence of the members and the overall quality of NL MARSOF.   
f. NL MARSOF and Its Performance 
This last section analyzes the outcome of NL MARSOF’s 
assessment of its own performance compared to the KCT (Dutch Army SOF). 
Respondents assessed the organization’s performance on ten points, of which 
five relate to the hot side of the organization (the goal-oriented subculture 
focused on real action) and five relate to the cold side of the organization (the 
process-oriented subculture focused on prevention, facilitation, and preparation). 
Figure 61 depicts NL MARSOF’s assessment on its own performance. 
On the hot side of the organization, one in five members think NL 
MARSOF performs less well than does the Army counterpart. Surprisingly, 
almost half of the senior NCOs think the overall performance of MARSOF is 
lower than that of KCT. Most striking, however, is the fact that almost 70 percent 
of the respondents say that NL MARSOF has lower quality staff members than 
has the KCT. This means that a large number of the staff members of NL 
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MARSOF have indicated this about themselves. The fact that in contrast only 2 
percent of the respondents think NL MARSOF has lower quality teams highlights 
the outcome even more. High quality staff is essential in SOF units, so the follow-
up interviews discussed this issue.  
 
 
Figure 61.   NL MARSOF Performance: How Do We Perform Compared to KCT 
(Dutch Army SOF)? 
On the cold side of the organization, the general perception is that 
the KCT better manages their superior resources. More positively, only 12 
percent believe that the members of the KCT are more loyal to their unit. Most 
worrisome is the fact that 40 percent of the respondents say that unit member 
satisfaction is higher within the KCT, compared to only 12 percent saying 
satisfaction is higher within MARSOF. Of those 40 percent, the majority are 




their choice to pursue a career in NL MARSOF or transfer to the Army SOF unit. 
It is hard to select, train, and retain high quality SOF personnel, so the follow-up 
interviews discussed this issue. 
Overall, the respondents’ answers generally revealed a slightly 
lower level of self-esteem compared to their perception of the Army counterpart. 
On the cold side of NL MARSOF, most of its members think KCT performs 
equally or better. On the hot side, the perception of NL MARSOF’s performance 
is more positive, with the exception of the quality of the staff and the relative 
share in Dutch SOF missions. Being humble and assuming an underdog position 
is not necessarily negative, as long as it does not become an inferiority complex 
and thus affect the unit’s esprit de corps. Therefore, the low perception of 
member satisfaction and staff quality deserves further investigation during the 
follow-up interviews.  
5. Concluding Thoughts on the Survey Results 
Mission is the single most influential cultural trait on which organizations 
can focus.222 If an organization is struggling with overall performance or is in 
crisis, it should focus on its mission. In organizations that are in crisis, leaders 
tend to think that they have to implement a new structure, a better system, or 
new processes, because they want to get more control of the situation. These 
measures are all elements of the Consistency trait (the degree to which values 
and behavior are concise and integrated). However, more consistency without 
the context of strong Mission or high Involvement will not optimally improve the 
overall organizational effectiveness. Caroline Fisher’s research shows that the 
way to start improving organizational effectiveness is not by trying to improve 
Consistency (systems and structures), but first to create more Involvement by 
letting people think about and work productively on the organizational mission 
(the vision, the goals & objectives, and the strategic direction). These cultural 
                                            
222 Caroline Fisher, as referred to in “New Paradigms: Why Mission Matters.” Leader to 
Leader no. 17 (Summer, 2000): 46–48. 
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traits of Mission and Involvement are the hardest to tackle, because they require 
deep personal change. Nevertheless, these two traits have the “highest 
leverage.”   
The results of the survey indicate a similar situation for NL MARSOF. The 
overall score on the Denison Cultural Survey is low, indicating low organizational 
effectiveness. The overall perceived lack of Vision, Goals, and Strategic Direction 
is obvious. Even though NL MARSOF leadership has focused on elements of the 
Consistency trait during the reorganization (new functions in staffs, new 
communication processes and working procedures to coordinate activities, and 
personnel exchange), it failed to produce and communicate a mission supported 
by the majority of the community and, thus, gave neither  a sense of purpose nor 
sufficient guidance. This lack of long-term vision, clarified in goals and objectives, 
and set out in strategic direction now negatively affects the overall performance 
of NL MARSOF. The way forward is to get NL MARSOF members involved in the 
process of defining the organization’s “way ahead” in order to achieve 
improvement in Mission and Involvement. Improving the other cultural traits, 
Adaptability and Consistency, will naturally follow this first important step.  
B. NL MARSOF FOLLOW-UP INTERVIEWS 
The purpose of conducting the follow-up interviews is twofold. First, 
interviews conducted subsequent to the survey allow interpretive questions to 
address any anomalies in the collected data or to illuminate any areas that may 
need further scrutiny. Compared to the quantitative survey results alone, this 
qualitative information provides more comprehensive evidence to the overall 
research results. Secondly, on specific issues arising from the survey results, key 
members discussed viable possibilities for improvement and formulated future 
recommendations for improvement.  
1. Stage 5: Debrief 
The researcher debriefed most of the members of NL MARSOF on the 
results of the survey. The one and a half hour presentation covered the results 
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on each cultural trait in detail. Afterwards sufficient time was planned for 
questions and general discussion. The researcher gave the briefing to three 
groups. The first group (by design) was the senior cadre of NL MARSOF. 
Knowing that the results were sensitive, this first briefing would give the senior 
cadre the opportunity to respond before the results were briefed to the total NL 
MARSOF community. Even though the senior cadre was not happy with the 
survey results, they were generally satisfied that specific issues were brought to 
light. Later, the briefing was not altered for the general UIM and the MSO 
community. Like the senior cadre, the members of both the UIM and MSO were 
not happy with the results. However, they were glad and in some way relieved 
that the research exposed the issues within NL MARSOF, so that leadership 
could take steps to resolve these issues.  
2. Stage 6: Interviews 
a. Interview Sample 
The target sample for these interviews was a selection of officers, 
NCOs, and senior enlisted members of NL MARSOF which represents the cadre 
of NL MARSOF and has the authority and influence to either support or reject 
recommendations. After briefing the survey results to all the officers, NCOs, and 
senior enlisted members of NL MARSOF, the selected target sample was split 
into groups of no more than four persons. The composition of these groups was 
based on functionality within MARSOF. The platoon commanders and senior 
NCOs formed sample groups. The heads of the staff bureaus (operations, 
training, education, personnel, intelligence, and communications) formed several 
sample groups and the last group consisted of the commanding officer, the 
executive officer, and warrant officers. The separation of the population in 
platoon groups, staff groups, and a command group assured the most 
comprehensive view on the survey results. In total, there were six different 
sample groups for the follow-up interviews.  
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b. Procedure 
The group interviews followed a semistructured protocol in 
discussing MARSOF’s results in each of the four cultural traits. In relation to each 
of these traits, the discussion first focused on the clarity of the results. The 
sample groups discussed any anomalies in the survey data or perceived 
ambiguity of the survey analysis results. These interpretive questions and 
discussions continued until the group had a common understanding of the 
results. Secondly, the sample groups discussed the three different indexes within 
each trait separately, in order to formulate possible practical recommendations. 
This protocol repeated itself four times for the traits: Mission, Involvement, 
Adaptability, and Consistency. Lastly, the sample groups discussed the results 
on the questions concerning the organizational effectiveness of MARSOF 
compared to the Army SOF counterpart.  
3. Stage 6: Discussion on Strategic Utility 
Based on the survey results of the cultural traits Mission and Adaptability, 
the interviews addressed the strategic utility of NL MARSOF. As in the survey, 
the sample groups used the framework of the 3-D cube as a tool to give more 
concrete understanding of the abstract concept of strategic utility. 
a. NL MARSOF Lacks a Sense of Mission 
After discussing the survey results with the sample groups, the 
bottom line is that the vast majority agrees on an overall lack of vision, goals, and 
strategic direction. Everyone especially seeks a clear mission to direct 
MARSOF’s efforts and actions. This direction should operationalize the long-term 
vision set out by higher command (“the dot on the horizon where you need to go 
as an organization”). This general opinion does not differ between ranks and sub-
units. One quote captured the general feeling within MARSOF personnel: 
“MARSOF is like a big powerboat without a steering wheel. It has the power 
potential to win races, but lacks one vital component.” The outcome of the follow-
up interviews thus do not contradict any of the findings from the survey. Both the 
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survey and the follow-up interviews indicate the high importance and need for 
strategic direction and (short-term) goals in contrast to the perceived absence of 
it within NL MARSOF.  
As mentioned in the previous section, NL MARSOF members’ 
preferred strategic direction (defined by the 3-D cube [geographic, political, 
special operations spectrum]) focuses on direct missions (Direct Action, Special 
Reconnaissance). The sample groups gave two explanations for this general 
focus. First, they said that direct missions are more appealing to SOF operators. 
Generally speaking, SOF operators prefer Direct Action and Special 
Reconnaissance missions to Military Assistance missions, because the former 
suits the inherently “action-oriented” operators more. A quote from an operator 
captures this sentiment: “a hostage rescue operation is far ‘sexier’ than drinking 
tea and talking for hours with village elders in village stability operations (VSO) in 
Afghanistan.”223 Secondly, the sample groups also acknowledged that these 
types of missions lie more in MARSOF’s historical “comfort zone.” As 
demonstrated in Chapter III C., Historical employment of SOF, MARSOF 
historically has operated primarily on the direct mission side on the spectrum of 
special operations. Over the years this has shaped MARSOF members’ 
perception of what special operations are. Naturally, conducting direct missions 
have become the “comfort zone” of MARSOF.  
In discussing NL MARSOF’s strategic utility, the most important 
question during the follow-up interviews was how to alter the perceived lack of 
clarity in Strategic Direction and (short-term) Goals & Objectives. The survey 
identifies both these indexes as most important for NL MARSOF. Again, the 
answers from the sample groups were almost unanimous and stress the need for 
strong leadership to “take the wheel and steer the MARSOF powerboat” in the 
                                            
223 The Village Stability Operations (sometimes called the Village Security Operations) is an 
initiative to provide stability and security to the Afghan population in rural areas considered key by 
the coalition forces. VSO are the embodiment of comprehensive COIN, conducted in partnership 
with the populace — in other words, through and with the population and local security forces. 
Source: Ty Connet and Bob Cassidy, “VSO: More than Village Defense,” Special Warfare 24, no. 
3 (Jul/Aug/Sep, 2011): 22–27. 
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right direction. Leadership should define the much-needed “dot on the horizon 
[vision], with the different markers [goals] along the way.” However, defining 
strategic direction is not enough. Leadership should also clearly communicate 
the chosen strategic direction to all members.  
Among the sample groups, there is full realization that not 
everybody has to agree on a specific direction and goal for NL MARSOF, but at 
least the direction should be clear to all. There is, however, no doubt within all 
sample groups that there will be more than sufficient support and commitment to 
the MARSOF direction if it is logically presented and justified. This last fact 
should give MARSOF leadership hope that clarification and realignment of the 
strategic direction and goals will be successful.     
The sample groups fully supported the survey result that NL 
MARSOF can distinguish itself with the quality and creativity of its people. “Our 
people are our most valuable asset.” The groups indicated that investing in 
personnel will have a positive effect on the confidence and quality of the 
members. The sample groups, however, do not believe that one third of the 
members, including senior cadre, really do not know what NL MARSOF’s mission 
is. Most members probably have a general idea of what NL MARSOF’s mission 
is, but the somewhat reluctant answers in the survey express dissatisfaction 
stemming from the confusion about NL MARSOF’s mission. The preferred 
strategic direction is in direct missions, but leadership has not clarified to the men 
if this is the correct direction for NL MARSOF. As said during the follow-up 
interview, “The men are still waiting on the boss to say whether we’re doing the 
right thing.”  
b. Adaptability is Important to NL MARSOF 
Within the sample groups, everybody agrees that flexibility always 
was and will remain a core competence of the Dutch Marine Corps and, 
therefore, naturally is a core competence of the MARSOF organization. When 
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asked, the sample groups define flexibility as the ability to change in response to 
the environment. The fact that MARSOF scored better on the trait Adaptability 
thus did not come as a surprise.  
In particular, the groups expected the relative high score on the 
index Organizational Learning, because all MARSOF ranks deem it important not 
be afraid to make mistakes. The organization generally considers making 
mistakes as a precursor to gaining knowledge. Thus, the follow-up interviews 
support the survey results of MARSOF in the cultural trait of Adaptability.  
All sample groups concurred that the survey indicates Creating 
Change as the most important index of Adaptability. Groups explained that high-
performing organizations like SOF have to distinguish themselves by adopting 
new ideas and constantly trying new “outside the box” approaches. Creating 
change, therefore, is an important part of the way they do business.  
Thus, NL MARSOF members have both the Dutch Marine Corps 
cultural background of flexibility and the SOF-specific necessity to be innovative 
in trying new ideas and approaches. Nevertheless, all sample groups agree that 
MARSOF still needs to improve its ability to create change. The follow-up 
interviews support the findings from the survey in improving MARSOF 
Adaptability by: (1) stimulating more cross-training with other (world-class) SOF 
units; (2) organizing seminars, workshops, and (intelligence) updates; and (3) 
putting effort into creating more capable staff members (training and education).  
4. Stage 6: Discussion on Unit Culture 
Based on the survey results of the cultural traits Involvement and 
Consistency, the interviews addressed the specific unit culture of NL MARSOF 
(defined as a distinct set of values, beliefs, and behavior patterns that form the 
core identity of a military organization). Overall, the outcome of the follow-up 
interviews do not contradict any of the general findings from the survey. All 
sample groups recognized the lack of Consistency within NL MARSOF and 
emphasized that the strength of NL MARSOF now predominantly lies in its 
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member’s Involvement. However, all sample groups see this Involvement 
diminishing rapidly because of lack of Strategic Direction, Goals and Vision.  
a. High Involvement within NL MARSOF 
In accordance with the survey results, the sample groups all agreed 
that most members of MARSOF are highly involved in their work, but that the 
lower ranks believe that they are inadequately involved in planning and that 
important information is not available to everyone. The sample groups also 
supported the survey result that NL MARSOF puts sufficient effort into education, 
training, and coaching. The groups especially perceived the new MSOF-basic 
course (Maritime Special Operations Forces Basic Course) as an improvement. It 
struck the sample groups as very surprising that one third of MARSOF members 
(mostly junior enlisted men) claimed that the new MSOF-course is not an 
improvement. This can cause problems in the acceptance of new members, and 
the sample groups unanimously think that MARSOF cadre should address this 
immediately. Nevertheless, the sample groups supported the average scores on 
the index Empowerment and Capability Development of the trait Involvement.  
Finally, all sample groups unanimously supported the low score on 
Team Orientation. They recognized that the members of the UIM and MSO do 
not fully support one another in accomplishing the work that needs to be done 
and emphasized that the senior cadre, the officers and senior NCOs of UIM and 
MSO, do not fully trust each other’s intentions. Senior cadre should address this 
matter of distrust first, in order to improve Team Orientation. Of secondary 
importance, the sample groups also suggested other fairly simple improvements, 
such as mandatory weekly updates, can easily answer the unit members’ need 
for information.  
b. No Consistency within NL MARSOF 
Most of the personnel interviewed agreed that the lack of 
Consistency throughout MARSOF is a natural result of, the lack of Strategic 
Direction. One quote from the follow-up interviews captured the general 
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frustration within NL MARSOF: “How can we act consistently when our leaders 
still haven’t decided where to take us, and constantly switch focus? As the old 
Dutch saying goes, the fish always starts to stink at the head. So, first be 
consistent at the top!”  The sample groups support the low scores on all of the 
three indexes (Core Values, Agreement, and Coordination & Integration), in 
which they generally agree on the reasons given in the survey for Coordination & 
Integration. Like the survey respondents, the sample groups stated that reaching 
agreement is certainly not necessary on every issue, but that it is crucial on the 
mission, strategic direction, real-time deployments, and TTPs (tactics, techniques 
and procedures).  
Most members value teamwork, quality, responsibility, flexibility and 
unity as most important values for NL MARSOF. The striking coherence 
throughout sub-units and ranks in choosing important core values for MARSOF 
confirms the idea that MARSOF member share the same basic values. This 
result reassures that, at its core, NL MARSOF members do not differ very much. 
They all value the same things, so unifying the UIM and MSO and solving the 
identified friction points seem less likely to be problem. All sample groups think 
that these core values must be incorporated in future official documents such as 
mission statements, command philosophies, and other senior directives. 
c. Assimilation, Separation, or Integration? 
An important question during the follow-up interviews was how to 
improve NL MARSOF’s unit culture. What strategy of unification should the 
leadership take to address the identified friction points and improve operational 
effectiveness? In accordance with Joseph Soeters and Tibor Tresh’s research, 
leadership can choose from three basic strategies. The first strategy, 
assimilation, is when an organization becomes more similar to another 
organization, because the latter appears to be “better” or has the power base to 
demand adaptation. The second strategy, separation, is when two or more 
organizations cooperate, but keep their own cultural characteristics, because 
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they perceive their own organization as being equal or better than the other ones. 
The third strategy, integration, is when two or more organizations cooperate, and 
try to adapt to the best cultural characteristics and qualities of one another. In 
other words, integration identifies and combines the strengths of each 
organization into one better, overarching organization. 
When asking the sample groups which strategy of unification is 
best to unify MARSOF, they all unanimously chose a strategy of integration. All 
agree that assimilation of the UIM into the MSO or vice versa is not desirable. In 
fact, especially MSO cadre argued that some of the friction points actually 
resulted from the perception that the bigger UIM was trying to force the MSO to 
assimilate into the UIM. One can even argue that because of this perception of 
assimilation, both sub-units moved towards a strategy of separation. Out of fear 
for assimilation, both UIM and MSO wanted to fiercely hold on to their own 
cultural characteristics. Each sub-unit does not necessarily see its own unit as 
better than the other, but fear complete adjustment toward the other, thereby 
losing their own cultural heritage.  
On the positive side, all sample groups agreed that both units (UIM 
and MSO) have their specific strengths and weaknesses, and that both units can 
complement each other. Therefore, the strategy of integration to identify and 
combine the strengths of each organization into one better, overarching 
organization suits best. The senior cadre proposed training seminars in change 
management to help them in the transition process of integrating both sub-units. 
Regarding the different categories of identified friction points 
(Selection Process, Training & Operations, and Customs & Traditions), 224 the 
sample groups gave insight on where the preferred strategy of integration should 
focus. All sample groups are convinced that this integration process will 
                                            
224 Four categories divide the identified friction points: (1) the selection process for the 
organization; (2 and 4) the way the organization is training and preparing for its missions and the 
specific kind of operations that have been conducted; and (3) the generally accepted customs 
and traditions of the organization members; See chapter I, Transformation to NL Maritime Special 
Operations Forces (NL MARSOF). 
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ultimately improve NL MARSOF’s (low) scores on the cultural traits Involvement 
and Consistency, thus improving the unit culture and consequently improving 
operational effectiveness.  
The Selection Process 
The historical differences in the former selection process of the UIM 
and MSO-Coy have resulted in different beliefs about the emphasis on physical 
toughness and the necessity for aptitude testing. With the creation of the new 
MSOF-course, NL MARSOF has already implemented the long-term solution. All 
new members of NL MARSOF have to go through a newly developed joint 
selection, so that over the long run all members of NL MARSOF share the same 
selection background. The majority of the sample groups agreed that this is the 
right way forward to mitigate any friction due to differing backgrounds. The new 
MSOF-course content is balanced properly to ensure the right amount of physical 
and mental toughness needed for MARSOF.  
However, at this time the majority of NL MARSOF personnel have not 
undertaken this new MSOF-course. To clear this difference in background, 
leadership could choose between two simple opposite viewpoints. Either they 
can decide to give all current MARSOF members the new MSOF-course 
qualification instantly, or they can decide to let all current MARSOF members 
complete the new MSOF-course to earn the qualification. Both options have 
been suggested and tried out, but both resulted in general discontent, because 
they both have disadvantages that outweigh their advantages. For instance, 
automatically giving all current members the same MSOF qualification does not 
solve the fact that the operators truly have different backgrounds and different 
skill sets. On the other hand, requiring current, experienced members to go 
through the full arduous MSOF-course again to prove themselves is disrespectful 
and has resulted in unnecessary loss of (good) personnel. The sample groups, 
therefore, agreed that current members must somehow go through additional 
training to create an equal background within MARSOF. The difficulty in setting 
up additional training is that all current members have different backgrounds; 
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some are frogmen, some are mountain leaders, and some are CT specialists. 
This almost requires tailor-made training for various groups, which is very labor- 
and cost-intensive. Nevertheless, all agree that several training packages should 
be developed that will ultimately give everybody the same background, taking 
into consideration their specific experience (background, rank, and age).  
Training & Operations 
Historically, the training philosophy, the type of training, the training 
locations, and the duration of the main exercises of the MSO-Coy and UIM have 
been quite different. The bottom line is that the MSO-Coy spends more time per 
year abroad in various (physically demanding) exercises, while the UIM is 
restricted to The Netherlands, with short training exercises with other special 
police units. This difference between the MSO-coy and UIM creates divergent 
ways of thinking about training.  
In accordance with the survey results, all sample groups agreed 
that training and cooperation should intensify between sub-units to improve unit 
cohesion, to learn from each other’s experience, and to strengthen external 
perception of a unified MARSOF. An important question for the sample groups 
was exactly how NL MARSOF could achieve this intensified training and 
cooperation, considering the fact that M-Squadron and C-Squadron have 
different tasks. M-Squadron (UIM) has the domestic counter-terrorism task and 
C-Squadron (MSO) is tasked with (maritime) special operations abroad. 
Preparing for these tasks inherently requires different types of training.  
Thus, the key is not to assimilate training, meaning that the M-
Squadron should conduct more training like C-Squadron or vice versa. MARSOF 
should integrate the training only when it is mutually beneficial. MARSOF units 
need to find the specific areas in which training can overlap. For instance, can 
the frogmen of C-Squadron train together with the frogmen of M-Squadron to 
benefit from the other’s specific diving skills? The general opinion of the sample 
groups is that they can, and so can other specialty fields. However, identifying 
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specific areas of interest and coordinating training in these areas remains 
difficult. After the interviews, the operations staff has taken it upon themselves to 
better facilitate mutual training and cooperation within MARSOF.  
Customs and Traditions 
Over the years, the UIM and MSO-Coy have developed different 
customs and traditions. The Frogmen and the ML Recce Troop historically have 
had a strong connection with their British counterparts, the UK Special Boat 
Service (SBS) and the UK Brigade Patrol Troop (BPT). The Unit Intervention 
Marines, on the other hand, historically have had strong connections with Dutch 
special police units and other European counter-terrorism units.  
According to the sample groups, the differences in customs and 
traditions are still present within NL MARSOF. This supports the survey’s low 
scores in the trait Consistency. Nevertheless, this does not come as a surprise, 
considering the fact that the UIM as well as the MSO-Coy have discrete traditions 
that go back forty years, while NL MARSOF has existed for a mere  two years.  
An organization needs long-term consistency to create a strong 
culture based on a shared system of beliefs, values, and symbols that are widely 
understood by its members. The creation of NL MARSOF two years ago was a 
clear break in consistency for both the UIM and the MSO-Coy members. 
Members were asked to form a new unit and part with their old unit’s customs 
and traditions. The mistake was that in asking this emotional sacrifice, NL 
MARSOF did not immediately start establishing new customs and traditions 
people could now build on and identify themselves with. For instance, the 
Frogmen were asked not to use their old unit logo or insignia anymore. However, 
leadership did not present a new official MARSOF logo or insignia. In addition, 
passing the new MSOF-course still does not result in a visible symbol of 
recognition for the men (a badge, insignia, or beret) to identify themselves with, 
but the symbols of the previous selection courses are considered obsolete. The 
following quotes capture the frustration of MARSOF members. “They ask me 
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take off my Frogmen badge for NL MARSOF, but do not offer anything in return.” 
“We had solid traditions, but now I don’t know how we should give MARSOF its 
specific identity. Traditions, like ‘the new members introduction evening’, are 
gone, and everybody misses them. These traditions actually strengthened our 
brotherhood.”  
The sample groups all agree that to improve Consistency within 
MARSOF, leadership should address certain apparently trivial matters first, 
starting with the creation of an official unit logo and MSOF-course insignia. 
Furthermore, the unit should instantiate specific unit traditions by either 
reinstating old ones or developing new ones. As the survey reveals, the core 
values are basically the same for most MARSOF members (quality, teamwork, 
responsibility, flexibility, and unity), but for a culture to be strong it has to be 
based on beliefs, values and symbols that are widely understood. Values and 
beliefs are not enough. Specific symbols and traditions are the unit’s visual 
expression of culture. This last aspect, symbolic visualization, is currently 
missing. One quote expresses this necessity: “We not only need to make 
MARSOF act like a world class unit, but also look the part, so that people want to 
belong to it and follow its course.”  
The general recommendation from the sample groups is to install 
an immediate working group to think about unit logos, insignia, traditions, etc. NL 
MARSOF will complete the shared system of beliefs and values with visible 
symbols. MARSOF needs all three ingredients for strong unit culture.  
5. Stage 6: Discussion on Self-Perception in Performance 
The last questions of the survey addressed the perception that NL 
MARSOF members have of their own performance in comparison to the Dutch 
Army Special Operations Forces (KCT). As discussed previously, these results 




relation to these findings, the questions during the follow-up interviews focused 
on why NL MARSOF members generally perceive the KCT as better than 
themselves.  
a. The Cold Side of NL MARSOF 
On the cold side of the uniformed organization (the bureaucratic 
and process-oriented subculture focused on prevention, facilitation, and 
preparation), the answers on the question how MARSOF performs in comparison 
to the KCT on “Unit Member Satisfaction” and “New TTP Development” raises 
concern. On both questions, almost 40 percent of MARSOF members indicated 
that they think KCT is performing better than MARSOF.  
The sample groups explained that for “New TTP Development,” the 
low score has several sources. First, during previous joint deployments, 
MARSOF always had to adjust to the TTPs of the KCT (the latter being the 
bigger unit), to ensure interoperability and effective integration. Even though both 
KCT and MARSOF constantly updated and improved these TTPs during 
deployments, KCT got full credit for these newly developed TTPs, giving the 
impression that they developed them. Secondly, the KCT numerically has a 
much bigger staff than has MARSOF, so it can more easily produce new official 
doctrine, including TTPs. This difference in official document output again results 
in the perception that KCT is better in developing new TTPs. The sample groups 
argued that this perception is skewed, because both units are equally good in 
developing new TTPs, but the KCT is just more capable of formally documenting 
these TTPs. The majority of the sample groups, therefore, agreed that this 
misperception must be resolved by both clarifying the difference between TTP 
development and documentation and by improving MARSOF’s ability to 
document formal TTP’s.  
As for the low survey outcome in “Unit Member Satisfaction,” the 
sample groups also present several sources. A significant portion of the 
members believing that satisfaction is higher at KCT never had any actual 
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contact with KCT units. So in part, the results can be explained by the basic 
human tendency to assume that “the grass is always greener on the other side of 
the fence.” Furthermore, the sample groups estimate that survey answers are 
largely based on how NL MARSOF members perceive the KCT as a whole. 
Indeed, from the outside the KCT “looks the part” of a world-class SOF unit. KCT 
members will rarely admit any flaw in their own organization to MARSOF 
members Neither the KCT nor MARSOF consider hanging out the unit’s dirty 
laundry acceptable. Thus, the sample groups believe that the perception of 
higher member satisfaction at the KCT deserves some scrutiny.  
Nevertheless, all sample groups agree that the relatively high 
number of young NL MARSOF members who think satisfaction is higher among 
the KCT gives reason for worry. The most important reason for this worry is that 
attracting and keeping high-quality personnel is essential for SOF and remains 
difficult. If young members believe it is better “on the other side of the fence,” it 
will be harder to keep them for the organization. To counter this, the sample 
groups indicate that it is particularly the NCOs’ (sergeants’) task to talk to their 
men about this perception of satisfaction. Almost all sergeants have real-time 
experience in working with the KCT and can at least mitigate any exaggerated 
image of the KCT. 
b. The Hot Side of NL MARSOF 
On the hot side of the uniformed organization (the flexible and goal-
oriented subculture focused on real action), the answers to the question of how 
MARSOF performs in comparison to the KCT on “Quality of the Unit’s Staff 
Members” and “Overall Organizational Performance” raises concerns. More than 
70 percent indicated that KCT has better quality staff members than MARSOF. 
This high percentage also means that a large portion of MARSOF’s own staff 
members thinks KCT staff members are of better quality. Almost 45 percent of 
NL MARSOF’s members believe that, overall, KCT performs better than NL 
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MARSOF does. More than half of the senior NCOs (Sergeant Majors and 
Warrant Officers) answered that the KCT performs better than MARSOF.  
The sample groups gave several reasons for the very low score on 
the quality of its staff members. First, even though the question clearly asks for 
an opinion of the quality of NL MARSOF’s staff, most persons in the sample 
groups believe that the majority of the members generally measure quality by 
quantity in staff members. The bigger the staff, the better it must be. People 
know KCT’s staff is bigger and, as a result, assume it must be better. Secondly, 
when specifically asked what qualities are lacking in NL MARSOF’s staff, the 
general answer is in intelligence capability. NL MARSOF does not have many 
qualified intelligence staff members, and the sample groups consider that 
scarcity to be a big weakness in conducting operations. Thirdly, in MARSOF, 
everybody wants to work in the teams instead of the staff. The members 
generally consider staff functions less important and rewarding. As several 
persons in the sample groups sarcastically expressed it: “When you can’t hack it 
anymore in the teams, you can always do a staff function.” The low perception of 
the quality of staff members to a degree reflects this idea that the less qualified 
team members are sent to the staff. In sum, the majority of the sample groups 
feel that most of the low score in staff member quality results from the 
misperception that quantity equates to quality and that NL MARSOF’s best 
people go to the teams instead of the staff. Therefore, the results deserve some 
scrutiny as well. On the other hand, all agreed that NL MARSOF has a genuine 
weakness in intelligence staff capability and needs to address this.  
The fact that almost half of NL MARSOF’s members think they are 
being outperformed by KCT is a clear signal of low unit confidence. Even though 
some might argue that there are some advantages in working from an underdog 
position, there are also disadvantages. First, low confidence naturally affects the 
unit’s esprit de corps (i.e., the spirit of a group that makes the members seek 
group success). As stated by Don Snider and James Burk, esprit de corps 
wedded to cohesion is one of the four essential elements of military culture. In 
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fact, it is a critical element with respect to the positive correlation between military 
culture and the operational effectiveness of military units.225 Secondly, when the 
young MARSOF members think KCT is structurally performing better than they 
are, they might be inclined to leave the unit or even switch to the better team. 
This is a problem, as recruiting new, qualified personnel is very onerous.  
When asked whether KCT is performing better than MARSOF, the 
majority of the sample groups asserted that considering the difference in size, 
KCT and MARSOF perform equally. The sample groups thus contradict the 
outcome of the survey. However, in this case, the question whether KCT is 
actually outperforming MARSOF is irrelevant. What matters is the perception of 
performance, because it is this perception that influences action. All sample 
groups agreed that if half of the senior NCOs think KCT is performing better, this 
will inevitably influence the rest of the men. The sample groups believe a big part 
of the explanation of the low score finds its origin here. Thus, to counter the 
perception that KCT is outperforming NL MARSOF, the NCOs and officers need 
to understand the origins of their own perception and realize the impact they 
have on the rest of the men. 
6. Concluding Thoughts on the Follow-up Interviews 
The follow-up interviews revealed that NL MARSOF is experiencing some 
degree of an “identity crisis.” The sample groups agreed that the lack of long-
term vision, clarified in goals and objectives and set out in strategic direction, 
now negatively affects the overall performance of NL MARSOF. The solution is to 
get NL MARSOF members involved in the process of defining the organization’s 
“way ahead,” in order to achieve improvement in Mission and Involvement. 
Improving the other cultural traits, Adaptability and Consistency, will naturally 
follow this first important step. The survey results reveal numerous small options 
and possibilities to get members involved in the process of defining the 
                                            
225 James Burk, “Military Culture,” in Encyclopedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict, vol. 2, 
eds., Lester R. Kurtz and Jennifer Turpin (San Diego: Academy Press, 1999). 
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organization’s “way ahead.” In general, the sample groups concur with these 
recommendations. The final chapter addresses these recommendations in detail.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This research shows that NL MARSOF needs to clarify its strategic utility 
and unify its culture. Results revealed deficiencies and several identified friction 
points and most likely accounted for NL MARSOF’s own low evaluation of its 
organizational effectiveness. The degree to which the organization achieves its 
goals on the both the hot and cold sides is mostly perceived lower than NL 
MARSOF’s Army counterpart.  
NL MARSOF does not lack a distinct set of values and beliefs, but lacks 
behavior patterns, symbols, and traditions that form its core identity. This results 
in the low consistency within NL MARSOF’s organization. Consistency, however, 
is the basis of a strong culture. On the other hand, sufficient involvement seems 
to be present, offering a good starting point to work on integrating the sub-units’ 
cultures (identifying and combining the strengths of each organization into one 
better, overarching organization). This strategy of integration will create common 
behavior patterns that will better unify NL MARSOF’s culture.  
The strategic utility of NL MARSOF, meaning how it directly supports 
national interests and strategy for dealing with current and future security 
challenges, needs to be clarified into one coherent vision that provides strategic 
direction, goals, and objectives. The inherent adaptability of NL MARSOF’s 
members has undoubtedly mitigated some of the lack in clarification, but it has 
probably still resulted in a somewhat ill-prepared and less effectively used NL 
MARSOF. The 3-D cube indicates that the range of NL MARSOF’s strategic 
utility so far has predominantly focused on direct missions. This historical 
employment of NL MARSOF corresponds with the strategic utility preferred by 
the majority of NL MARSOF’s members. Nevertheless, governing document 
analysis indicates a growing need for military assistance and special 
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reconnaissance, thus more indirect types of missions should be expected. 
Leadership now has to “step up to the plate” and guide NL MARSOF’s strategic 
utility.  
In conclusion, this research has above all offered NL MARSOF an 
objective evaluation of where it stands two years after its creation. Up until this 
point, no one had systematically collected information to investigate the 
effectiveness of NL MARSOF. Members often complained about problems and 
issues within the new organization, but the leadership had no clear picture of 
what problems and issues they needed to address. The visible friction points are 
effects, but the exact causes were not clearly identified. Statements from various 
members encouraged and emphasized the necessity of this research: “Finally 
we’re being heard!” “This research is what we have been missing. Now, nobody 
can deny the issues we’re facing.” “I’m glad that we’re looking at how improve 
our beloved unit, because things were turning bad.”  
1. Theoretical Foundation 
The research explored strategic utility and revealed the importance of unit 
culture. Most significantly, the research presented a theoretically founded 
framework—the 3-D cube—that represents the whole range in strategic utility of 
SOF. All possible SOF missions can be placed within the 3-dimensional content 
of the cube: (1) Special Operations Spectrum, (2) Political Domain, and (3) 
Geographic Environment. Thorough analysis of conducted missions and 
governing documents explored the historical and required strategic utility. The 
analysis showed past and most likely future operations for NL MARSOF. This is 
a first (theoretical) step in helping NL MARSOF leadership identify opportunities 
and develop vision, strategic direction, and goals and objectives.  
The theory research on unit culture revealed a similarity in definitions of 
culture, organizational culture, and unit culture. All generally refer to 
organizational culture as a distinct set of values, beliefs, and behavior patterns 
that form the core identity of a (military) organization. Except for obvious 
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differences in degree of institutionalization, hierarchy, discipline, and 
organizational purpose, military culture does not differ from general 
organizations. Widely used models to measure culture are therefore applicable to 
military organizations as well. This thesis used Denison’s user-friendly research-
based model and the Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS) to 
measure NL MARSOF’s unit culture. 
2. Survey Research 
The most remarkable result of the survey research is the overall low score 
on the Denison Organizational Culture Survey (DOCS). This suggests that NL 
MARSOF’s culture does not promote optimal organizational effectiveness. When 
examining the DOCS results more closely, they reveal a relatively better score on 
the flexible traits (Adaptability and Involvement) than on the stable traits (Mission 
and Consistency). Thus, NL MARSOF as an organization perceives itself as fairly 
flexible, but lacks capacity for long-term stability. Nevertheless, there is no 
practical difference in organizational culture between the sub-units or between 
the ranks. This indicates that there are no insurmountable cultural differences 
between sub-units or ranks, which is very positive.  
The involvement of NL MARSOF’s members is average, compared to 
other organizations. To improve involvement, NL MARSOF leadership can focus 
on improving team orientation by conducting more large-scale exercises within 
NL MARSOF, improving mutual communication between units and ranks, and 
giving clear goals and guidance. 
The adaptability of NL MARSOF is average. Its members need to realize 
that it has to serve their most important stakeholder, the Commandant of the 
Netherlands Marine Corps. To improve adaptability overall, NL MARSOF 
leadership should focus on improving the ability and willingness to change by 
stimulating more cross-training with other (world-class) SOF units, organizing 
seminars, workshops, and (intelligence) updates, and putting effort into creating 
more capable staff members (training and education).  
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NL MARSOF does not have a strong culture. Across the board, the 
members believe there is no common mindset within NL MARSOF, even though 
core values—teamwork, quality, unity, flexibility, and responsibility—reveal a 
striking unity between sub-units and ranks. Overall, the low consistency leaves 
much room for improvement, but leadership can develop a common mindset by 
focusing their efforts on better coordination and integration of the sub-units and 
on reaching agreement on essential issues.  
There is no meaningful long-term direction defined for NL MARSOF. 
Across the board, its members believe there is a lack of vision, goals, and 
strategic direction. The members generally miss guidance that tells them why 
they are doing particular work and how they contribute to the strategic intent of 
NL MARSOF. The majority prefers direct missions (DA and CT), predominantly in 
an international maritime domain. However, the question remains whether this 
preferred strategic direction aligns with the required strategic direction. 
Furthermore, the majority sees NL MARSOF’s strength in the quality and 
creativity of its people. Thus, NL MARSOF’s leadership needs to give (strategic) 
guidance and invest in personnel capability and skills. 
Overall, the respondents’ answers generally reveal a slightly lower level of 
self-esteem compared to their Army counterparts. Being humble and assuming 
an underdog position is not necessarily negative, as long as it does not affect the 
unit’s esprit de corps. To increase the level of self-esteem within NL MARSOF, it 
must especially address the low perceptions of member satisfaction and staff 
quality. 
In sum, the survey research indicates that NL MARSOF is struggling with 
its overall performance. It should therefore focus on the single most influential 
cultural trait that organizations can focus on: its mission. For NL MARSOF, the 
way forward is to get NL MARSOF members involved in the process of defining 
the organization’s “way ahead” in order to improve strategic direction and 
involvement. Improving other cultural traits, such as adaptability and consistency, 
will naturally follow this first important step.  
 191 
3. Follow-up Interviews 
The most significant outcome of the follow-up interviews was that they 
generally supported all the survey results. Some survey results prompts further 
discussion, in which the sample groups clarified outcomes or advised scrutiny in 
the interpretation of results. Nevertheless, all the sample groups generally 
agreed on the survey outcome and offered more insight and recommendations to 
address the exposed issues. Because the recommendations are based on the 
input from NL MARSOF’s own members, they should enjoy wide support. This 
strengthens the credibility and acceptance of the recommendations  
The sizeable majority of NL MARSOF agreed there is the overall lack of 
vision, goals, and strategic direction. Leadership must define the much-needed 
“dot on the horizon” (vision), with the different markers (goals) along the way. 
Leadership must also clearly communicate the expected strategic direction to all 
members. Not everybody has to agree on a specific direction and goal, but at 
least the direction should be clear for everybody. The preferred strategic direction 
is in direct missions, but leadership has not clarified to the men whether this is 
the correct direction for NL MARSOF.  
Flexibility (the capability to change in response to the environment) is a 
core competence of the organization. The unit generally considers making 
mistakes as a precursor to gaining knowledge. Nevertheless, NL MARSOF can 
improve its ability and willingness to change by stimulating more cross-training 
with other SOF units, organizing seminars/workshops, and creating more 
capable staff members (training and education). 
Most members of MARSOF are highly involved in their work. The groups 
especially perceived the new MSOF-basic course as an improvement, but it 
struck them as very surprising that one third of MARSOF members claimed that 




the senior cadre should address the issue that members of the UIM and MSO do 
not fully trust and support one another in accomplishing the work that needs to 
be done. 
The lack of consistency throughout MARSOF is a natural result of the lack 
of strategic direction. Agreement throughout NL MARSOF is necessary, but 
agreement is foremost necessary on its mission, strategic direction, real-time 
deployments and TTPs. The striking coherence in core values—teamwork, 
quality, unity, flexibility, and responsibility—confirms the assertion that MARSOF 
members share the same basic values, so unifying the UIM and MSO and 
solving the identified friction points seem less daunting.  
The strategy of integration to identify and combine the strengths of each 
sub-unit into one better, overarching unit suits best to unify NL MARSOF. Both 
units (UIM and MSO) have their specific strengths and weaknesses, and both 
units can complement each other. This integration process should ultimately 
improve NL MARSOF members’ involvement and consistency, thus improving 
the unit culture. 
To create an equal background among MARSOF members, current 
members should somehow go through additional training. Several training 
packages should be developed that will ultimately give everybody a common 
background, taking into consideration their specific circumstances (background, 
rank, and age). 
Training and cooperation should intensify between the sub-units to 
improve unit cohesion, to learn from each other’s experiences, and to strengthen 
external perception of a unified MARSOF. The key is not to assimilate training, 
but to integrate training when it is mutually beneficial. MARSOF units need to find 
the specific areas in which training can overlap. 
The follow-up interviews indicate the importance of an official unit logo and 
MSOF-course insignia. In addition, the unit should instantiate specific unit 
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traditions by either reinstating old ones or by developing new ones. Shared 
values and beliefs alone are not enough. Specific symbols and traditions are the 
unit’s visual expression of culture. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The surveys and follow-up interviews resulted in several 
recommendations. This section organizes these recommendations according to 
cultural traits: Involvement, Adaptability, Consistency, and Mission. The section 
ends with a roadmap of three main recommendations, inferred from the surveys 
and interview results. Implementing these recommendations will clarify NL 
MARSOF’s strategic utility and better unify its culture. This will reduce the 
identified friction points and ultimately improve NL MARSOF’s organizational 
effectiveness. 
1. Involvement 
Overall, NL MARSOF can strengthen involvement by addressing the low 
team orientation between the sub-units. Large-scale exercises, better mutual 
communication among units and ranks, and coherent leadership will improve 
team orientation. NL MARSOF can accomplish more large-scale exercises in a 
budget-neutral way, by shifting priorities in training. NL MARSOF does not have 
to engage in exercises more frequently or with more resources, which is more 
costly. Where possible, it should just train more as a whole unit instead of 
separate single sub-units. Budget restraints should therefore not hamper this 
initiative. Better mutual communication and clear guidelines are both 
communication issues. Simple methods to improve the feedback loop in the 
organization have already been suggested (for instance mandatory weekly 
updates and digital announcement boards), but further discussions within the 
ranks will undoubtedly generate more simple, practical points of improvement. 
These discussions should take place in the near future.  
The new MSOF-course is the “way ahead,” but it needs further 
acceptance by its members. Many of the doubts about the new course can be 
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attributed to its relative newness. Therefore, senior cadre needs to inform the unit 
better on the MSOF-course. This can take many forms. For instance, teams can 
provide more assistance to the course (demonstrations, exercises), which will 
give them an inside look at the new course. Regular meetings between the 
instructors and teams to align tactics and procedures can also incorporate 
presentations on the course, again giving the teams more insight into the course. 
To create a common background for all members of MARSOF, current members 
must go through additional training. T-Squadron has to develop tailor-made 
training packages that will ultimately give everybody the same background, 
taking into consideration their specific circumstances (background, rank, and 
age).  
The leadership should create a sense of ownership and responsibility of 
NL MARSOF issues to generate a greater commitment to the organization. 
Currently the follow-up interviews indicate a level of distrust between the senior 
cadre of the UIM and the MSO, leading to a lesser degree of support for one 
another. The UIM does not feel responsible for the success and 
accomplishments of the MSO and vice versa. Simple methods like team-building 
sessions are a first start in resolving some of the issues of distrust between the 
senior cadres. The Dutch MoD provides various team-building packages that can 
be customized to fulfill NL MARSOF needs and goals. Dutch MoD also offers 
two-day training courses in change management. This training helps to build 
awareness of the issues and potential pitfalls involved in changing organizations. 
MoD designed the course to help units during reorganization processes. 
Leadership must explore these options and commit to a schedule of suitable 
options.  
2. Adaptability 
Flexibility and innovativeness are core competences of SOF, and NL 
MARSOF needs to be proficient in both. Being able to receive, interpret, and 
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translate signals from the operating environment into internal behavioral changes 
will increase NL MARSOF’s chances for survival, growth, and development. 
NL MARSOF leadership should focus on improving the ability and 
willingness to change. Cross-training with other national and international SOF 
units will stimulate this behavior. In the past, the UIM and MSO-Coy have 
frequently conducted training with other units, but increased operational 
commitments have diminished this effort these last years. NL MARSOF needs to 
reinvigorate the old ties with other SOF units again and start sharing experiences 
and new ideas. Particularly beneficial are longstanding ties with the world-class 
SOF units from the United States, the United Kingdom and Northern European 
countries. Again, from a budget perspective, this initiative is feasible, because 
the expected costs are minimal.  
Members should participate more in internationally organized seminars 
and workshops. Lead organizations, such as USSOCOM and NSHQ, regularly 
organize SOF-related seminars and workshops. From these events, the gathered 
information and social networking will improve the adaptability of NL MARSOF, 
because it will expose members to new ideas and lines of thinking. Furthermore, 
by creating more capable staff members, NL MARSOF will increase the ability to 
correctly interpret and translate signals from the operating environment. This, 
however, is easier said than done. It takes years of experience and advanced 
education to build high-quality staff. Investing in SOF-specific educational 
programs offers a good first step. Education programs at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS), the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and NATO SOF 
Training and Education Program (NSTEP) offer specific SOF education open to 
NATO SOF forces. NL MARSOF T-Squadron will explore these and other 
educational and training opportunities. In addition, this investment in personal 




While the core values of the sub-units and ranks reveal a striking 
commonality, the members do not believe there is a common mindset within NL 
MARSOF. One ingredient of strong culture—symbols—is missing. Therefore, NL 
MARSOF should install a working group to develop unit logos, official insignias, 
and think about useful customs and traditions. Two first priorities of this working 
group should be the creation of a new unit logo and insignia authorized for wear 
on the dress-blue uniform for “badged” personnel. This first step in the 
visualization of NL MARSOF will complete the shared system of beliefs and 
values with appropriate symbols and create a stronger unit culture. To further 
reify the common core values—teamwork, quality, responsibility, flexibility and 
unity—these can be incorporated in future official documents, for example in the 
unit’s mission statements, command philosophies, and other senior directives. 
The sub-units must not assimilate all the different types of training within 
NL MARSOF, but have to cooperate more by integrating mutually beneficial 
training. Identifying specific areas in which training of the UIM and MSO can and 
cannot overlap, considering their differing tasks, is essential. The operations staff 
must develop one coherent training philosophy and schedule that incorporates 
this intention. Eventually, the increased cooperation will stimulate integration and 
coordination and thus increase consistency within NL MARSOF.  
Furthermore, agreement is lacking amongst the sub-units, creating 
inconsistency in decision-making and operating methods. Even though reaching 
unanimous agreement is not necessary on every issue, it is especially necessary 
on the unit’s mission and strategic direction. The recommendations connected to 
Mission (below) address the importance of agreement on this specific point.  
4. Mission 
After its relatively quick formation, NL MARSOF is having something of an 
identity crisis. There is an overall lack of vision and strategic direction. NL 
MARSOF members are longing for guidance. The majority misses a clear 
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mission (i.e., “the dot on the horizon”) that can direct NL MARSOF’s efforts and 
actions. Even though everybody probably has a general idea of what the mission 
of NL MARSOF is, one third of the members indicate they do not know. This is a 
clear signal of dissatisfaction about the lack of clarity in NL MARSOF’s mission 
(i.e., NL MARSOF’s strategic utility). 
The preferred strategic utility of NL MARSOF lies in direct missions (see 
Figure 58). This preference can be attributed to the fact that this type of mission 
is more appealing and fits better in the historical comfort zone of NL MARSOF. 
However, leadership has not clearly communicated whether this is the correct 
strategic direction for NL MARSOF. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a 
meaningful long-term direction for the organization (Mission) is the single most 
influential cultural trait on which an organization can focus. Therefore, the way 
forward is to get NL MARSOF members involved in the process of defining the 
organization’s “way ahead.” To accomplish this first step in improving 
organizational effectiveness, RNLMC and NL MARSOF leadership have initiated 
the start of strategic management sessions for NL MARSOF. RNLMC will hire 
professional strategic consultants that will run the management sessions to 
ensure objectivity and neutrality. This initiative is an indication of the level of 
importance and commitment of RNLMC leadership to the success of NL 
MARSOF. All other recommendations considered, these strategic management 
sessions are the most important step in improving operational effectiveness of 
NL MARSOF.  
The strategic management sessions will be phased and have different 
purposes for each phase. The purpose of the first phase sessions is to formulate 
a coherent vision and strategic direction for NL MARSOF. A selection of senior 
(staff) officers of the RNLN, RNLMC and NLMARSOF will participate in these 
sessions. Senior officer selection is based on seniority and position. The goal is 
to operationalize the required strategic utility of NL MARSOF, based on 
governing documents and RNLMC General Officer guidance. The purpose of the 
second phase sessions is to create support within NL MARSOF for the intended 
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strategic direction by involving them in the process of defining the organization’s 
“way ahead.” Parity in representation of the sub-units and ranks within NL 
MARSOF will ensure sufficient support for the results of the strategic 
management sessions. In this second phase, NL MARSOF leadership has the 
opportunity to align the preferred strategic utility with the required one. The 
members conversely will have the opportunity to clarify issues and discuss 
(commander’s) intentions. Foremost, the members will simply “be heard and 
listened to,” which will ultimately improve understanding and commitment to the 
organization’s vision. The end products of the strategic management sessions 
are to be an official mission statement, supported from top to bottom, and a 
roadmap of clear goals and objectives to provide strategic direction for NL 
MARSOF.   
5. Roadmap to Improved Operational Effectiveness 
In order to effect the best implementation of the proposed 
recommendations, the Commander must prioritize them for NL MARSOF. The 
most important recommendation is the strategic management sessions that will 
define the “way ahead” for NL MARSOF, thereby clarifying its strategic utility. 
These sessions are vital to improve operational effectiveness. Without a clear 
mission statement that guides action, all other recommendations will not improve 
operational effectiveness.  
The second most important recommendation is the formation of the 
working group on symbols & traditions. It might sound trivial, but this research 
shows the importance of symbolism for NL MARSOF. The working group will 
give NL MARSOF its much-needed professional “face” and provide the symbols 
(logos, insignias, traditions, and customs) to reify the shared system of beliefs 
and values and thus create a stronger unit culture. 
Finally, NL MARSOF cadres will explore the various options in attending 
training courses in change management and holding team-building sessions. 
These management tools are provided (costless) by the Ministry of Defense, and 
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will help smoothen the transition from two sub-units (UIM and MSO) to one NL 
MARSOF. It would be a waste of available recourses not to use any of these 
tools. Change does not happen overnight and this especially is the case when 
you merge units with strong traditions and heritage.  
Up to now, NL MARSOF has learned the hard way; but it is not too late to 
turn the tide. The tools provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Defense will 
facilitate the transition from two sub-units to one unified organization. The 
conditions for change are set; the leadership is aware of the specific problems, 
and the unit itself has provided the potential solutions. Now it is time to execute.  
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONS CONNECTION TO THE 
DENISON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE MODEL 
Denison Organizational Culture Survey
60 closed Likert-Type scale questions
Item Trait Index Question (Dutch) Question (English)
Q1 Involvement Empowerment De meeste mensen binnen de eenheid zijn zeer betrokken bij hun werk. Most unit members are highly involved in their work.
Q2 Involvement Empowerment
Beslissingen worden gewoonlijk genomen op het niveau waar de beste 
informatie  beschikbaar is.
Decisions are usually made at the level where the best information is 
available.
Q3 Involvement Empowerment
Informatie wordt uitgebreid gedeeld zodat iedereen, indien nodig, de 
informatie kan verkrijgen die hij of zij nodig heeft.
Information is widely shared so that everyone can get the information he or 
she needs when it's needed.
Q4 Involvement Empowerment Iedereen gelooft dat hij of zij een positieve invloed kan uitoefenen. Everyone believes that he or she can have a positive impact.
Q5 Involvement Empowerment
Planning van oefeningen, schema's etc.  is een continueproces waarbij 
iedereen tot op zekere hoogte wordt betrokken. Planning is ongoing and involves everyone in the process to some degree.
Q6 Involvement Team Orientation
Samenwerking tussen de verschillende eenheden van MARSOF (UIM en MSO) 
wordt actief gestimuleerd. Cooperation across different units of MARSOF is actively encouraged.
Q7 Involvement Team Orientation Mensen werken alsof zij deel uitmaken van een (1) eenheid People work like they are part of a team.
Q8 Involvement Team Orientation In plaats van hierarchie wordt teamwork gebruikt om werk klaar te krijgen. Teamwork is used to get work done, rather than hierarchy.
Q9 Involvement Team Orientation Teams (en niet de individuen) zijn onze voornaamste bouwstenen. Teams are our primary building blocks.
Q10 Involvement Team Orientation
Werk wordt zodanig georganiseerd dat voor iedereen binnen de eenheid de 
samenhang tussen zijn werkzaamheden en de doelstellingen van MARSOF 
duidelijk is.
Work is organized so that each person can see the relationship between his job 




Besluitvorming wordt gedelegeerd naar het juiste niveau zodat mensen zelf 
actie kunnen ondernemen. Authority is delegated so that people can act on their own.
Q12 Involvement
Capability 




Er wordt continu geïnvesteerd in de kennis en vaardigheden van het 




De vaardigheden van onze mensen worden beschouwd als een belangrijke 
bron van concurrentievoordeel tov andere SOF eenheden.





Problemen doen zich vaak voor omdat we niet de vaardigheden bezitten die 
nodig zijn om het werk te verrichten. Problems often arise because we do not have the skills necessary to do the job. 
Q16 Consistency Core Values De leiding van MARSOF doet wat ze zeggen. The leaders ""practice what they preach.""
Q17 Consistency Core Values
Er is een consequente manier van leiding geven en  duidelijke  richtlijnen 
vanuit de staf.
There is a characteristic leadership style and a distinct set of management 
practices.
Q18 Consistency Core Values
Er is een duidelijke set waarden en normen die de manier waarop wij 
opereren regelt. There is a clear and consistent set of values that governs the way we operate.
Q19 Consistency Core Values Het negeren van deze waarden en normen brengt je in de problemen. Ignoring core values will get you in trouble.
Q20 Consistency Core Values
Wij hebben een etische gedragscode waardoor het verschil tussen goed en 
kwaad voor iedereen duidelijk is. There is an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us right from wrong.
Q21 Consistency Agreement
Bij onderlinge meningsverschillen tussen MSO en UIM werken we hard om 
een "win-win" oplossing te bewerkstelligen. When disagreements occur, we work hard to achieve ""win-win"" solutions.
Q22 Consistency Agreement Er is een (1) "sterke" cultuur. There is a ""strong"" culture.
Q23 Consistency Agreement
Het is gemakkelijk om het binnen MARSOF met elkaar eens te worden, zelfs 
over moeilijke kwesties tussen MSO en UIM. It is easy to reach consensus, even on difficult issues.
Q24 Consistency Agreement
Wij hebben vaak moeite om het binnen MARSOF eens te worden over 
essentiele kwesties. We often have trouble reaching agreement on key issues. 
Q25 Consistency Agreement
Er is een duidelijke overeenstemming over de juiste en verkeerde manier om 
dingen te doen. There is a clear agreement about the right way and the wrong way to do things.
Q26 Consistency
Coordination & 




Mensen uit verschillende delen van MARSOF hebben een gemeenschappelijk 




Het is gemakkelijk om projecten (oefeningen, aanschaf materiaal, oplijnen 
procedures etc.) te coordineren over de verschillende eenheden van MARSOF 




Werken met iemand uit een andere sub-eenheid van MARSOF is alsof je werkt 
met iemand uit een compleet andere organisatie
Working with someone from another sub-unit of MARSOF is like working with 




Er is afstemming van de doelstellingen over de verschillende organisatie 




Q31 Adaptability Creating Change
De manier waarop de dingen gedaan worden is heel flexibel en makkelijk te 
veranderen. The way things are done is very flexible and easy to change.
Q32 Adaptability Creating Change
Wij reageren goed op veranderingen bij onze concurrentie (bijv. KCT) en 
andere veranderende (veiligheids)situaties in de wereld waar op 
ingesprongen moet worden.
We respond well to competitors and other changes in the operating 
environment.
Q33 Adaptability Creating Change
Wij ontwikkelen voortdurend nieuwe en verbeterde manieren om ons werk 
te doen. New and improved ways to do work are continually adopted.
Q34 Adaptability Creating Change Initiatieven die leiden tot verandering stuiten op weerstand. Attempts to create change usually meet with resistance. 
Q35 Adaptability Creating Change
Verschillende eenheden van MARSOF werken vaak samen om verandering te 
bewerkstelligen. Different parts of MARSOF often cooperate to create change.
Q36 Adaptability Customer Focus
Opmerkingen en aanbevelingen van de hogere Korps leiding leiden vaak tot 
veranderingen. Marine Corps comments and recommendations often lead to changes.
Q37 Adaptability Customer Focus
Inbreng door de de hogelere leiding van het Korps Mariniers beïnvloedt onze 
beslissingen direct. Marine Corps leadership input directly influences our decisions.
Q38 Adaptability Customer Focus
Alle leden hebben een diep begrip voor de wensen en behoeften vanuit het 
perspectief van het Korps Mariniers. All members have a deep understanding of Marine Corps wants and needs.
Q39 Adaptability Customer Focus
De belangen van het Korps Mariniers worden veelal in onze beslissingen 
genegeerd. The interests of the Marine Corps often get ignored in our decisions. 
Q40 Adaptability Customer Focus
Wij stimuleren het directe contact tussen personeel van MARSOF en de rest 
van het Korps Mariniers. We encourage direct contact with the Marine Corps by our people.
Q41 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Wij beschouwen fouten als een gelegenheid tot leren en verbetering. We view failure as an opportunity for learning and improvement.
Q42 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Innovatie en het nemen van risico wordt bemoedigd en beloond. Innovation and risk taking are encouraged and rewarded.
Q43 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Veel dingen vallen "tussen wal en schip". Lots of things ""fall between the cracks"". 
Q44 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Leren is een belangrijke doelstelling in ons dagelijks werk. Learning is an important objective in our day-to-day work.
Q45 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Wij zorgen ervoor dat de "rechterhand weet wat de linkerhand doet". We make certain that the ""right hand knows what the left hand is doing.""
Q46 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent Er is een MARSOF doel en richting op lange termijn. There is a long-term purpose and direction for MARSOF.
Q47 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent
Onze strategie dwingt andere SOF eenheden om te veranderen in de manier 
waarop zij op ons terrein (maritiem en CT) concureren.
Our strategy leads other SOF units to change the way they compete in our field 
of expertise
Q48 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent
Er is een duidelijke MARSOF missie die betekenis en richting geeft aan ons 
werk. There is a clear MARSOF mission that gives meaning and direction to our work.
Q49 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent Er is een duidelijke MARSOF stategie voor de toekomst. There is a clear MARSOF strategy for the future.
Q50 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent De richting van onze MARSOF strategie is mij niet duidelijk. Our MARSOF strategic direction is unclear to me. 
Q51 Mission Goals & Objectives Er bestaat brede overeenstemming over de te bereiken doelstellingen. There is widespread agreement about goals.
Q52 Mission Goals & Objectives Onze commandanten stellen ambitieuze maar realistische doelstellingen. MARSOF Leaders set goals that are ambitious, but realistic.
Q53 Mission Goals & Objectives
De commandanten hebben de doelstellingen die wij, het personeel van 
MARSOF, nastreven duidelijk gecommuniceerd.
The leadership has ""gone on record"" about the objectives we are trying to 
meet.
Q54 Mission Goals & Objectives Wij controleren onze voortgang tegen de gestelde doelstellingen. We continuously track our progress against our stated goals.
Q55 Mission Goals & Objectives
Onze mensen begrijpen wat er gedaan moet worden om ons succes op de 
lange termijn te verzekeren. People understand what needs to be done for us to succeed in the long run.
Q56 Mission Vision
Wij hebben een gedeelde visie over hoe MARSOF er in de toekomst uit zal 
zien. We have a shared vision of what MARSOF will be like in the future.
Q57 Mission Vision MARSOF Leiders hebben een lange termijn visie. Leaders have a long-term viewpoint.
Q58 Mission Vision Korte termijn denken brengt onze visie op lange termijn in gevaar. Short-term thinking often compromises our long-term vision. 
Q59 Mission Vision
De MARSOF gedachte creert  enthousiasme en is een bron van motivatie voor 
het personeel Our vision for MARSOF creates excitement and motivation for our employees.
Q60 Mission Vision
Wij zijn in staat om aan eisen op korte termijn te voldoen zonder onze visie 
op lange termijn in gevaar te brengen.




These survey questions determine preferred  culture
20 Questions: 11 close-ended and 9 open-ended* questions
Item Trait Index Question (Dutch) Question (English)
Q1
Involvement 
Consistency      
Adaptation 
Mission All
Rangschik de volgende stell ingen in de mate van belangrijkheid voor NLMARSOF 
(Gebruik "1" voor meest belangrijk en "4" voor minst belangrijk. Gebruik elk 
nummer slecht 1 keer)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
- De betrokkenheid van leden binnen MARSOF                                                                                           
- De overeenstemming tussen alle leden van MARSOF                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
- Het aanpassingsvermogen van MARSOF aan nieuwe situaties                                                                                
- Een  doel en richting voor MARSOF
Please rank the following values in how important you think they should be in 
MARSOF (Using "1" for most important and "4" for least important. Do not give any 
two items the same value)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- Involvement of members in the MARSOF organization                                                                                                                                                                                                          
- Consensus between members of MARSOF                                                                                                                                                                     
- Adaptability of MARSOF members to new situations                                                                                                                                          
- Clear sense of purpose and direction of MARSOF
Q2 Involvement
Empowerment           
Team Orientation 
Capability Development
Rangschik de volgende stell ingen in de mate van belangrijkheid voor jou. (Gebruik 
"1" voor meest belangrijk en "3" voor minst belangrijk. Gebruik elk nummer slecht 1 
keer)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- Personeel moet zijn eigen werk kunnen bepalen en indelen                                                                                                                                                               
- We moeten gezamelijk werken om dezelfde doelen te halen                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
- We moeten continue investeren in individuele  vakopleidingen
Please rank the following statements in how important they are to you. (Using "1" for 
most important and "3" for least important. Do not give any two items the same 
value)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- Unit members must have the opportunity to manage their own work                                                                                                                                                               
- We need to work cooperatively towards common goals                                                                                                                                                      
- We must continually invest in personal education and training
Q3 Involvement Empowerment Hoe kun je het beste invloed uitoefenen op jou dagindeling en werkzaamheden? Describe the best way to manage your own work?
Q4 Involvement Team Orientation Hoe kun je teamwork het beste stimuleren en verbeteren binnen MARSOF? What is the best way to stimulate teamwork in MARSOF?
Q5 Involvement Capability Development
Rangschik de volgende opleidingen in de mate van belangrijkheid voor jou. 
(Gebruik "1" voor meest belangrijk en "3" voor minst belangrijk. Gebruik elk 
nummer slecht 1 keer)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- Functiegerelateerde opleidingen  (bijv. SF medic als je die functie gaat vervullen)                                                                                                                                                             
- Carriere opleidingen (bijv. de VVO of LMO)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
- Algemene vakopleidingen (bijv. computer cursus of groot rijbewijs)
Please rank the following forms of education in how important they are to you. 
(Using "1" for most important and "3" for least important. Do not give any two items 
the same value)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- Function related education; for instance the medic course for medics                                                                                                                                       
- Career education; for instance the NCO cource                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
- General military education and courses; for instance driving courses.
Q6 Consistency
Core Values                                     
Agreement                                                         
Coord & Integration
Rangschik de volgende statements in de mate van belangrijkheid voor jou. (Gebruik 
"1" voor meest belangrijk en "3" voor minst belangrijk. Gebruik elk nummer slecht 1 
keer)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
- MARSOF personeel moet dezelfde normen en waarden delen.                                                                                                                                                               
- MARSOF personeel moet altijd overeenstemming kunnen bereiken over belangrijke 
zaken                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
- MSO en UIM moeten samenwerken om gezamelijke doelen te bereiken.
Please rank the following statements in how important they are to you. (Using "1" for 
most important and "3" for least important. Do not give any two items the same
value)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- MARSOF personnel share the same set of values  and beliefs.                                                                                                                                                             
- MARSOF personnel need to agree on critical issues.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
- Different sub-units of MARSOF need to work together to achieve common goals
Q7 Consistency Core Values
Van de volgende waarden, welke zijn volgens jou belangrijk voor MARSOF? Kies er 
vier.                                                                                                                                                                                           
- Initiatief - Saamhorigheid - Inventiviteit - Richtlijnen (guidance) - Inbreng - 
Medewerking - Creativiteit - Excelleren - Teamwork - Gelijkheid - Leervermogen - 
Kwaliteit - Eigen verantwoordelijkeheid - Open staan voor anderen - Flexibiliteit - 
Sturing                                                                                                                                                                                            
Of the following values, which ones do you think need to be common within NL 
MARSOF? Choose four                                                                                                                                                                                           
- Initiative - Collectivism - Innovativeness - Rules and Regulations - Empowerment - 
Collaboration - Creativity - Excellence - Teamwork - Equality - Problem Solving - Quality - 
Responsibility - Compliance - Flexibility - Guidance                                                                                                                                                                                            
Q8 Consistency Agreement
Het is noodzakelijk om het over het algemeen met elkaar eens te zijn binnen 
MARSOF? (SD-SA) Leg uit.





Vul de volgende zin in. MSO en UIM moeten _________met elkaar samenwerken.(veel 
minder, minder, hetzelfde, meer, veel meer) Leg uit.
Complete the following sentence. The MSO and the UIM need to work together 
__________. (much less often, less often, as they do now, more often, much more 
often) Please explain.
Q10 Adaptability
Creating Change                                                                        
Customer Focus                                                                                                                     
Organizational Learning                                                    
Rangschik de volgende zinnen in de mate van belangrijkheid voor jou. (Gebruik "1" 
voor meest belangrijk en "3" voor minst belangrijk. Gebruik elk nummer slecht 1 
keer)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
- MARSOF moet zich snel kunnen aanpassen aan de situatie.                                                                                                                                                               
- MARSOF moet doen waar de hogere leiding om vraagt.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
- MARSOF moet innovatie en creativiteit stimuleren.
Please rank the following statements in how important they are to you (Using "1" for 
most important and "3" for least important. Do not give any two items the same 
value)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- NL MARSOF needs to be able to adapt quickly to  changes in the operating 
environment                                                                      
- NL MARSOF needs to fulfi l l high-level organization's requirements                                                                                                                                                                                  
- NL MARSOF needs to stimulate innovation and creativity
Q11 Adaptability Creating Change
Wat is volgens jou de beste manier om het aanpassingsvermogen van MARSOF te 
verbeteren? Met andere woorden, hoe kan MARSOF beter inspringen op nieuwe 
situaties? What is the best way to improve adaptability to new situations?
Q12 Adaptability Customer Focus
Aan wie zijn verzoeken moet MARSOF de meeste prioriteit geven? Rangschik de 
volgende organisaties in mate van prioriteit voor MARSOF 
(Gebruik "1" voor meeste prioriteit en "5" voor minste prioriteit. Gebruik elk 
nummer slechts 1 keer)                                                                                                                                                      
- the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- the Royal Netherlands Navy                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
- the Department of Defense (Joint Special Operations Branch)                                                                                                                    
- NATO SOF Head Quarters                                                                                                                                                                                                              
- the national police service (DSI)
Who's requirements are most important to fulfi l l? Please rank the following 
organizations in how important you think it is for MARSOF to fulfi l l  their 
requirements  (using "1" for the most important and "5" for the least important. Do 
not give any two items the same value)                                                                                                                                                     
- the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps                                                                                                                                                            
- the Royal Netherlands Navy                                                                                                                                                            
- the Department of Defense (Joint Special Operations Branch)                                                                                                                    
- NATO SOF Head Quarters                                                                                                                                                            
- the national police service (DSI)
Q13 Adaptability Organizational Learning Hoe kun je het beste nieuwe ideeen stimuleren binnen de eenheid (MARSOF)? What is the best way to stimulate the development and employment of new ideas?
Q14 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent                                                                                      
Goals & Objectives                                    
Vision
Rangschik de volgende zinnen in de mate van belangrijkheid voor jou. (Gebruik "1" 
voor meest belangrijk en "3" voor minst belangrijk. Gebruik elk nummer slecht 1 
keer)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
- MARSOF moet zichzelf kunnen onderscheiden van andere Nederlandse SOF                                                                                                                                                              
- Al het personeel moet weten wat de taakstell ing van MARSOF is.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
- Al het personeel moet het eens zijn over de taakstell ing van MARSOF.
Ple se rank the following statem nts in how i portant they are to you. (Using "1" for 
most important and "3" for least important. Do not give any two items the same 
value)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- MARSOF needs distinguish itself from other Dutch SOF.                                                       
- Every member needs to know what MARSOF's mission is.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
- There is a shared view amongst the members of what we want to achieve with 
MARSOF.
Q15 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent Wat is de huidige taakstell ing van MARSOF? What is principle task of NL MARSOF?
Q16 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent
Welke van deze twee type taken is volgens jou belangrijker voor MARSOF? 
(Gebruik "1" voor meest belangrijk en "2" voor minst belangrijk. Gebruik elk 
nummer slechts een keer)                                                                                                                                                    
- Nationale taken; bijvoorbeeld CT tbv justitie.                                                                                                                                                                            
- Internationale taken; bijvoorbeeld military assistence in Afrika.
What mission type do you think are more important for MARSOF? Please rank these 
missions in priority for MARSOF (using "1" for the most important and "2" for the 
least important. Do not give any two items the same value)                                                                                                                                                       
- National missions; for instance counter terrorism                                                                                                                                                                       
- International missions; for instance military assistence in Africa
Q17 Mission Goals & Objectives Hoe kan MARSOF zich het beste onderscheiden van andere Nederlandse speciale                                                                                             eenheden?What is the best way in which NL MARSOF can distinguish itself  from other Dutch SOF units?
Q18 Mission Goals & Objectives
Op welk geografische operatiegebied moet MARSOF zich volgens jou richten? 
Rangschik de volgende geografische operatiegbied in prioriteit voor MARSOF. 
(Gebruik "1" voor grootste prioriteit en "4" voor laagste prioriteit. Gebruik elk 
nummer slechts een keer)                                                                                                                                                      
- Land (binnenland)
- Zee 
- Kustgebied (l itoraal) 
- Riviergebieden (binnenland)
What operating environment should MARSOF focus on? Please rank the following 
environments in priority for MARSOF (using "1" for the most important and "4" for 
the least important. Do not give any two items the same value)                                                                                                                                                              
- Land 
- Sea 
- Littoral (Coast l ine) 
- Riverine
Q19 Mission Vision
Wat zou volgens jou de taakstell ing van MARSOF moeten zijn? (Jou persoonlijke 
'ideaal plaatje') What should the principle task be for NL MARSOF?
Q20 Mission Vision
Op welke capaciteiten moet de focus van de  training van MARSOF liggen? 
Rangschik deze capaciteiten in prioriteit voor MARSOF. (Gebruik "1" voor hoogste 
prioriteit en "3" voor laagste prioriteit. Gebruik elk nummer slechts een keer.)                                                                                                                                                                                      
- Military Assistance; het trainen en/of adviseren van lokale (para)militaire 
eenheden.  
- Special Reconnaissance; “eyes on target ” in vijandig, moeili jk begaanbaar, of 
politiek gevoelige gebieden
- Direct Action; raids, hinderlagen, sabotages, opposed boardings, etc.
What capabilities should MARSOF training focus on? Please rank these capabilities 
in priority for MARSOF (using "1" for the most important and "3" for the least 
important. Do not give any two items the same value)                                                                                                               
- Military Assistance; training and/or advising by, with, or through friendly 
indigenous forces 
- Special Reconnaissance; “eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive 
territory 
- Direct Action; raids, direct assaults, and opposed boardings  
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Perception on organization effectiveness (devided in the "Cold Side" and the "Hot Side")
These 10 items are preceeded by the following text:
English: "This final set of questions asks about the performance of NL MARSOF."
"Compared to KCT (Dutch Army SOF), how would you assess your organization's effectiveness in the following areas?"
Dutch: "De volgende reeks vragen gaat over de prestatie van MARSOF."
"Vergeleken met het KCT, hoe schat je de prestaties van MARSOF in op de volgende gebieden?"
Item DV: Operational Effectiveness Indicator English Dutch
Q1 Cold Side  of the Organization GROWTH External Resource Allocation by DoD Aandeel in toegewezen middelen door Defensie
Q2 Cold Side  of the Organization EFFICIENCY Appropriate internal Resource Allocation
Efficiente verdeling van middelen tussen de eenheden 
(UIM en MSO)
Q3 Cold Side  of the Organization INNOVATION New TTP Development Ontwikkeling nieuwe tactiek, techniek, en procedures
Q4 Cold Side  of the Organization LOYALTY Group Loyalty Loyaliteit naar je eenheid
Q5 Cold Side  of the Organization UNIT MEMBERS Unit member Satisfaction Personeelstevredenheid
Q1 Hot Side  of the Organization QUALITY Quality of the Unit's team members Kwaliteit van de teams
Q2 Hot Side  of the Organization QUALITY Quality of the Unit's staf members Kwaliteit van de staf
Q3 Hot Side  of the Organization READINESS The readiness of the unit to conduct its mission De gereedheid om de opgedragen missie uit te voeren
Q4 Hot Side  of the Organization MISSIONS Dutch SOF Mission assignment Aandeel in uitgevoerde Nederlandse SOF operaties
Q5 Hot Side  of the Organization OVERALL Overall Organization Performance Algemene prestaties van de organisatie
Performance Questions
English Dutch
1 = Much Lower than ARMY SOF Veel lager dan KCT
2 = Lower than ARMY SOF Lager dan KCT
3 = The Same as ARMY SOF Hetzelfde als KCT
4 = Higher ARMY SOF Hoger dan KCT
5 = Much Higher than ARMY SOF Veel hoger dan KCT
? = Don't know Weet niet  
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APPENDIX C: DENISON ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE SURVEY 
REPORTS 
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APPENDIX D: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SURVEY 
DATA 
Denison Organizational Culture Survey
Mean and Standard Deviation
Item Trait Index Question (English)
MEAN STDEV
Q1 Involvement Empowerment Most unit members are highly involved in their work. 4.36 0.63
Q2 Involvement Empowerment
Decisions are usually made at the level where the best information is 
available. 3.13 0.82
Q3 Involvement Empowerment
Information is widely shared so that everyone can get the information he or 
she needs when it's needed. 3.14 0.95
Q4 Involvement Empowerment Everyone believes that he or she can have a positive impact. 3.40 0.84
Q5 Involvement Empowerment Planning is ongoing and involves everyone in the process to some degree. 2.90 1.01
Q6 Involvement Team Orientation Cooperation across different units of MARSOF is actively encouraged. 2.63 0.85
Q7 Involvement Team Orientation People work like they are part of a team. 3.17 1.16
Q8 Involvement Team Orientation Teamwork is used to get work done, rather than hierarchy. 3.90 0.79
Q9 Involvement Team Orientation Teams are our primary building blocks. 3.85 0.91
Q10 Involvement Team Orientation
Work is organized so that each person can see the relationship between his job 
and the goals of MARSOF. 2.92 0.88
Q11 Involvement
Capability 
Development Authority is delegated so that people can act on their own. 3.33 0.77
Q12 Involvement
Capability 
Development The ""bench strength"" (capability of people) is constantly improving. 3.37 1.01
Q13 Involvement
Capability 








Development Problems often arise because we do not have the skills necessary to do the job. 2.37 0.92
Q16 Consistency Core Values The leaders ""practice what they preach."" 3.04 0.78
Q17 Consistency Core Values
There is a characteristic leadership style and a distinct set of management 
practices. 2.69 1.01
Q18 Consistency Core Values There is a clear and consistent set of values that governs the way we operate. 3.46 0.78
Q19 Consistency Core Values Ignoring core values will get you in trouble. 3.24 0.81
Q20 Consistency Core Values There is an ethical code that guides our behavior and tells us right from wrong. 3.61 0.83
Q21 Consistency Agreement When disagreements occur, we work hard to achieve ""win-win"" solutions. 2.63 0.93
Q22 Consistency Agreement There is a ""strong"" culture. 2.76 1.18
Q23 Consistency Agreement It is easy to reach consensus, even on difficult issues. 2.55 0.90
Q24 Consistency Agreement We often have trouble reaching agreement on key issues. 3.27 0.71
Q25 Consistency Agreement There is a clear agreement about the right way and the wrong way to do things. 3.08 0.76
Q26 Consistency
Coordination & 
Integration Our approach in operating is very consistent and predictable. 3.08 0.89
Q27 Consistency
Coordination & 
Integration People from different parts of MARSOF share a common perspective. 2.81 0.94
Q28 Consistency
Coordination & 




Working with someone from another sub-unit of MARSOF is like working with 
someone from a different organization. 2.66 0.92
Q30 Consistency
Coordination & 
Integration There is good alignment of goals across levels. 2.78 0.73  
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Q31 Adaptability Creating Change The way things are done is very flexible and easy to change. 3.31 0.90
Q32 Adaptability Creating Change
We respond well to competitors and other changes in the operating 
environment. 3.03 2.80
Q33 Adaptability Creating Change New and improved ways to do work are continually adopted. 3.45 0.85
Q34 Adaptability Creating Change Attempts to create change usually meet with resistance. 3.01 0.91
Q35 Adaptability Creating Change Different parts of MARSOF often cooperate to create change. 2.43 0.65
Q36 Adaptability Customer Focus Marine Corps comments and recommendations often lead to changes. 2.98 0.76
Q37 Adaptability Customer Focus Marine Corps leadership input directly influences our decisions. 3.18 0.82
Q38 Adaptability Customer Focus All members have a deep understanding of Marine Corps wants and needs. 2.45 0.82
Q39 Adaptability Customer Focus The interests of the Marine Corps often get ignored in our decisions. 2.66 0.72
Q40 Adaptability Customer Focus We encourage direct contact with the Marine Corps by our people. 3.04 0.94
Q41 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning We view failure as an opportunity for learning and improvement. 3.79 0.81
Q42 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Innovation and risk taking are encouraged and rewarded. 3.32 0.84
Q43 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Lots of things ""fall between the cracks"". 3.45 0.84
Q44 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning Learning is an important objective in our day-to-day work. 3.72 0.82
Q45 Adaptability
Organizational 
Learning We make certain that the ""right hand knows what the left hand is doing."" 3.20 0.93
Q46 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent There is a long-term purpose and direction for MARSOF. 2.93 1.09
Q47 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent
Our strategy leads other SOF units to change the way they compete in our field 
of expertise 2.89 0.95
Q48 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent There is a clear MARSOF mission that gives meaning and direction to our work. 2.74 0.92
Q49 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent There is a clear MARSOF strategy for the future. 2.51 0.84
Q50 Mission
Strategic Direction & 
Intent Our MARSOF strategic direction is unclear to me. 3.42 0.98
Q51 Mission Goals & Objectives There is widespread agreement about goals. 2.81 0.75
Q52 Mission Goals & Objectives MARSOF Leaders set goals that are ambitious, but realistic. 2.91 0.85
Q53 Mission Goals & Objectives
The leadership has ""gone on record"" about the objectives we are trying to 
meet. 2.91 0.92
Q54 Mission Goals & Objectives We continuously track our progress against our stated goals. 2.92 0.79
Q55 Mission Goals & Objectives People understand what needs to be done for us to succeed in the long run. 3.15 0.92
Q56 Mission Vision We have a shared vision of what MARSOF will be like in the future. 3.11 0.97
Q57 Mission Vision Leaders have a long-term viewpoint. 3.11 0.91
Q58 Mission Vision Short-term thinking often compromises our long-term vision. 3.73 0.81
Q59 Mission Vision Our vision for MARSOF creates excitement and motivation for our employees. 2.79 0.92
Q60 Mission Vision
We are able to meet short-term demands without compromising our long-
term vision. 3.32 0.91  
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APPENDIX E: SOF CORE MISSIONS (NATO DOCTRINE) 
Principal Tasks of Allied Joint Special Operations Forces. In the context of Allied 
joint operations, SOF conduct three principal tasks: SR&S, DA, and MA. (NATO 
AJP 3–5 – Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations Forces) 
I. Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance: SR&S complements 
national and Allied theatre intelligence collection assets and systems by 
obtaining specific, well-defined, and possibly time-sensitive information of 
strategic or operational significance. It may complement other collection methods 
where constraints are imposed by weather, terrain-masking, hostile 
countermeasures or other systems availability. SR&S is a predominately 
HUMINT function that places “eyes on target” in hostile, denied, or politically 
sensitive territory. SOF can provide timely analysis by using their judgement and 
initiative in a way that technical ISTAR cannot. SOF may conduct these tasks 
separately, supported by, or in conjunction with, or in support of other component 
commands. They may use advanced reconnaissance and surveillance 
techniques, equipment, and collection methods, sometimes augmented by the 
employment of indigenous assets. Activities within SR&S include the following: 
(1) Environmental Reconnaissance. These are operations conducted to 
collect and report critical geospatial information including hydrographical, 
geological, geographical, and meteorological information. 
(2) Threat Assessment. Threat assessments should, whenever possible, 
be based on accurate and timely intelligence. SR&S can assist the JFC in 
determining which elements of an adversary force pose a threat to operations 
and the friendly force, what are the adversary’s capabilities for mounting attacks, 
what methods that are likely to be employed in conducting these operations, and 
determining which friendly targets that are likely to be attacked. SR&S also 
provides the option to observe a target and interpret the behaviour of opposing 
forces over an extended time. 
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(3) Target Assessment. These are operations conducted to detect, 
identify, locate, and assess a target to determine the most effective employment 
of weapons. This type of operation might include the assessment of the potential 
effects (to include collateral damage) of engaging the target. 
(4) Post-Strike Reconnaissance. These operations are undertaken for the 
purpose of gathering information for battle damage assessment (BDA) and 
munitions effects assessment (MEA) to measure results of an attack. 
II. Direct Action: These are precise operations that are normally limited in 
scope and duration. They usually incorporate a planned withdrawal from the 
immediate objective area. DA is focused on specific, well-defined targets of 
strategic and operational significance, or in the conduct of decisive tactical 
operations. SOF may conduct these tasks independently, with support from 
conventional forces, or in support of conventional forces. Activities within DA 
include the following: 
(1) Raids, Ambushes, and Direct Assaults. These operations are designed 
to achieve specific, well-defined and often time-sensitive results. They are 
sometimes beyond the effective strike capabilities of conventional force 
elements. Such operations typically involve attacking critical targets, interdicting 
of lines of communications (LOC) or other target systems, capturing designated 
personnel or materiel; or seizing, destroying, or neutralizing adversary facilities or 
capabilities. 
(2) Terminal Guidance Operations. These are actions to identify and 
report the precise location of targets, and to allow non-organic stand-off platforms 
to use their ordnance to effectively engage them. This includes any electronic, 
mechanical, voice or visual communication that provides approaching aircraft or 
weapons additional information regarding a specific location or target. 
(3) Recovery Operations. These are operations conducted to search for, 
locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items 
critical to Alliance security from contested or adversary controlled areas. Special 
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operations recovery missions are characterized by detailed planning, rehearsal, 
and thorough intelligence analysis. These operations employ unconventional 
tactics and techniques, discreet search, and the frequent use of ground combat 
elements. 
(4) Precision Destruction Operations. These are operations in which 
collateral damage must be minimized. Therefore, they use highly sophisticated 
weapons or timed detonation of specific amounts of explosives placed in exact 
locations to accomplish mission objectives. Precision destruction operations can 
be conducted against targets where precision-guided munitions cannot 
guarantee first strike success or when the contents of a facility must be 
destroyed without damage to that facility. 
(5) Opposed Boarding Operations. During maritime interdiction operations 
(MIOs), non-compliance with internationally agreed shipping procedures may 
result in opposed boarding operations of uncooperative maritime vessels or 
platforms. 
(6) Armed Reconnaissance. These are operations that involve locating 
and attacking targets of opportunity such as adversary materiel, personnel, and 
facilities in assigned general areas or along assigned LOC. Armed 
reconnaissance is not conducted for the purpose of attacking specific known 
targets. 
III. Military Assistance: MA is a broad spectrum of measures in support of 
friendly forces throughout the spectrum of conflict. MA can be conducted by, 
with, or through friendly forces that are trained, equipped, supported, or 
employed in varying degrees by SOF. The range of MA is thus considerable, and 
may vary from providing low-level military training or material assistance to the 
active employment of indigenous forces in the conduct of major operations. MA 
activities may include the following: 
(1) Training. These are activities that train host nation (HN) military 
individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, 
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air, and maritime skills, provide advice and assistance to military leaders, and 
provide training on tactics, techniques, and procedures enabling a HN to protect 
itself from threats, and to develop individual, leader, and organizational skills. 
(2) Advising. These are activities that strengthen population security by 
providing active participation in tactical operations conducted by HN military units 
to neutralize and destroy insurgent threats, isolate insurgents from the civil 
population, and protect the civil population. 
IV. Additional Activities of Allied Joint Special Operations Forces: 
a. Support to Counter-Irregular Threat Activities. Counter-terrorism (CT) is 
an overarching umbrella of offensive measures designed to reduce the 
vulnerability of Allied interests, their forces, individuals, and property to terrorism; 
to include counter-force activities and containment by military force and civil 
agencies. COIN operations are those military, paramilitary, political, 
psychological, and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. CT and COIN are 
not the exclusive domain of NATO SOF, but SOF can effectively complement the 
overarching application of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military 
operations applied in a COIN role. An irregular threat, by virtue of its very nature, 
will usually involve NATO SOF conducting CT activities within COIN operations 
across the operational continuum. 
b. Countering Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons. 
Activities designed to secure, interdict, destroy, or assist with the rendering safe 
of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons are inherently 
complex, involve restrictive OPSEC procedures, and generally necessitate the 
employment of specially trained and equipped personnel. In the context of a 
NATO operation, NATO SOF involvement in the interdiction, capture, or securing 
of CBRN weapons, and or associated capabilities or facilities, will generally be 
deferred to the members of the Alliance possessing these specialized 
capabilities. In-extremis, however, where specialized forces cannot be brought to 
bear in sufficient time to prevent the employment of CBRN weapons, or their 
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immediate interdiction is required, the authority to utilize other NATO forces, to 
include NATO SOF, to capture, deter, secure or assist in the process of 
rendering safe CBRN weapons, facilities, and associated enemy forces might be 
sought. 
c. Hostage Release Operations. SOF operating under a NATO mandate 
normally do not undertake deliberate hostage release operations (HROs). 
However, this does not preclude the direct or indirect involvement of NATO SOF 
in certain circumstances. SOF could support the personnel recovery efforts of 
isolated personnel through non-conventional assisted recovery. 
HROs are operations to secure the release of hostages, or other related 
operations that employ similar specialized techniques and training. The general 
term “hostage” can mean anything from a single captive in seclusion, to a large 
group held by armed units or gangs dispersed in multiple locales. HROs can be 
broken down into two categories, deliberate and in-extremis. Deliberate HROs 
are complex multi-agency operations usually with a civil governmental lead. In-
extremis operations may be necessitated when deliberate planning does not 
allow time-sensitive execution and the lives of the hostage(s) are deemed to be 
in imminent peril. They are normally military led, especially when occurring in an 
uncertain, hostile, or denied areas, such as non-combatant evacuation 
operations, and therefore require a military-type force composition. However, 
police forces, if available, may have a supporting role. 
HROs are predominantly as a national responsibility and most countries 
would likely assist the national authorities of the country where the incident has 
occurred in the resolution of any hostage situation involving their own nationals. 
Many nations have contingency plans to deploy a hostage release force. These 
designated hostage release forces may be found within the armed forces, 
national police or other law enforcement agencies. It is unlikely that a nation 
would give operational control (OPCON) of such a force or type of operation to 
NATO. However, NATO SOF (though not all NATO SOF are trained in HROs) 
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may be asked to support the nation concerned or to prepare and conduct an in-
extremis option before the arrival of a more complete or appropriate force. 
d. Faction Liaison. Particularly during NA5CROs, JFCs may need to 
communicate with their counterparts in the local armed forces and various 
paramilitary organizations, civilian factions, and governmental and non-
governmental organizations in the region. This communication may be in the 
form of issuing directions for conducting day-to-day implementation of the terms 
of any agreement that form part of the CJTF mission. Establishing a faction 
liaison office (FLO) may further facilitate this liaison. 
FLOs have become an important tool for the JFC to accomplish the 
mission. During an operation, commanders will find it necessary to bring together 
military and/or political leaders of protagonist factions to negotiate agreements, 
mediate disputes, and to secure the cooperation of all parties. 
On the local level, establishing a FLO can provide a “hot-line” through 
which situations can be quickly defused or negotiations facilitated in a timely 
manner. SOF can provide invaluable support to a FLO in the form of unique 
cultural awareness of local conditions and parties, timely HUMINT gained 
through SR&S within the JOA, and MA support to the parties. 
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APPENDIX F: SOF CORE MISSIONS (US DOCTRINE) 
Special Operations Core Activities (U.S. Joint Pub 3–05 Special 
Operations) 
SOF are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish the 
11 core activities listed in Figure below. The core activities represent the 
collective capabilities of all joint SOF rather than those of any one Service or unit. 
While CF also conduct many of these activities (e.g., FID, SFA, COIN, and CT), 
SOF conduct them using specialized tactics, techniques, and procedures, and to 
unique conditions and standards in a manner that complement CF capabilities. 
Use of SOF with CF creates an additional and unique capability to achieve 
objectives that may not be otherwise attainable. SOF can arrange and package 
their capabilities in combinations to provide DoD options applicable to a broad 
range of strategic and operational challenges. Additionally, SOF can perform 
other activities of a collateral nature such as counterdrug operations and 
noncombatant evacuation operations. SOF also conduct preparation of the 
environment as a type of shaping activity supporting core activities that may be 
conducted in the future. 
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Direct Action. DA entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale 
offensive actions conducted as SO in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive 
environments, and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, 
destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets. DA differs from 
conventional offensive actions in the level of diplomatic or political risk, the 
operational techniques employed, and the degree of discriminate and precise 
use of force to achieve specific objectives. In the conduct of these operations, 
SOF may employ raids, ambushes, or other direct assault tactics (including 
closequarters combat); emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff 
attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance 
for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; conduct anti-ship 
operations, as well as shipboarding and seizure (e.g., maritime interception 
operations). 
(1) Normally limited in scope and duration, DA usually incorporates an 
immediate withdrawal from the planned objective area. These operations can 
provide specific, welldefined, and often time-sensitive results of critical 
significance at the operational and strategic levels of war. 
(2) SOF may conduct DA independently or as part of larger conventional 
or unconventional operation or campaign. Although normally considered close 
combat DA also includes sniping and other standoff attacks by fire delivered or 
directed by SOF. Standoff attacks are preferred when the target can be damaged 
or destroyed without close combat. SOF employ close combat tactics and 
techniques when the mission requires precise or discriminate use of force or the 
recovery or capture of personnel or materiel. 
(3) DA missions may also involve locating, recovering, and restoring to 
friendly control selected persons or materiel that are isolated and threatened in 
sensitive, denied, or contested areas. These missions usually result from 
situations that involve political sensitivity or military criticality of the personnel or 
materiel being recovered from remote or hostile environments. These situations 
may arise from a political change, combat action, chance happening, or 
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mechanical mishap. DA usually differs from personnel recovery by the former’s 
use of dedicated ground combat elements, unconventional techniques, precise 
survivor-related intelligence, and indigenous assistance. 
(4) DA, whether unilateral or combined, are short-duration, discrete 
actions. The SOF command executes DA to achieve the supported commander’s 
objectives. 
Special Reconnaissance (SR). SR entails reconnaissance and 
surveillance actions conducted as SO in hostile, denied, or diplomatically 
sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational 
significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in CF. These 
actions provide an additive collection capability for commanders and supplement 
other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions. SR may include 
collecting information on activities of an actual or potential enemy or securing 
data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a 
particular area. SR may also include assessment of chemical, biological, residual 
nuclear, radiological, or environmental hazards in a denied area. SR includes 
target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance, and may be 
accomplished by air, land, or maritime assets. 
(1) SR complements national and theater intelligence collection assets 
and systems by obtaining specific, well-defined, and time-sensitive information of 
strategic or operational significance. SR may also complement other collection 
methods constrained by weather, terrain-masking, or hostile countermeasures. 
Selected SOF conduct SR when authorized, to place “eyes on target” in hostile, 
denied, or diplomatically sensitive territory. SR typically provides essential 
information to develop a commander’s situational awareness necessary for a 
command decision, follow-on mission, or critical assessment. 
(2) Using SOF for SR enables the JFC to enhance situational awareness 
and facilitate staff planning and execution of joint operations, whether by CF, 
SOF, or integrated CF-SOF elements. However, CF-SOF integration does not 
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mean that SOF will become dedicated reconnaissance assets for CF. Rather, the 
JFC typically tasks SOF through their JSOTF or TSOC to provide SR within a 
joint special operations area (JSOA), and/or the JFC may task SOF on a case-
by-case basis to conduct SR within a CF’s operational area. 
(3) SOF may also employ advanced reconnaissance and surveillance 
sensors and collection methods that utilize indigenous assets. 
Counterproliferation (CP) of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
CP refers to actions taken to defeat the threat and/or use of WMD against the 
United States, our forces, allies, and partners. WMD are chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear weapons capable of a high order of destruction or 
causing mass casualties and exclude the means of transporting or propelling the 
weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part from the weapon. 
The major objectives of combating WMD policy, which include nonproliferation, 
CP, and consequence mitigation activities, are to prevent the acquisition of WMD 
and delivery systems, to stop or roll back proliferation where it has occurred, to 
deter and defeat the use of WMD and their delivery systems, to adapt U.S. 
military forces and planning to operate against the threats posed by WMD and 
their delivery systems, and to mitigate the effects of WMD use. The continued 
spread of WMD technology can foster regional unrest and provide terrorist 
organizations with new and potent weapons. SOF provide the following 
capabilities for this core activity: 
(1) Expertise, materiel and teams to supported combatant command 
 teams to locate, tag, and track WMD, as required. 
(2) Capabilities to conduct DA in limited access areas, as required. 
(3) Build partnership capacity for conducting CP activities. 
(4) Conduct IO and MISO to dissuade adversary reliance on WMD. 
(5) Other specialized capabilities to combat WMD. 
For further information on CP of WMD, refer to JP 3–40, Combating 
Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
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Counterterrorism. Terrorism has evolved over several decades from a 
tactic of inducing fear in select populations to a transnational threat of strategic 
proportions, particularly against the United States, Western societies, and 
emerging democracies perpetuated primarily by groups of violent extremists. 
Today, whether the extremists are local insurgents or members of an 
international terrorist network, they are generally viewed as terrorists if they use 
terrorist tactics. Furthermore, the threat to U.S. interests posed by violent 
extremists will increase as the continued proliferation of WMD presents an 
opportunity for terrorists to acquire and use them. CT is a form of IW. 
(1) CT is defined as actions taken directly against terrorist networks and 
indirectly to influence and render global and regional environments inhospitable 
to terrorist networks. In addition to being a SOF core activity, CT is part of the 
DoD’s broader construct of combating terrorism (CbT), which is actions, including 
antiterrorism and CT, taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat 
continuum. 
(2) The United States Government (USG) policy on CbT is to defeat 
violent extremism and create a global environment that is inhospitable to violent 
extremists. The broad USG strategy is to continue to lead an international effort 
to deny violent extremist networks the resources and functions they need to 
operate and survive. The DoD strategy for CbT implements the following 
objectives from the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, objectives that 
are derived from the National Security Strategy (NSS): 
(a) Thwart or defeat terrorist attacks against the U.S., our PNs, and our 
 interests. 
(b) Attack and disrupt terrorist networks abroad so as to cause 
 adversaries to be incapable or unwilling to attack the U.S. homeland, 
allies,  or interests. 
(c) Deny terrorist networks WMD. 
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(d) Establish conditions that allow PNs to govern their territory effectively 
 and  
(e) Deny a hospitable environment to violent extremists. 
(3) CDRUSSOCOM is responsible for synchronizing planning for global 
operations against terrorist networks, in coordination with other combatant 
commands, the Services and, as directed, appropriate USG agencies. 
(4) Success in the global CT effort requires interorganizational 
coordination to maximize the effectiveness of all the instruments of national 
power of the United States and PNs. USSOCOM, as the integrating command for 
global CT planning efforts, supports a global combating terrorism network 
(GCTN)—a growing network of relationships and liaison partnerships, a 
supporting technical infrastructure, and the use of information sharing policies. 
Along with interagency partners, this network draws upon an increasing number 
of countries, regional organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and the private sector to 
achieve unified action. 
(5) The DoD global campaign plan for the war on terrorism requires 
integration of both the direct and indirect approaches. The ability to manage both 
approaches and harness their synergistic effects is vital to the success of both 
near- and long-term CT objectives, whether within the scope of a theater 
operation/campaign of a GCC, or the global campaign. 
Unconventional Warfare. UW are those activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a 
government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, 
auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. The United States may engage in 
UW across the spectrum of armed conflict from major campaigns to limited 
contingency operations. The U.S. has conducted UW in support of insurgent 
movements attempting to overthrow an adversarial regime as well as in support 
of resistance movements to defeat occupying powers (e.g., the Nicaraguan 
Contras and the Afghan Mujahedeen). UW was also successfully used against 
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the Taliban in the initial stages of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in 
Afghanistan. UW can be an effective way of putting indirect and direct pressure 
on a hostile government or occupying power. 
(1) Military leaders must carefully consider the costs and benefits prior to 
making a recommendation to engage in UW. Properly coordinated and executed 
UW may help set conditions for international crisis resolution on terms favorable 
to the United States or allies without the need for an overt U.S. CF commitment. 
(2) The conduct of UW can have a strategic military-politico utility that can 
alter the balance of power between sovereign states, and there is potentially 
significant political risk both at home and abroad. The paramilitary aspect of UW 
may place DoD in a supporting role to interorganizational partners. The necessity 
to operate with a varying mix of clandestine/covert means and ways places a 
premium on operations security (OPSEC) and all-source intelligence. In UW, as 
in all conflict scenarios, U.S. military forces must closely coordinate their 
activities with interorganizational partners to enable and safeguard sensitive 
operations. 
(3) A JFC typically tasks SOF to conduct the military aspect of UW. It will 
usually require support relationships with some interagency partners and some 
Service components. A JFC and staff must be able to conduct/support UW 
operations simultaneously during both traditional warfare and/or IW. 
(4) While each UW mission is unique, U.S.-sponsored UW generally 
includes seven phases: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-
up, employment, and transition. These phases may occur concurrently in some 
situations or may not be required in others. For example, a large established 
resistance movement may only require initial contact and build up of logistical 
support to begin UW activities, thereby bypassing the other earlier phases of 
preparation, infiltration, and organization. The phases also may occur out of 
sequence, with each receiving varying degrees of emphasis, such as when 
members of an indigenous irregular force are moved to another country to be 
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trained, organized, and equipped before being infiltrated back into the designated 
operational area, either with or without U.S. SOF. 
(5) Senior civilian leaders and JFCs should understand that UW 
operations require time to mature and reach maximum effectiveness, especially 
when all of the insurgent or resistance underground networks have to be 
established.  
Foreign Internal Defense. From the U.S. perspective, FID refers to the 
U.S. activities that support a HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) 
strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, 
terrorism, and other threats to their security, stability, and legitimacy. As shown in 
Figure II-3, characteristics of FID involve the instruments of national power 
(diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) through which elements of that 
power (e.g., financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) can be applied to 
support a HN’s IDAD program. The U.S. FID effort is tailored to the needs of the 
individual nation or region. 
(1) SOF units typically contribute to a FID effort under the OPCON of a 
TSOC commander, conducting FID operations other than combat, and may 
require the participating SOF chain of command to have a direct coordination 
relationship with the chief of mission (COM) or another designee at the 
appropriate U.S. embassy. In smaller FID operations, SOF units may compose 
the majority, if not the entire U.S. force. The opposite may be true in a large-
scale FID operation, where limits on total troop numbers may result in a smaller 
number of SOF personnel than CF. In some cases, long-term FID operations 
may be initiated by SOF, then handed over to CF. 
(2) SOF may conduct FID operations unilaterally in the absence of any 




Security Force Assistance. USG security sector reform (SSR) activities 
focus on the inextricably linked governmental sectors of security and justice. 
DoD’s primary role in SSR is supporting the reform, restructuring, or 
reestablishment of the armed forces and the defense sector, which is 
accomplished through SFA. SFA specifically pertains to those DoD activities that 
contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the 
capacity and capability of foreign security forces (FSF) and their supporting 
institutions. FSF include but are not limited to military forces; police forces; 
border police, coast guard, and customs officials; paramilitary forces; interior and 
intelligence services; forces peculiar to specific nations, states, tribes, or ethnic 
groups; prison, correctional, and penal services; and the government ministries 
or departments responsible for the above services. The U.S. military engages in 
activities to enhance the capabilities and capacities of a PN (or regional security 
organization) by providing training, equipment, advice, and assistance to those 
FSF organized under the equivalent of a national ministry of defense (or an 
equivalent regional military or paramilitary force), while other USG agencies 
focus on those FSF assigned to other ministries such as interior, justice, or 
intelligence services. 
(1) USSOCOM is the designated joint proponent for SFA, with 
responsibility to lead the collaborative development, coordination, and integration 
of the SFA capability across DoD. This includes development of SFA joint 
doctrine; training and education for individuals and units; joint capabilities; joint 
mission essential task lists; and identification of critical individual skills, training, 
and experience. Additionally, in collaboration with the Joint Staff and United 
States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), and in coordination with the 
Services and GCCs, USSOCOM is tasked with developing global joint sourcing 
solutions that recommend the most appropriate forces (CF and/or SOF) for a 
SFA mission. 
(2) SFA includes activities of organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, 
and advising various components of FSF. SOF/CF performing SFA conduct initial 
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assessment of the FSF they will assist and then establish a shared way to 
continue assessing them throughout their development. The HN/PN determines 
the structure of its military forces, to include approving all organizational designs. 
These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, and internal 
organizational designs. 
(3) Conducting successful SFA operations requires an advisor’s mindset 
and dedication to working through or with FSF. The responsible CCDR tasking 
U.S. forces to conduct SFA must emphasize that legitimacy is vital for both the 
U.S. and its partners. 
(4) FID and SFA are similar at the tactical level where advisory skills are 
applicable to both. At operational and strategic levels, both FID and SFA focus 
on preparing FSF to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, terrorism, and 
other internal threats to their security; however, SFA also prepares FSF to 
defend against external threats and to perform as part of an international force. 
Although FID and SFA are both subsets of security cooperation, neither are 
considered subsets of the other. 
Counterinsurgency. COIN refers to the comprehensive civilian and 
military efforts taken to defeat insurgency and to address any core grievances. 
The combat skills, experience, cultural awareness, and language skills of SOF 
allow them to conduct a wide array of missions working through or with HN 
security forces or integrated with U.S. CF, which make them particularly suitable 
for COIN operations or campaigns. 
(1) Operational Approaches. There are three primary operational 
approaches to COIN: direct, indirect, and balanced. The direct approach focuses 
on protecting U.S. and HN interests while attacking the insurgents. The indirect 
approach focuses on establishing conditions (a stable and more secure 
environment) for others to achieve success with the help of the U.S.. The 
balanced approach is a combination of the direct and indirect methods. 
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Commanders adjust their approach as circumstances change, but the 
COIN approach should strive to move from direct to balanced, and ultimately to 
indirect. However, the scale of effort for any approach will vary according to 
operational requirements and overall objectives for the COIN operations or 
campaign. 
(a) Direct. A direct approach may be required where an HN government is 
losing ground in its struggle with an insurgency or there is no viable HN 
government. The first task in this situation is to establish security and control in 
as wide an area and extent as possible. 
(b) Indirect. An indirect approach utilizes more development and 
diplomatic efforts than military efforts to address the insurgency. This approach is 
best suited to early intervention but requires that the HN be viable and viewed as 
legitimate. 
(c) Balanced. The balanced approach is a more even blend of U.S. 
diplomatic, developmental, and military efforts. Military efforts are secondary and 
subordinate to diplomatic and development activities when using this approach. 
(2) SOF Contributions to COIN. The SOF contribution to COIN is critical 
through all approaches. Their role as warfighters in the direct approach 
provide the capabilities for urgent, necessary, and largely lethal activities, often 
with immediate impact—and to create time for the balanced and indirect 
approaches. SOF are well suited for the balanced and indirect approaches as 
combat trainers and advisors as well as warfighters. SOF assistance can 
increase the capability and capacity of HN specialized or irregular units, which 
helps mitigate manpower and leadership problems common among HN forces in 
COIN operations or campaigns. SOF also bring the unique capability to quickly 
adapt their skills with very little additional training to provide decision makers with 
a responsive tool to achieve U.S. national objectives while avoiding the large 
footprint that would accompany CF. CA can provide key development assistance 
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in contested areas. All SOF Service components have capabilities that can 
contribute to a COIN effort. 
Information Operations. IO are the integrated employment, during 
military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines 
of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of 
adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own. When properly 
coordinated, integrated, and synchronized as a part of the overall operation, IO 
affect the quality, content, and availability of information available to decision 
makers. IO also influence the perceptions and motivations of targeted key 
audiences with the goal of convincing them to act in a manner conducive to 
established objectives and desired end states. IO are conducted throughout all 
operational phases, across the range of military operations, and at every level of 
war. 
(1) IO play a key role in the successful accomplishment of SO missions 
and promote other SOF core activities. For example, electronic warfare (EW) and 
computer network operations (CNO) disrupt adversary communications and 
networks while protecting our own fundamental conditions for successful SO 
missions. Similarly, OPSEC denies the adversary information needed to correctly 
assess SOF capabilities and intentions. MISO, a vital component of IO and a key 
SOF activity, can be employed to optimize the psychological impacts (positive or 
negative) of other SO activities (e.g., CT or COIN) on a variety of target 
audiences (TAs) and undermine an adversary’s will to fight. Military deception 
(MILDEC) deliberately misleads adversary decision makers as to friendly military 
capabilities, intentions, and operations. When interwoven with EW and CNO, 
MILDEC can drive an adversary to take specific actions (or not take action), 
ultimately contributing to the efficacy of SOF activities (e.g., DA). 
(2) In a similar fashion, other SOF activities complement IO and provide 
assistance toward the accomplishment of strategic and operational IO-related 
objectives. For example, SR and DA may identify, observe, target, disrupt, 
capture, or destroy specific capabilities tied to an adversary’s C2 (i.e., decision 
 255 
making) processes. Further, successful FID, UW, COIN, and SFA can have a 
significant psychological impact on an adversary’s morale or deliver a detrimental 
blow to the adversary’s ability to recruit and finance operations. SOF may also 
play a key role in MILDEC by replicating the tactical impact of a much larger 
force presence. 
(3) SOF leaders and staffs must integrate IO throughout all phases of an 
operation to protect critical capabilities and information, reduce overall risk to the 
mission and forces, and increase the prospect of mission success. The role of 
the IO planner is to coordinate, integrate, deconflict, and synchronize IO, and the 
supporting and related capabilities, whether CF- or SOF-provided, in accordance 
with the commander’s objectives and selected courses of action (COAs). 
Likewise, the IO cell within the SOF headquarters (HQ) performs the critical 
function of optimizing the combined effects of SO activities and IO within the 
information environment; as related to stated SOF objectives, as well as larger 
operational and strategic end states. 
(4) USSOCOM plays a broader, integrating role for IO in support of SOF 
across the combatant commands. As directed by the Unified Command Plan, 
USSOCOM integrates and coordinates DoD MISO capabilities to enhance 
interoperability, and supports United States Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM) with its IO responsibilities and other CCDRs with MISO 
planning and execution. Additionally, USSOCOM supports the strategic and 
operational planning, oversight, and execution of IO and provides IO functional 
expertise and leadership by assisting in the development of policy, doctrine, 
future force plans, as well as conducting oversight/coordination of IO 
requirements for SOF. This includes development, education, joint IO training, 
experimentation, and advanced technology initiatives. 
Military Information Support Operations. MISO are planned operations 
to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence 
their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of 
foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of 
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MISO is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the 
originator’s objectives. 
(1) MISO should be integrated during all phases of operations/campaigns, 
with both SOF and CF. Effective MISO require the commander’s emphasis and 
active involvement. SO MISO forces and staff planners support the commander 
by integrating MISO throughout the operation. MISO are executed within 
carefully reviewed and approved programs and under mission-tailored approval 
guidelines that flow from national-level authorities. 
(2) MISO planners follow a deliberate but responsive process that aligns 
commander’s objectives with a thorough analysis of the environment; select 
relevant TAs; develop focused, culturally and environmentally tuned messages 
and actions; employ sophisticated media delivery means and produce 
observable, measurable behavioral response. However, MISO is most successful 
when fully synchronized and integrated with complementary actions by the larger 
joint force and other USG capabilities. The U.S. military message must be 
congruent with U.S. military actions if TAs are to be persuaded by MISO to 
modify short-term attitudes and perceptions and long-term behavior. 
(3) Effective MISO are continuously planned and conducted across the 
range of military operations and throughout all phases of operations. In 
peacetime and limited crises response operations, MISO forces and activities are 
usually planned and coordinated through the TSOC. In permissive or uncertain 
environments not involving combat operations, MISO activities are planned and 
integrated with other operations and with other USG efforts to further national 
defense strategies through the GCC’s theater campaign plan. In major 
contingencies, the JFC may establish a separate JSOTF known as the joint 
military information support operations task force (JMISOTF) to conduct MISO. 
(4) MISO may be employed within the U.S. under limited circumstances. 
During natural disasters or national security crises, MISO forces may deploy civil 
authority information support elements (CAISEs) supporting the designated lead 
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federal agency to support civil authorities. SOF and CF MISO specialists, as part 
of CAISEs, may provide MISO for civil support (i.e., defense support of civil 
authorities) following natural disasters or other major crises. 
(a) When authorized for employment in this manner, MISO forces inform 
rather than influence by utilizing their media development, production, and 
dissemination capabilities to deliver administrative and command information to 
populations in the operational area. Messages typically include information such 
as the location of relief sites, how to obtain essential services, disease prevention 
tips, current civil authority instructions, and similar messages. MISO 
dissemination assets such as radio broadcast systems, print production, and 
loudspeaker teams also can augment civilian commercial broadcast capabilities. 
(b) All CAISE efforts are coordinated with ongoing military and lead federal 
agency public affairs (PA) activities as required. 
(5) MISO play a key role in SO and in relation to each of the other SOF 
core activities; particularly in irregular conflicts that focus on ideological and 
social-political dimensions such as FID, COIN, CT, and UW. For example, MISO 
military information support teams may deploy to support approved COIN 
operations, demining, or foreign humanitarian assistance programs under either 
JFC or U.S. diplomatic control. MISO staff planners and supporting MISO units 
provide the detailed planning and execution to reduce operational risk, enlist the 
aid of key populations, and optimize the impact of SO on the achievement of 
command objectives and USG policy. 
(6) USSOCOM retains the preponderance of active duty MISO forces 
under United States Army Special Operations Command. USSOCOM also gains 
Air RC MISO forces through Air Force Special Operations Command when those 
Air National Guard assets are mobilized. To provide a strategic level MISO 
capability, USSOCOM established the Joint Military Information Support 
Command (JMISC), a joint subordinate command to serve as a key contributor in 
DoD’s ongoing efforts to erode adversary power, will, and influence. JMISC 
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plans, coordinates, integrates, and manages the execution of transregional 
information programs to achieve operational, strategic, and national goals and 
objectives. USSOCOM is the designated DoD proponent for MISO with the 
responsibility of coordinating the collaborative development and integration of 
DoD MISO. 
Civil Affairs Operations. CAO are operations conducted by CA forces 
that enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in 
localities where military forces are present. This requires coordination with 
OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private 
sector. It involves application of CA functional specialty skills that are normally 
the responsibility of civil government to enhance planned CMO. All CMO must be 
synchronized and support the commander’s intent and operational concept. All 
CA core tasks support the JFC’s CMO objectives. 
(1) CAO performed in support of SO are characterized by actions 
conducted by small CA teams or elements generally without the support of larger 
military formations, in isolated, austere, and in many cases politically-sensitive 
environments. Such CAO are unique and require flexibility and ingenuity from CA 
teams. Successful employment requires planning and support from the CA staff 
at the supported TSOC. Additionally, these operations require a greater level of 
planning and coordination with multiple civilian and military partners for 
decentralized execution. 
(2) CA personnel, leaders, and forces receive advanced skills training 
specific to CAO. CA teams are trained to identify critical (civil) vulnerabilities, 
conduct civil reconnaissance, engage HN and interagency counterparts, create 
country or region specific supporting plans, develop a series of activities to 
ensure unity of effort to achieve JFC and TSOC objectives, oversee projects, and 
eventually close activities and actions with assessments and targeting 
refinement. CA team members should be organized, trained, and prepared to 
serve as the senior SOF representative in countries with a limited SOF footprint. 
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(3) CAO consist of those actions taken to coordinate with HN military and 
civilian agencies, OGAs, NGOs, or IGOs, in order to support U.S. policy or the 
military commander’s assigned mission. CA core tasks include: 
(a) Populace and resources control, 
(b) Foreign humanitarian assistance, 
(c) Nation assistance, 
(d) Support to civil administrations, and 
(e) Civil information management. 
(4) CAO are conducted by CA forces organized, trained, and equipped to 
provide specialized support to commanders conducting CMO. Commanders 
having responsibility for an operational area typically will also have responsibility 
for the civilian populace therein. Commanders conduct CMO to establish, 
maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civilian 
authorities (governmental and nongovernmental) and the civilian populace in a 
permissive or hostile operational environment to facilitate military operations and 
to consolidate operational objectives. CA forces may assist in performance of 
activities and functions by military forces that are normally the responsibility of 
local government. CMO may be conducted before or during military operations 
and especially during stability operations. 
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